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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, through his parents/guardians Barbara and Daren 
Jensen, BARBARA JENSEN, individually, and DAREN JENSEN, individually, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
KARI CUNNINGHAM, RICHARD ANDERSON, LARS M. WAGNER, 
KAREN H. ALBRITTON, and SUSAN EISENMAN, in their respective 
individual capacities. 
Defendants-Appellees. 
STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER BRIEF 
State Defendants/Appellees Kari Cunningham, Richard Anderson, and 
Susan Eisenman respectfully submit this answer brief. 
Jurisdictional Statement 
This Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah 
Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(j) (West Supp. 2008). 
Issues Presented 
1. Issue Preclusion/Law of the Case 
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues decided by a prior, final 
judgment. Law of the case, in turn, contemplates the temiination of issues when 
they arise again in the same case. In this action removed to federal court, Judge 
Ted Stewart dismissed Plaintiffs' federal claims, finding Defendants Cunningham 
and Eisenman absolutely immune; and finding that Defendants Cunningham and 
Anderson violated no constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the federal court's final 
order precluded it from relitigating the issues underlying Plaintiffs' dismissed 
federal claims? 
Standard of Review 
Whether issue preclusion bars this action presents a question of law that this 
Court reviews for correctness. Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 
93, % 17, 16 P.3d 1214. Next, whether a trial court correctly interpreted a prior 
judicial decision constitutes a questions of law, also reviewed for correctness. 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, % 56, 82 P.3d 1076. 
2. No Broader State Constitutional Rights. 
Plaintiffs sued State Defendants for violations of Plaintiffs' inherent state 
constitutional rights. The federal court dismissed Plaintiffs' similar claims under 
the United States Constitution. Because Plaintiffs failed to establish under the 
unique posture of this case that the Utah Constitution afforded them broader 
constitutional protections, did the trial court err when it awarded State Defendants 
summary judgment? 
2 
Standard of Review 
Interpretation of the state constitution presents a question of law reviewed 
de novo with no deference to the trial court. Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, % 5, 
184P.3d592. 
3. No Flagrant Violation 
An individual government employee is not liable for money damages under 
the state constitution unless a plaintiff establishes that he suffered a flagrant 
violation of a constitutional right. Plaintiffs must show that State Defendants 
violated Plaintiffs' "clearly established" constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known. If Plaintiffs' allegations establish violations of the 
Utah Constitution, were those violations flagrant? 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for this issue is the same as set out for issue two 
above. 
Preservation of Issues 
State Defendants raised these issues in their motions for summary judgment 
and supporting memoranda. R.947-1082, 1086-1129. The district court's final 
order granting those motions is attached as Addendum A. R. 4199-4210. 
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions 
Article I of the Utah Constitution is attached as Addendum B. Sections 1, 
7, and 14 being determinative. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs sued State Defendants, among others, for damages allegedly 
suffered when the Division of Child & Family Services instituted action in Utah's 
juvenile court to promote the best interests of PJ., a pediatric cancer patient. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On July 18, 2005, Plaintiffs sued State Defendants and others in Utah's 
Third District Court for violations of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, and for the 
common law torts of wrongful initiation of process and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. R.l-70. The action was removed to federal court. R. 106-08. 
There, State Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, with supporting 
memoranda that Plaintiffs opposed. U.S. District Judge Ted Stewart dismissed 
Plaintiffs' federal claims and remanded their state claims to state court. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment and Remanding 
State Law Claims (D & O), 2008 WL 4372933 (D. Utah, Sept. 22, 2008), attached 
as Addendum C. Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, where 
the case is pending. 
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On remand, State Defendants again filed motions for summary judgment that 
Plaintiffs opposed. R. 947-1082, 1086-1129, 1271 \ The trial court granted each 
motion, and Plaintiffs timely appealed. R 4199-4210, 4211 -4213. 
Statement of the Facts 
Plaintiffs take their facts from the Statement of Additional Facts that Plaintiffs 
filed in the state court.2 See R. 1130-1270. Conversely, State Defendants draw 
their facts largely from the federal court's preclusive determination of the material 
and undisputed facts.3 See Oman v. Davis Sch. DisL, 2008 UT 70, U 31, 194 P.3d 
165,965. 
1
 The record index provides that Plaintiffs' Consolidated Memorandum is 
contained at pp. 1271-3826. But the record contains only the caption page of that 
memo. R. 1271. The remaining pages contain exhibits that Plaintiffs submitted 
below. R. 1272-3826. State Defendants attach a copy of that memorandum at 
Addendum D and submits a Stipulated Motion to Supplement the Record. 
2
 Plaintiffs filed a consolidated statement of additional facts in the district 
court. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). State Defendants responded in detail to those 
additional facts, many of which are misstated or unsupported. Those responses are 
set out in full at R. 3843-3885; 3893-3917; 4006-4189. 
3
 Rule 7 mandates that "[a] memorandum opposing summary judgment 
shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted . . . ," id. at. 7(c)(3)(B), and deems admitted each fact set forth in a 
moving party's memorandum "unless controverted by the responding party." Id. at 
7(c)(3)(A). Plaintiffs offered no dispute to Defendants Eisenman's and 
Anderson's verbatim restatement of facts that Judge Stewart recognized as 
material and undisputed in the federal court proceedings. Compare R. 956-974; 
1093-1102 with R. 1272-1286; 1451-1476. Those facts are thus deemed admitted 
and this Court should strike Plaintiffs' assertions here that lack conformity with the 
federal court's determination. Utah R.Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). 
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On April 30, 2003, 12-year-old P.J. had a small growth removed from the floor 
of his mouth by an oral surgeon named Dr. Christensen. Dr. Christensen sent the 
excised tissue to Laboratory Corporation of America in Kent, Washington for 
analysis. LabCorp determined that the sample was malignant and informed Dr. 
Christensen, who referred P.J. to Dr. Harlan Muntz at Primary Children's Medical 
Center (PCMC). [R. 515 (Doctors^ Ex 5, Christensen Dep. pp 10, 12-16, 20-21, 
24-26); R. 3285-3286, May 9, 2003 LabCorp Path. Rep.]. 
The Jensens met with Dr. Muntz on May 9, 2003. After examining PJ., Dr. 
Muntz referred him to PCMC's oncology department where he met with Dr. Lars 
Wagner. Dr. Wagner also met with and examined P.J. on May 9, but could not 
offer any diagnosis until after PCMC's pathology department completed its own 
testing. [R. 6 Comp. U 24; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 15, PCMC Chart Notes pp 1-3); 
(Doctors' Ex 16, Wagner note p 5); R. 2335-2336, D. Jensen Dep.]. 
At PCMC's request, LabCorp sent P.J.'s tissue sample to PCMC's pathology 
department. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Amy Lowichik completed a pathology report 
on P.J.'s tissue and diagnosed the growth as Ewing's sarcoma based on 
immunohistochemical staining and the tumor cells' appearance. Dr. Lowichik's 
report indicated that P.J.'s "case was reviewed by [fellow pathologist] [Dr. Cheryl 
Coffin] who concurs in this interpretation." Deposition testimony indicates that 
both pathologists reviewed the testing and were confident in the diagnosis. Dr. 
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Lowichik estimated her confidence in the diagnosis to be "in the high 90 percent." 
Dr. Coffin was also confident that the tumor was Ewing's sarcoma, and testified 
that the diagnosis was rendered with near certainty. [R. 3292-3293, PCMC Path. 
Rep.; R. 2794-2795, 2804, Dr. Lowichik Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 3, Dr. 
Lowichik Dep. pp 67-68); (Doctors' Ex 2, Dr. Coffin Dep. pp 12-14, 148)]. 
In addition to immunohistochemical staining, Ewing's Sarcoma may be 
diagnosed tlirough cytogenetic and molecular testing. Ewing's cells often manifest 
a chromosomal translocation (an "11; 22 translocation"), which may be detected 
through those tests. The presence of an 11;22 translocation indicates that a 
specimen is Ewing's sarcoma. Cytogenetic testing may be performed only on 
fresh or frozen tissue. Where a tissue sample is placed in formalin or paraffin, 
cytogenetic testing is not possible. Although not optimal, molecular testing can be 
performed on tissue samples that have been placed in formalin or paraffin. [R. 
3292-3293, PCMC Path. Rep.; R. 3206-3207, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 2668, Dr. 
Johnston Dep.]. 
In 2003, PCMC would commonly attempt to conduct cytogenetic testing on 
sarcoma tissue samples that were excised at PCMC where "there was adequate 
sample left over after the standard pathology examination." Molecular testing was 
available through an affiliated institution. In 2003, it would not have been unusual 
for a PCMC pathologist to send samples out for molecular testing to provide 
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further diagnostic information. [R. 3167-3168, 3170, 3208, 3210-3211, Dr. 
Wagner Dep.; R. 2730-2733, Dr. Lemons Dep.; R. 1759-1760, Dr. Coffin Dep.; R. 
1500, Dr. Albritton Dep.]. 
Because Dr. Christensen placed the tissue in formalin or paraffin, cytogenetic 
testing could not be performed on that specimen. There were still tumor cells in 
P.J.'s mouth, which could have been extracted for this purpose, but this would 
have required further surgery to obtain a sample. In contrast, molecular testing 
could have been performed on the tissue sample obtained by Dr. Christensen. [R. 
1754-1755, Dr. Coffin Dep.; R. 3163-3164, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 2704, Dr. 
Johnston Dep.]. 
Dr. Wagner discussed P.J.'s diagnosis with Dr. Coffin. She told him that she 
was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. According 
to Dr. Coffin, where the cell appearance and immunohistochemical staining fit 
"the criteria for the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma," it is not necessary to perform 
cytogenetic or molecular testing to establish the diagnosis. [R. 3164-3165, 3175-
3177, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 2, Dr. Coffin Dep. pp 43-44), 
(Doctors' Ex 17, Dr. Wagner Case Summary p 1); R. 1798, Dr. Coffin Dep.]. 
On May 21, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens for more than an hour. Dr. 
Wagner expressed his confidence in the diagnosis and explained the need to begin 
chemotherapy right away. Dr. Wagner further explained the difference between 
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localized and non-localized Ewing's sarcoma. Specifically, Dr. Wagner informed 
the Jensens that the cure rate for localized disease - where there is no evidence of 
cancer in places other than where it was discovered - was approximately 70% 
when treated with the recommended chemotherapy, but that the cure rate for non-
localized - metastatic - disease was as low as 20%. Thus, Dr. Wagner explained 
the necessity of beginning treatment right away to prevent the cancer from 
spreading throughout P.J.'s body. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner Case Summ. 
pp 1-2), (Doctors' Ex 23, Wagner Aff. pp 1-2, and ffi| 4, 6-7), (Doctors' Ex 11, D. 
Jensen Dep. pp 47-57, 138-140), (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. p 142), 
(Doctors' Ex 16, Wagner note p 7); R. 3382, PCMC Chart Notes; R. 3607-3609, 
Wagner Affj. 
That same day, radiographic examinations were performed on P.J.'s neck, 
thorax, chest, and skull to determine whether the cancer had spread beyond the 
floor of P.J.'s mouth. Each exam was negative. Ms. Jensen testified that they 
asked Dr. Wagner "if there was any other test he could run to help confirm that it 
was Ewing's and he said no." "He was sure it was Ewing's." [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 
1, PCMC Lab Reports pp 6-12), (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. p 127), (Doctors' 
Ex 15, PCMC Chart Notes pp 4-8), R. 2154-2155, B. Jensen Dep]. 
During that visit, the Jensens asked Dr. Wagner to have P.J/s tissue sample 
sent to the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute at Harvard University for a second 
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opinion. Dr. Wagner informed the Jensens that insurance companies often would 
not pay for a second opinion and encouraged them to contact their insurance 
provider. Nonetheless, Dr. Wagner agreed to the second opinion and sent the 
tissue to Dana-Farber as requested. The Jensens ultimately cancelled the Dana-
Farber consultation. 
[R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 34, 64-70); (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen 
Dep. pp 96-97); (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner Case Summ. p 2)]. 
The Jensens again met with Dr. Wagner on May 29, 2003. At this meeting they 
asked Dr. Wagner to order a Positron Emission Tomography ("PET") scan. Dr. 
Wagner refused to order a PET scan, explaining that it would not be useful in 
P.J.'s situation because there was no evidence of metastatic disease. Dr. Wagner 
further explained to the Jensens that a negative PET scan would not change the 
need for chemotherapy. The Jensens again asked Dr. Wagner if there were other 
tests to confirm the Ewing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner said "no." [R. 3395, PCMC 
Chart Notes; R. 3218-3219, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. (515 Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen 
Dep. pp 95-96, 103-104, 120-121)]. 
By early June 2003, the Jensens and Dr. Wagner differed significantly in their 
views regarding P.J.'s medical care. Accordingly, a meeting between the Jensens, 
Dr. Wagner, Dr. Richard Lemons (head of the oncology department), a PCMC 
social worker, and PCMC's head of quality assurance was scheduled for June 9, at 
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PCMC. Dr. Wagner again emphasized the need to begin treating P.J. with 
chemotherapy right away in order to prevent the cancer from spreading. The 
Jensens' statements during this meeting are disputed. The Jensens contend that 
they refused to consent to the proposed chemotherapy based on their desire for 
further confirmatory tests. Dr. Wagner contends that they refused chemotherapy 
because they wanted to pursue an alternative treatment called Insulin Potentiation 
Therapy. Regardless, the parties were unable to resolve the impasse. During the 
meeting, the PCMC head of quality assurance told the Jensens that a referral to the 
Division Child and Family Services (DCFS) might be necessary. The Jensens left 
the meeting, telling the PCMC representative, "You're fired." [R. 515 (Doctors' 
Ex 4, Dr. Wagner Dep. pp 148-149), (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner Case Summ.); ( 
Doctors'Ex 8, Dr. Lemons Dep. pp 91, 94-95, 106, 113-114, 123-125); R. 2761-
2762, Lemons Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 15, Social Worker Notes p 16), (Doctors' 
Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 178-183), (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. pp 118-119, 
136-148)]. 
At some point, Dr. Corwin of Safe and Healthy Families - a division of PCMC 
responsible for ensuring that patients are not left untreated - became involved in 
P.J.'s case. Around June 12, Dr. Corwin attempted to make contact with the 
Jensens. Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen had a lengthy telephone conversation on June 
15, but were unable to reach an agreement as to P.J.'s medical care. Dr. Corwin 
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and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to schedule a further meeting to discuss 
the situation. At that point, PCMC decided to refer P.J.'s case to DCFS for 
medical neglect in refusing what the doctors believed was medically necessary 
treatment. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 15, PCMC Chart Notes pp 17, 19-20), (Doctors' 
Ex 29, Dr. Corwin Dep. pp 52-53, 55-56, 60-61, 73, 76, 79-80, 90-91, 113-115, 
119-120, 165), (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. p 215); R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex J, 
Dr. Corwin Dep. pp 70, 117); R. 2424-2429, 2438, 2639, D. Jensen Dep.] 
On June 16, a regularly-scheduled meeting was held at PCMC with 
representatives from DCFS, PCMC, and other community organizations in the 
child welfare system. Dr. Wagner and Dr. Corwin were also present. At this 
meeting, and in a case summary submitted to DCFS, Dr. Wagner summarized his 
interactions with the Jensens. A formal referral to DCFS was made that same day. 
The parties dispute whether it was Dr. Corwin or Dr. Wagner who actually 
submitted the referral. For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the district 
court presumed the latter. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 17. Wagner Case Summary); 
(Doctors' Ex 29, Dr. Corwin Dep. p 165); R. 1075 (Cunningham Ex A, 
Cunningham Dep. pp 90-93, 114-117)]. 
DCFS assigned P.J.'s case to Ms. Cunningham, a DCFS social worker. Drs. 
Wagner and Corwin provided Cunningham with information regarding their 
understanding of P.J.'s situation, both orally and in written case summaries. 
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Cunningham was also present at the June 16 meeting at PCMC. Based on 
communications with Dr. Wagner, Cunningham believed that P.J.'s situation 
constituted a medical emergency and that something needed to be done within a 
matter of hours or days. Cunningham possessed no information that additional 
tests existed that could confirm P J. 's diagnosis. And Dr. Wagner reported to 
Cunningham that he had talked to Dr. Coffin, who believed that no further tests 
were required. [R. 1075 (Cunningham Ex A, Cunningham Dep. pp 74-81, 114-
117, 150-155, 162-165); R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex K, Cunningham Dep. p 110, 112-
113); R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner's Case Summary); R. 3407-3411, Wagner 
email to Cunningham]. 
On June 18, 2003, Cunningham, through Assistant Attorney General (AAG) 
Julie Lund, filed a Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and 
Guardianship (Verified Petition) in the Third District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Cunningham filed this petition on the information provided to her 
by Drs. Wagner and Corwin. She did not conduct an independent investigation of 
PCMC's referral or into whether P.J., in fact, had Ewing's sarcoma. But 
Cunningham believed that P.J.'s case was an emergency and also that she was 
entitled to rely on PCMC's diagnosis and Dr. Wagner's medical opinion. [R. 1075 
(Cunningham Ex A, Cunningham Dep. pp 147-148, 150-151, 153-154); R. 3435-
3446; Juv. Ct. Pldg, Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and 
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Guardianship]. 
Cunningham vacillated about whether she should contact the Jensens directly. 
But she ultimately decided not to contact P.J. or his parents, because they obtained 
counsel before the CPS case opened. Id. Cunningham also believed that because 
P.J.'s case constituted and emergency, DCFS policy precluded her from contacting 
the Jensens until after the Verified Petition had been filed. [R. 1075 (Cunningham 
Ex A, Cunningham Dep. pp 158-161); R. 3431-3432, DCFS Medical Neglect 
Policy; R. 3711-3712, DCFS Activity Records]. 
On June 20, the Jensens first appeared before the juvenile court. Eisenman 
represented DCFS in place of Ms. Lund and became the primary AAG on P.J.'s 
case. [R. 1011 Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 6-9, 14-17]. 
At the June 20 hearing, the Jensens' attorney, Frank Mylar, represented that 
they were interested in obtaining further tests of the tissue sample excised by Dr. 
Christensen. The Court continued the hearing until July 10, as the parties indicated 
that a stipulation regarding P.J.'s treatment was possible. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex 
B, Eisenman Dep. pp 38-41, 106-109, 115-117); R 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-A, Juv. 
Ct. Trans., generally and pp 7-9); R. 3454-3455, Juv. Ct. Pldg., Pre-Trial Order]. 
Around this time, the Jensens sought out Dr. Jorg Birkmayer, who practiced in 
Vienna, Austria. After reviewing P.J.'s medical records, Dr. Birkmayer indicated 
to the Jensens that he was not "totally convinced" that P.J. had Ewing's Sarcoma 
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or that chemotherapy was necessary. [R. 3530, Birkmayer letter] 
After the June 20 hearing, the Jensens expressed their desire to have Dr. 
Birkmayer supervise P.J.'s treatment, and on or about June 30, Mylar provided 
Eisenman and P.J.'s then Guardian ad Litem (GAL) attorney with a copy of a June 
23, 2003 letter from Dr. Birkmayer. On July 2, Eisenman sent an email to Dr. 
Birkmayer in which she asked questions regarding, among other things, Dr. 
Birkmayer's qualifications and licensure and whether Austria had a standard of 
care similar to that used by the American Academy of Pediatrics.4 Dr. Birkmayer 
forwarded Eisenman's email to Mylar, who contacted Eisenman and instructed her 
not to contact Dr. Birkmayer directly, but to direct inquires regarding Dr. 
Birkmayer to Mylar. According to Mr. Jensen, the Jensens abandoned their desire 
to have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. at that time because DCFS was requiring that 
P.J.'s medical care be provided by a board-certified pediatric oncologist. [R. 1011 
(Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 118-121, 125-133); R. 3529, Birkmayer letter 
to Eisenman; R. 3530, Birkmayer email to D. Jensen; R. 3535, Eisenman email to 
Birkmayer; R. 2451, 2571-2572, D. Jensen Dep]. 
Also in late June 2003, Dr. Wagner left Utah to pursue a new job in Ohio. He 
4
 The Jensens attempt to construe those guidelines and to suggest that 
Eisenman came upon the guidelines through independent research. The record 
does not support those claims. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 118-
121, 126-129); R. 3232, Wagner Dep.]. 
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informed Eisenman that he was leaving and that she could contact Dr. Lemons or 
Dr. Karen Albritton if she needed anything. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman 
Dep. pp 54-55, 149-150); (Eisenman Ex O, p 2)]. 
In preparation for the July 10 hearing, Eisenman filed a bench brief and 
disclosed to the juvenile court and counsel that she intended to prove DCFS's case 
using three medical experts: Drs. Coffin, Wagner, and Albritton. Eisenman 
provided the court and counsel with a copy of Drs. Coffin's, Wagner's, and 
Albritton's CVs and with the PCMC lab results and Dr. Wagner's case summary. 
Also in preparation for that hearing, Eisenman provided Dr. Albritton with 
materials related to the case, including Dr. Wagner's case summary and a list of 
questions that might be asked. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex O, Email from Dr. Wagner 
to Eisenman); R. 3150, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 1490-1491, Dr. Albritton Dep.; R. 
515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldgs., Witness List at 46-48); (Notice of Intent to 
Use Experts at 49-52); (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner's Case Sum.); (Doctors' Ex 33-B, 
Juv. Ct. Trans., July 10, 2003)]. 
The Jensens were represented by Mylar and attorney Blake Nakamura at the 
July 10 hearing. At the outset, Mylar objected to the introduction of testimony 
because he believed the hearing was set for a pre-trial conference and not an 
evidentiary hearing. The juvenile court sustained the objection and Drs. Albritton 
and Coffin did not testify. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Reds, Nakamura 
Notice of Appearance at 178-179; Objection to Pre-Trial Disclosures at 220-222; 
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Juv. Ct. Minutes at 227-228; Juv. Ct. Pre-Trial Order at 229-233)]. 
The Jensens again raised the issue of whether P.J. really had Ewing's sarcoma. 
And at the hearing's outset, the Jensens submitted a second letter from Dr. 
Birkmayer, dated July 9, 2003. But neither the Jensens nor their counsel requested 
leave of the court to have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. Instead, after a short recess, the 
parties stipulated that P.J. would be examined by doctors at the Children's Hospital 
of Los Angeles (CHLA) and that the Jensens would abide by CHLA's treatment 
recommendations. The juvenile court set another pretrial conference for July 28, 
2003. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex X, Birkmayer letter to Eisenman); R 515 (Doctors' 
Ex 33-B, Juv. Ct. Trans., July 10, 2003), (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Records, Juv. 
Ct. Pre-Trial Order at 229-233)]. 
Per the stipulation, the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where P.J. met with 
Dr. Tishler on July 21. At this meeting, Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he 
was recommending chemotherapy based on prior pathology tests, but that CHLA 
would do its own pathology analysis and genetic testing to confirm the Ewing's 
sarcoma diagnosis. The Jensens were unhappy with this result because they 
believed that Dr. Tishler was not performing an independent evaluation, but was 
merely deferring to the PCMC doctors. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 41, Dr. Tishler Dep. 
p 25); R. 3088-3089, 3096-3099, Dr. Tishler Dep; R. 2499-2500, D. Jensen Dep.; 
R 2179, 2234, 2254, B. Jensen Dep.]. 
Based on this dissatisfaction, the Jensens never returned to CHLA, but sought 
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medical care from Dr. Charles Simone, a New Jersey physician. Dr. Simone 
initially agreed to treat P.J., but on learning of the legal battle in which the Jensens 
were entrenched, Dr. Simone declined involvement. Nonetheless, the Jensens 
believed that Dr. Simone would still agree to treat P. J., if the juvenile court would 
permit it. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 42, Dr. Simone Dep. pp 11-15, 24-25, 41); 
(Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 315-323, 974-975); (Doctors' Ex 41, Tishler 
Dep. pp 60-61); (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. p 491); R. 3616, Tishler email to 
Eisenman; R. 2188-2189, 2243, 2246, B. Jensen Dep]. 
On July 28, the court received a report from Dr. Tishler, via telephone, 
regarding P.J.'s evaluation at CHLA. Dr. Tishler indicated that to his knowledge 
the CHLA testing was not yet complete. But he also stated that there was no 
question that P.J. had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy right 
away and that the remaining pathological and radiologicial tests would serve only 
to clarify what type of tumor he had for purposes of tailoring the chemotherapy to 
P.J.'s needs. Nakamura advocated the Jensens' concern that not all of the testing 
had been completed. Nonetheless, based on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the juvenile 
court ordered that P.J. commence chemotherapy before August 8, 2003, without 
regard to the CHLA test results. The court also provided that should the test 
results indicate that chemotherapy was not needed, the Jensens were free to bring 
that fact to the juvenile court's attention. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-C, Juv. Ct. 
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Trans, July 28, 2003, generally and at 17-18, 23-24, 41-42); R. 3481-3484, Juv. Ct. 
Pldg., Order for Treatment]. 
Nakamura also represented, on July 28, that the Jensens were uncomfortable 
with Dr. Tishler and preferred that P.J. be treated by Dr. Simone. The court asked 
Dr. Albritton whether Dr. Simone could be the primary treating physician: 
No, we wouldn't make him the primary oncologist. My understanding, in 
fact, is that he is not board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical 
oncology. He's - from what little I know, he's a specialist in 
complimentary and alternative medicine. So the gist I get is that he would 
be asking someone in Utah or in L.A. to be prescribing the chemotherapy 
and then he would be suggesting the complimentary approaches that might 
diminish side effects and so on. I do not think there will be an oncologist in 
Utah or L.A. who would let him prescribe the chemotherapy from New 
Jersey. 
[R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep p 978); (Doctors' Ex 33-C, Juv. Ct. Trans, 
July 28, 2003 at 50-51)]. 
The juvenile court also asked Dr. Tishler whether P.J.'s primary treating 
physician needed to be a board certified oncologist: "Definitely. There's no other 
physician that could lead the care and provide the care." Based on this, the 
juvenile court ordered that P.J.'s primary treating physician be a board certified 
pediatric oncologist or hematologist, but that Dr. Simone was authorized to work 
with P.J.'s other treating physicians. The court also scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing on the Verified Petition for August 20, 2003, in the event P.J.'s situation 
was not yet resolved. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-C, Juv. Ct. Trans, July 28, 2003 at 
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53-54); (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg., Signed Minute Entry at 234-235)]. 
The Jensens maintain that prior to July 10, Eisenman advocated that P.J. 
receive treatment only from a board-certified physician. The transcripts from the 
June 20 and July 10 court hearings contain no evidence that Eisenman took that 
position. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-A, Juv. Ct. Trans, June 20, 2003); (Doctors' Ex 
33-B Juv. Ct. Trans, July 10, 2003)]. It was attorneys Mylar and Nakamura who 
first discussed P.J. being treated by a board-certified physician on July 10. [R. 515 
(Doctors' Ex 33-B Juv. Ct. Trans, July 10, 2003 at 6)]. Eisenman did insist that 
P.J. receive treatment from a board-certified pediatric oncologist after the juvenile 
court made that part of its July 28 order. 
The Jensens never returned to CHLA or PCMC to receive the ordered 
chemotherapy. Instead, around August 6, they contacted the Burzynski Clinic in 
Houston, Texas to inquire whether P.J. could be treated there. A clinic employee 
contacted the Jensens on August 7 to indicate that the clinic would see PJ. and 
scheduled an appointment for August 12. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. 
pp 424-425); (Doctors' Ex 51, Burzyinski Clinic Intake Sheet p 1); R. 2248-2249, 
2264, B. Jensen Dep.]. 
The Jensens apparently believed that they did not have to comply with the 
juvenile court's order to begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003, and that this 
would result only in that court holding the August 20, evidentiary hearing on the 
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Verified Petition. Thus, on August 8, the Jensens took P. J. and the rest of their 
children to Bear Lake in Idaho to go boating. From Idaho, they planned to travel 
to Houston for P.J. to be evaluated in the Burzyinski Clinic on August 12. [R. 
2466-2467, 2518-2522, 2534, 2541, D. Jensen Dep.]. 
Having not received confirmation that PJ. 's chemotherapy was underway, 
Eisenman sought a hearing with the juvenile court on August 8, 2003, for the 
purpose of seeking authorization to take P.J. into protective custody. Eisenman 
called Nakamura to notify him of her intentions. The court heard directly from 
Eisenman, Cunningham, and P.J.'s GAL, and from Nakamura, who participated 
by telephone. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 198-201, 218-229), 
(Eisenman Ex Q, Nakamura Dep. pp 444-445); R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 55, McDonald 
Dep. pp 49-50, 223-225); (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Reds., Order for Treatment at 
237-240); (Doctors' Ex 10, Application for a Warrant with Aff at 241-251); 
(Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Minutes of 8/13/03 at 297-298); (Doctors' Ex 33-D, Juv. 
Ct. 8/13/03 Phone Conference Trans, at 192-209); (Doctors' Ex 34, Nakamura 
Dep. pp 101-106, 115, 244-245, 446); (Doctors' Ex 28, Dr. Albritton Dep. pp 109-
113)]. 
Nakamura indicated that PJ. was not receiving chemotherapy, that the Jensens 
did not want to initiate chemotherapy, and that they were taking P.J. to the 
Burzynski Clinic for evaluation. In response, Cunningham paged Dr. Albritton, 
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who joined the hearing by phone. The court and counsel asked Dr. Albritton 
whether the Burzynski Clinic was qualified to treat P.J. Dr. Albritton indicated 
that Dr. Burzynski was not a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his 
clinic was known for providing extremely controversial therapy. Dr. Albritton 
further indicated that she was unaware of any pediatric oncologists at the clinic, 
but would have to confirm that fact. Finally, Dr. Albritton testified that to her 
understanding, the clinic was not an appropriate treatment option for a newly-
diagnosed cancer patient who had not exhausted standard treatment options. [R. 
515 (Doctors' Ex 28, Dr. Albritton Dep. pp 109-113), (Doctors' Ex 55, McDonald 
Dep. pp 223-225), (Doctors' Ex 33-D, Juv. Ct. Trans., 8/13/2003); (Doctors' Ex 
34, Nakamura Dep. pp 101-106, 115); R 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 
201-205,219-220,225-226)]. 
Eisenman filed an Application to Take a Child Into Protective Custody, which 
was supported by Cunningham's August 8, 2003 affidavit, and the attached 
affidavit of Dr. Wagner, dated July 22, 2003. The juvenile court then signed an 
order authorizing DCFS to take P.J. into protective custody, finding that was in his 
best interest. Eisenman enlisted the help of Sandy City Police Officer, Travis 
Peterson, whom she had contacted earlier that day to serve the court's order, but he 
was unable to do so because the Jensens had already left for Bear Lake. [R. 515 
(Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg, Application & Aff.'s pp 241-251; Order to Take 
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Child Into Protective Custody pp 253-254); R. 2020-2021, Eisenman Dep.; R. 
3642-3643, Sandy City PD Red], 
After the hearing, a court clerk told Eisenman and the GAL that a juvenile court 
warrant would not be placed on a national database, which required an adult 
warrant. Thereafter, Eisenman told the Jensens' counsel and the GAL that if the 
Jensens failed to cooperate with the juvenile court orders, she would have to seek 
assistance from local and federal enforcement authorities. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10, 
Juv. Ct. Reds., Guardian ad Litem Motion for OSC pp 259-298); (Doctors' Ex 33 
D, Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03 pp 192-209); R. 2904, McDonald Dep.; R. 3728-3729, 
Eisenman 8/11/03 letter]. 
Nakamura informed the Jensens of the court's "pickup order" and of the fact 
P.J. was to be placed in DCFS' legal custody to begin chemotherapy. Despite this, 
the Jensens decided to stay in Idaho and seek an independent opinion of P.J.'s 
condition in preparation for the August 20 evidentiary hearing. [R. 2529-2531 & 
2535-2539, D. Jensen Dep.; R. 2273, B. Jensen Dep.; R. 3013-3014, Nakamura 
Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-D, 8/13/03 Juv. Ct. Trans)]. 
On August 11, the GAL and Eisenman co-authored a letter to the Burzynski 
Clinic, notifying it that the juvenile court had placed PJ. in State's legal custody 
and stating that the State did not consent to P.J. receiving treatment there. And on 
August 13, P.J.'s GAL filed a motion for an order to show cause. The juvenile 
court held a hearing the same day. [R. 3732, McDonald/Eisenman letter; R. 2011-
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2014, Eisenman Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Reds., GAL Motion for 
OSC pp 259-298); (Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03)]. 
Nakamura informed the court that he had made telephone contact with the 
Jensens, and that he had advised them of the court's August 8 order and told them 
to comply. Eisenman notified the court and counsel that the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney's (DA) Office planned to screen the matter for criminal charges. 
The juvenile court then issued bench warrants for Daren and Barbara Jensens' 
arrest and ordered them to appear and to present P.J. Id. [R. 515 (Dr.s Ex 10, Juv. 
Ct. Reds, 8/13/03 Juv. Ct. Min. pp 297-298), (Doctors' Ex 33-D, 8/13/03 Juv. Ct. 
Trans, pp 192-209)]. 
On August 15, 2003 and based, in part, on information provided by Eisenman to 
Officer Peterson, the DA's Office held a criminal case screening that Eisenman, 
Cunningham, and the GAL attended. Eisenman provided the DDA with a copy of 
the juvenile court's August 8 custody order and told the DDA that Eisenman was 
most concerned with getting P.J. into treatment. The same day, a Deputy DA filed 
one count each of custodial interference and child kidnaping against Daren and 
Barbara Jensen. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 230-237); (Eisenman 
Ex T, Micklos Dep. pp 36-38, 84-86); R. 3744, 3774-3781, SL DA File; R. 3658-
3661, SCPD File; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-D, Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03 p 12)]. 
Utah's child kidnaping statute does not require that a person "flee" with a minor 
child, but states that a person commits child kidnaping if he or she "intentionally or 
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knowingly, without authority at law, and by any means and in any manner, seizes, 
confines, detains, or transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent of 
the victim's . . . guardian . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (West 2004). 
The DDA's understanding that Parents left the state after the warrant was 
entered came from her conversations with law enforcement. [R. 1011 (Eisenman 
Ex T, Micklos Dep. pp 37-38); R. 974, Eisenman SOUF % 40]. 
On August 16, Mr. Jensen was arrested in Idaho, where he spent four days in 
jail before making bail. Ms. Jensen left Idaho and took P.J. to Houston to meet 
with the Burzynski Clinic. But the clinic refused to see P.J. because Eisenman and 
the GAL had informed it that the State of Utah had legal custody over P.J. and did 
not consent to his treatment there. [R. 2534, 2569, D. Jensen Dep.; R. 2206-2207 & 
2320, B. Jensen Dep.; R. 3732, McDonald letter to Burzynski Clinic]. 
On August 20, the juvenile court held a non-evidentiary hearing. Nakamura 
read a letter authored by Mr. Jensen into the record and explained to the court that 
the Jensens wanted an opportunity to present evidence. The court agreed to set an 
evidentiary hearing, but refused to lift the warrants. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-E, Juv. 
Ct. Trans, 8/20/03); (Doctors' Ex 48, D. Jensen letter to Yeates pp 1-4)] . 
Shortly after this hearing, Eisenman assumed a new position in the AG's office 
and no longer participated in P.J.'s case. Mark May, then Division Chief of the 
AG's Child Protection Division, assumed primary responsibility for the Jensen 
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matter. [R. 2028-2029, Eisenman Dep.]. 
Also at this time, a representative of Utah's governor asked Anderson, DCFS' 
then-Director and who had only recently learned of PJ.'s case, to personally assist 
in negotiating a resolution to PJ. 's case. On August 27, Anderson flew to Idaho to 
meet with the Jensens, where negotiations continued for several days. [R. 1129 
(Anderson Ex B, Ex 1, Anderson Dep. pp 65, 67, 72-73, 84-86, 101-104); R. 515 
(Doctors' Ex 33-E, Juv. Ct. Trans, 8/20/03)]. 
By this date, the juvenile court had orders in place: (1) directing P.J. to 
commence chemotherapy and to be treated by a board-certified pediatric 
oncologist/hematologist; (2) placing P. J. in the state of Utah's legal custody for 
purposes of commencing that treatment; and (3) authorizing the arrest of PJ.'s 
parents for their violation of the juvenile court's prior court orders. [R. 1075 
(Cunningham Ex O, D. Jensen Warrant & OSC); (Cunningham Ex P, B. Jensen 
Warrant & OSC pp); R. 3735-3736, Juv. Ct. 7/28/03 Minutes; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 
33-D, Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03)]. 
When asked by then Governor Leavitt to resolve the situation between the 
Jensens and DCFS, Anderson also reviewed DCFS policies relative to medical 
neglect. And though not asked to do so, Anderson reviewed Cunningham's 
handling of PJ.'s case - including her failure to independently investigate 
PCMC'S referral before seeking court action - to determine whether it complied 
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with DCFS policy for addressing medical neglect in an emergency. Anderson 
believed that it did. [R. 1129 (Anderson Ex B, Ex 1, Anderson Dep pp 39, 43, 53, 
62, 125, 232, 234)]. Relevant DCFS Policy provides that "[i]n cases where the 
consequence of the parents' failure to follow treatment may be death or significant 
permanent physical or mental damages, the worker will take steps to initiate 
emergency court proceedings by contacting the [AAG] immediately and will not 
attempt to resolve the situation through voluntary services alone." [R. 3431-3432, 
DCFS Medical Neglect Policy]. 
When asked by the governor to intervene in the Jensen matter, Anderson's goal 
was to help the Jensens assemble a plan to present to the juvenile court that would 
meet both PJ.,'s needs and the court's prior orders. Anderson told the Jensens that 
he did not believe they were neglecting the situation, but that he also believed that 
they needed to get a treatment plan in place that was in P.J.'s best interest before 
the matter could be resolved. Anderson also believed that although the Jensens 
were addressing P.J.'s situation, they could still be guilty of medical neglect by 
failing to provide P.J. with standard treatment that was designed to maximize P.J.'s 
chances for survival. [R. 1129 (Anderson Ex B, Ex 1, Anderson Dep. pp 72-73, 87-
88); R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 801, 809-810)]. 
Accordingly, on September 5, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby the 
Jensens agreed to submit P.J. to the care of Dr. Martin Johnston, a board certified 
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pediatric oncologist at St. Luke's Hospital in Boise, Idaho and to abide by Dr. 
Johnston's treatment recommendations. DCFS, in turn, agreed to ask the juvenile 
court to return full custody of P.J. to the Jensens and to vacate the warrants. Upon 
receiving assurances from the Jensens that they would submit P.J. to chemotherapy 
if it was recommended, the juvenile court approved the stipulation. [R. 515 
(Doctors' Ex 33-H, Juv. Ct. Trans. 9/5/03), (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg., 
Stipulated Agreement pp 375-378), (Doctors' Ex 10, Minute Entry p 374), 
(Doctors' Ex 10, Order pp 379-381)]. 
Dr. Johnston performed the evaluation and concluded that P.J. needed 
chemotherapy. The Jensens refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy and claimed 
Dr. Johnston had rubber-stamped PCMC's diagnosis. Mr. Jensen told Dr. Johnston 
that if P.J. did receive chemotherapy at St. Luke's, he would "make sure it's a 
hellish experience for everybody involved." [R. 3807-3810, Johnston 9/26/03 letter; 
R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 389, 697-698, 700-702), (Doctors' Ex 
14, B. Jensen Dep. pp 349, 354, 451-454)]. 
The juvenile court held another hearing on October 8, where Dr. Johnston 
testified and confirmed that P.J. had Ewing's sarcoma and that the Jensens had 
rejected his recommendation that P.J. undergo chemotherapy. AAG Mark May 
indicated the parties would attempt to reach a settlement. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-
J, Juv. Ct. Trans., 10/8/03, generally and at 6-10, 78); R. 2029, Eisenman Dep. p 
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242]. 
But having determined that the Jensens would not submit P.J. to chemotherapy 
under any circumstances, DCFS filed a Motion to Dismiss the Verified Petition on 
October 22, 2003. There, DCFS stated that its decision to dismiss the petition was 
made with full recognition that without chemotherapy, P.J.'s chances of survival 
would fall dramatically. Nonetheless, DCFS concluded that it was simply 
unworkable to attempt to force a 13 -year-old boy to undergo chemotherapy 
unwillingly. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg., Motion & Memo to Dismiss 
Verified Petition pp 438-455)]. 
On October 2, the Jensens entered a plea agreement on the criminal charges. 
The Jensens each pled guilty to one count of custodial interference. In exchange, 
the DA's Office dismissed the kidnaping charges. The Jensens' pleas were held in 
abeyance for one year and were later dismissed. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen 
Dep. pp 733-735) (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. p 591)]. Neither entered an 
Alford plea. [R. 1011 Eisenman (Ex V, D. Jensen Plea in Abeyance reds pp 6, 8-12; 
B. Jensen Plea in Abeyance reds pp 15-23; Ct Minutes pp 24-25), (Ex W 10/2/03 
Plea Hearing Trans.)]. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); State v. 
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1993). 
Daren Jensen testified on deposition in 2007 that the facts alleged in the 
criminal information and probable cause statement were true. [515 (Doctors' Ex 11, 
D. Jensen Dep pp 733-735)]. And Barbara Jensen agreed that she interfered with 
29 
the State's custody of P.J. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep., p 591)]. 
Summary of the Argument 
The trial court correctly granted State Defendants' motions for summary 
judgment because Plaintiffs' similar claims under the U.S. Constitution were fully 
and fairly litigated and were dismissed as a matter of law in the United States 
District Court. That decision is sound and should be affirmed by this Court 
because, as a threshold matter, all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred alternatively by 
the doctrines of issue preclusion or law of the case. Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot 
establish that they possess greater constitutional rights under Utah's Constitution 
than under the U.S. Constitution; thus their claims are unfounded in law. And were 
this not the case, State Defendants should nonetheless prevail because Plaintiffs 
cannot demonstrate a "flagrant" violation of their rights. Finally, Plaintiffs failed to 
adequately raise or to brief any claims against Defendant Eisenman or to support 
their common law claims on appeal. For this reason alone, the trial court's 
dismissal of Defendant Eisenman and of Plaintiff s tort claims should be affirmed. 
State Defendants therefore ask this Court to affirm the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' state law claims. But to the 
extent the Court may determine that Plaintiffs possess broader constitutional rights 
as a matter of state law and that the federal court's issue determinations are not 
binding here, the Court should remand this matter to the state court for further 
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consideration of the facts and record evidence adduced below in the first instance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF LAW OF 
THE CASE BAR RELITIGATION OF THE ISSUES 
UNDERLYING PLAINTIFFS' STATE LAW CLAIMS. 
Utah law recognizes two interrelated doctrines regarding the finality of judgments: 
res judicata and the law of the case. See Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, 194 
P.3d 956; IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & KMgmL, Inc., 2008 UT 73, 196 P.3d 588. 
Res judicata, in turn, embraces issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Oman, 2008 UT 
70, T) 28. Only issue preclusion pertains here.5 
Issue preclusion and law of the case are kindred concepts designed to limit the 
relitigation of issues. Traditionally, law of the case contemplates the termination of 
issues when they arise again in the same case, see D & KMgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, % 
26, and issue preclusion contemplates the termination of issues when they arise in 
subsequent, related litigation. See Oman, 2008 UT 70, fflj 28, 31. But this is not a 
traditional case. Instead, given its unique procedural posture, this Court can affirm the 
5
 Plaintiffs" dismissed federal claims were predicated on the U.S. 
Constitution. Their dismissed state claims rest upon the Utah Constitution and 
state common law torts. Because those claims differ, issue, not claim preclusion 
applies. See Oman, 2008 UT 70, |^ 31 (issue preclusion properly bars relitigation 
of issues that have been finally determined, even where the claims for relief may 
differ) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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trial court's summary judgment, alternatively, under either concept.6 
A. The Federal Court Determined All of the Issues Underlying Plaintiffs' State 
Law Claims. 
Plaintiffs filed suit in Utah's Third District Court for violations of the state and 
federal constitutions and other common law torts. R. 1-70. All of the defendants 
removed the case under federal question jurisdiction. R. 106-08. There, the State 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' 
claims. The federal court determined the material facts were not in dispute and that 
State Defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. That court 
dismissed Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims and remanded the state claims to state court. 
Plaintiffs timely appealed the federal court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
On remand, the district court determined that because Judge Stewart conclusively 
found that no disputed issues of material fact existed on the same evidence and 
arguments, it was bound by the federal court's determination. Judge Stewart's issue 
determinations bear repeating here: 
Defendant Eisenman. Plaintiffs sued Eisenman for alleged "non-prosecutorial 
functions" relative to P.J.'s case, including investigative and complaining witness 
functions. R. 4, CompL ^ 15. In both federal and state court, Plaintiffs alleged that (1) 
6
 This Court may affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
State Defendants on any ground apparent from the record. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 
UT 58, ffif 10, 13,52 P.3d 1158. 
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Eisenman made factual misrepresentations or omissions to the state juvenile court, to 
her clients and co-counsel, and to a deputy district attorney, Add,. D, Consol. Memo, 
pp 43-51; and (2) Eisenman engaged in other, investigative functions. Id. at pp. 74, 78. 
But in the prior litigation, Judge Stewart concluded that all of Eisenman's conduct fell 
squarely within her role as the state's attorney and that she was absolutely immune 
from suit. Add. C, D & O, 2008 WL 4372933 at * 12-13. 
Judge Stewart determined that "[e]ven assuming that Ms. Eisenman intentionally 
misrepresented facts to the Juvenile Court, those misrepresentations were made in her 
role as an advocate. There is no evidence that any of the alleged misrepresentations 
were made under oath or as a witness." Id. at *12; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 
14-26. He found that Eisenman's relationship with Cunningham and Anderson was 
that of attorney-client and that her relationship with AG Shurtleff was as co-counsel. 
Judge Stewart concluded that Eisenman's "communications with th[o]se persons were 
all directly related to the Juvenile Court proceedings," D & O at *12, and held that 
even assuming the alleged misrepresentations, the communications were "directly 
related to [Eisenman's] ability to present the State's case, [and] satisfied] the guiding 
principle of prosecutorial immunity - proximity to the 'judicial process and the 
initiation and presentation of the state's case.'" Id. (quoting Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 
897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
The federal court also recognized that though Eisenman provided information to the 
DDA, she did so to effectuate the juvenile court's order of protective custody: "It is 
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clear to this Court that th[o]se actions were intimately connected to her duties to the 
Juvenile Court." D & O at * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra pp. 23-25. The court 
reached the same conclusion respecting a letter Eisenman co-authored with P.J.'s GAL 
and sent to the Burzynski Clinic. D & O at * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 23-
24. 
Finally, Judge Stewart examined the actions that Plaintiffs describe as investigatory. 
Respecting Dr. Albritton, the court notably observed that Plaintiffs failed to "show how 
providing documents to a witness in the course of preparing for a hearing is 
investigative." D & O * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 16. And as to the letter 
to Dr. Birkmayer, Judge Stewart determined that even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs, the alleged facts precluded even an inference that Eisenman 
obtained and forwarded an errant standard of care "through her own investigative 
efforts." D & O * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp.15. 
Because the federal court determined the threshold issue of Eisenman's absolute 
immunity in prior litigation, the district court correctly estopped Plaintiffs from 
relitigating that issue. The district's court decision is sound and should be affirmed. 
Defendant Cunningham. Next, Plaintiffs complain that Cunningham violated 
their state and federal constitutional rights by: (1) initiating a child welfare proceeding 
without first independently investigating P.J.'s diagnosis and Dr. Wagner's report of 
medical neglect, Add. D, Consol. Memo, pp. 51-55; (2) making material 
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misrepresentations and omissions in the verified petition7 and affidavits she filed with 
the juvenile court, id. at pp. 56-58; and (3) acting as a complaining witness with respect 
to criminal charges filed by a deputy district attorney. Id. at p. 78. Judge Stewart 
ruled in Cunningham's favor on each issue. D&O, 2008 WL 4372933 at ** 21-24, 
26-30. 
Judge Stewart found "[t]he Jensens have produced no evidence that Ms. 
Cunningham had reason to suspect that the information and opinions given to her by 
Drs. Wagner and Corwin were misleading." Id. at * 21; see Statement of Facts, supra, 
pp. 12-13. The court also determined Cunningham reasonably believed that P.J.'s case 
constituted an emergency and that as such, she "was reasonable in relying on the 
information provided to her by the doctors, even in the absence of further 
investigation/' D & O * 22 (citing Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 
1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
The federal court analyzed Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and 
omissions, and found that "[a]ssuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the 
misrepresentations . . . do not establish a constitutional violation," id. at * 23, and that 
"[t]he alleged misrepresentations and omissions were of little, if any, consequence." 
7
 Judge Stewart also determined that Cunningham functioned as a 
prosecutor and was thus entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to file the 
Verified Petition in the juvenile court. Add. C, D & 0, 2008 WL 4372933, *14 . 
Plaintiffs' have not addressed that finding here and any argument that they may 
have made below is waived. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^  23, 16 P.3d 540. 
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Id; see R. 3918-29 (Add 2 to Cunningham's Reply in Supt of MSJ). 
Judge Stewart found that two of the allegations "were not misrepresentations or 
omissions at all, as demonstrated by the [July 28] hearing transcript itself," D & O * 
23; see Statement of Fact, supra, pp. 18-20; R. 3918-29, and that when viewed in their 
proper context, the remaining misrepresentations were not germane to the issues then 
before the juvenile court and thus "were plainly immaterial." D & O at * 23. Instead, 
the federal court noted the allegations amounted to nothing more than "nitpicking". Id. 
at * 26. Respecting the alleged misrepresentations and omissions, Judge Stewart 
concluded 
. . . Cunningham instituted process before a State court of competent 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of medical neglect against [Plaintiffs]. 
In this proceeding, [Plaintiffs'] fundamental rights to direct the custody, 
care, and control of their son were carefully balanced by a neutral judge. 
There is simply insufficient evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately 
misrepresented or omitted material facts to the Juvenile Court. 
Id at * 24; see also * 26. 
That Court also addressed and rejected Plaintiffs' claim that they possessed a 
separate liberty interest in Utah's child welfare statutes. D & O at * 27. And, finally, 
Judge Stewart determined that upon the undisputed evidence that Cunningham neither 
initiated nor continued the criminal action against the Plaintiff parents. Id. at * 29; see 
Statement of Facts, supra, p. 24. 
Defendant Anderson. Plaintiffs complained that Defendant Anderson violated 
their state and federal constitutional rights by (1) interfering with the Plaintiff parents' 
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ability to take P.J. to a physician of their choice, Add. D., Consol. Memo, pp. 59-63; 
(2) refusing to immediately dismiss the juvenile court action, id. at p. 63; (3) failing to 
disclose information to the juvenile court, id. at pp. 63-64; and (4) failing to properly 
train or supervise Defendant Cunningham. Id. at pp.58-9; 65-66. But Judge Stewart 
addressed and then rejected each, discrete issue. Add. C , D & O, 2008 WL 4372933 
at ** 24-27. 
Specifically, he found that Anderson's involvement in P.J.'s case did not begin until 
late August 2003 and was limited to negotiating a resolve to the case between the state 
and the Plaintiff parents. Id. * 24; see Statement of Facts, supra, p 26-27. The Court 
determined that by the time Anderson became involved, the juvenile court previously 
had already "ordered P.J. to begin chemotherapy administered by a board-certified 
pediatric oncologist by August 8, 2003," D & O *24, and had placed P.J. in the state's 
protective custody because the Plaintiff parents had, by then, missed that deadline. Id.; 
see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 26. Judge Stewart found that Anderson's position 
that P.J. be treated by a board-certified pediatric oncologist was in accord with both the 
juvenile court's orders and the opinion of Dr. Tishler, a physician whom Parents self-
selected. D & O * 24; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 18-20, 26-27. Judge Stewart 
thus determined that Anderson's conduct was "narrowly tailored to serve the State's 
compelling interest in protecting P.J." Id.; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 27-28. 
Judge Stewart next observed Anderson's remark that Plaintiffs were "great 
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parents," but found that comment did not infer that Anderson believed Plaintiffs had 
not medically neglected PJ. D & O at * 25; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 26-27. 
The court remarked, instead, that when viewed in context in which Anderson made this 
statement, it "in no way interfered with [Plaintiffs'] right to familial association or to 
[Parents'] right to direct P.J.'s care. D & O at * 25. 
Judge Stewart also underscored that Plaintiffs did "not direct[] the Court to 
evidence that Mr. Anderson knew the Juvenile Court was unaware of the possibility of 
genetic testing or that genetic tests were 'definitive.'" Id. "Moreover," that court 
observed, Plaintiffs "repeatedly stated their desire for further testing during the 
Juvenile Court proceedings." Id. Finally, Judge Stewart found that Plaintiffs had 
adduced no evidence that Anderson understood that if Dr. Johnston diagnosed P.J. 
before genetic testing was complete that that breached the September 5 stipulation or 
resulted in a violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights because, as the court observed: 
"[Plaintiffs] refused to follow Dr. Johnston's treatment recommendations, which lead 
to DCFS's decision to dismiss the case shortly thereafter. The only action taken by the 
Juvenile Court subsequent to Dr. Johnston's recommendation was to dismiss the case." 
Id.; Statement of Fact, supra, pp. 28-29. 
Judge Stewart then rejected Plaintiffs' claim that Anderson failed to train and 
supervise Defendant Cunningham, finding that (1) Plaintiffs brought no evidence to the 
Court's attention that could show, if true, that Anderson acted with "deliberate 
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indifference" to the rights of others in failing to train Ms. Cunningham; and (2) 
Plaintiffs failed to establish that Cunningham's conduct violated their constitutional 
rights, a prerequisite to Anderson's liability as a matter of law. D & O * 26 (citations 
omitted); see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 26-27.. 
Finally, Judge Stewart observed that Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim also 
failed, because Plaintiffs' provided no evidence that DCFS possessed a policy of not 
investigating medical neglect referrals received from PCMC physicians and that the 
evidence Plaintiff did possess failed to support even the inference of such a policy. Id. 
* 27; see Statement of Facts, supra, 26-27. But the court found instead, that even if 
Plaintiffs had provided such evidence, it would merely indicate that DCFS policy 
permitted a caseworker to initiate an action, without further investigation when the 
caseworker possessed objectively reasonable evidence that the case constituted an 
emergency. Id. 
B. Issue Preclusion Bars Plaintiffs' Claims. 
Issue preclusion provides that a court's final decision on an issue actually litigated 
and necessarily decided in a previous suit is conclusive on that issue in subsequent 
litigation. Oman, 2008 UT 70, fflf 31-32 ("The issue was squarely before the federal 
court, was litigated by the parties, and was necessary to the court's final judgment on 
the § 1983 claim"); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The 
doctrine is more than a court management tool, but is intended to relieve parties of the 
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cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage 
reliance on adjudication. Id. at ^ 28. 
Issue preclusion applies when: 
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the 
action in question, (2) the prior action has been fully adjudicated on the 
merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or 
in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against 
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the prior action. 
Barrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations and emphasis 
omitted); see Oman, 2008 UT 70, ^  28 n.5 (federal law applies to determine preclusive 
effect of federal court decision on a subsequent state court proceeding). Each element 
is satisfied. 
First, the federal court's Decision and Order represents a final adjudication on the 
merits of Plaintiffs' federal claims and of the issues underlying those claims.8 Next, 
the parties are identical in each action. Third, the prior summary judgment proceedings 
afforded Plaintiffs a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues at controversy here. 
And, the determinative issues decided by Judge Stewart are identical with the 
8
 Plaintiffs take exception with that assertion. But Plaintiffs confuse issue 
preclusion with claim preclusion. The federal court did not adjudicate Plaintiffs' 
state law claims) the court remanded them. But where Plaintiffs' state claims 
embody the same facts and dispositive issues that the federal court determined by a 
final order, issue preclusion applies. Oman, 2008 UT 70, % 31. 
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determinative issues presented here. See supra, pp 32-39.9 
Despite this, Plaintiffs contend that issue preclusion does not apply to bar 
relitigation of issues decided within the same case. To support this claim, Plaintiffs 
rely on inapposite case law and dicta, that this Court can distinguish and disregard. See 
Appnt. Br. pp 63, 66 (citing Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (finding under 28 U.S.C. § 1450 that in context of removal, prior state order 
was not conclusive, but was binding until set aside); Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal 
Corp., 204 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 & n. 1 (10th Cir. 2000) (dicta). 
In neither case was the appellate court faced with whether a final order dismissing a 
Plaintiffs contend that, in part, the issues presented in the state court 
differ from those presented in the federal court and assert that in Utah a party's 
intent presents an issue of fact. Namely, Plaintiffs argue that "the federal court's 
findings that misrepresentations made by . . . Cunningham were not made 
deliberately would be impermissible on summary judgment in state court." Appnt. 
Br., pp 65-66. But that argument misstates the federal court's determination. 
Judge Stewart ruled that to the extent Plaintiff proved Cunningham made 
misrepresentations, they were not germane to the matters then before the juvenile 
court and they were therefore immaterial. Add. C, D & 0, 2008 WL 4372933, 
*23-24. The court also found that despite alleging that Cunningham engaged in a 
scheme of deliberate misrepresentations, Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence 
to support that claim. Id. 
Plaintiffs likewise insist that the state court was not bound to follow the 
federal court's determination that defendants acted "reasonably," because 
questions of "reasonableness" pose issues of fact best left to the jury. Appnt. Br, 
pp. 67-68. First, that contention is overbroad. See D & KMgmt., 2008 UT 73, fflj 
18-19 (courts should proceed with caution on fact-dependent questions, but courts 
are not required to draw remote or improbable inferences in favor a non-moving 
party). Second, none of the instances cited pertain to State Defendants. See 
Appnt. Br., pp. 68-69. 
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claim could preclude relitigating the issues essential to that claim on remand.10 But the 
majority of courts that have considered that issue, have found that issue preclusion may 
prevent relitigation of issues inside the same suit. See, e.g., Vines v. Univ. of 
Louisiana at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 710-11 (5th Cir. 2005) (collateral estoppel 
precludes plaintiff from relitigating issues in remanded state case where they involve 
the same issues of ultimate fact determined by a prior, final federal judgment); Thacker 
v. City ofHyattsville, 762 A.2d 172, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (when federal court 
disposes of federal claim before trial, on remand to state court, collateral estoppel 
precludes relitigating issues the federal court actually decided); cf. Jaskolski v. Daniels, 
905 N.E.2d 1,13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding no preclusion because federal court did 
not adjudicate determinative issue). See also, Haase v. R &P Indus. Chimney Repair, 
Co., 409 N.W.2d 423, 426-27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (issues determined by summary 
judgment dismissing co-defendant are binding and conclusive at later stage of same 
litigation), rev. denied', Columbus Line, Inc. v. Gray-Line Sight Seeing Co., 120 
Cal.App.Ct.3d 622, 628-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (collateral estoppel precludes 
relitigation of issues determined by prior summary judgment dismissing cross-
complaint filed in same action); Hicks v. Hicks, 176 S.W. 2d 371, 374-75 (Term. Ct. 
App. 1943) (when issue has been finally determined, res judicata prevents relitigation 
10
 This Court was also not faced with that issue in D & K Management, 
Inc., 2008 UT 73, |^ 26 & n.20 (differentiating, in dicta, law of the case from res 
judicata). 
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of that issue whether in same or independent suit). 
It is black letter law that "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and 
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, 
whether on the same or a different claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 
27 (1982). That rule was created to ward off endless litigation and to ensure the 
stability of judgments. See 46 AM.JUR.2D Judgments § 515 (1994). And while the rule 
usually applies when an issue has been decided in one action and subsequently arises in 
a second, nothing in the rule's rationale prevents its application within the four comers 
of the same litigation. The doctrine is intended to limit needless relitigation of issues. 
Because that rationale is not limited to only subsequent or independent actions, this 
Court should find that issue preclusion can apply to subsequent proceedings within the 
same action. See e.g., Oman, 2008 UT 70, fflj 28, 31. 
Here, the same material issues to Plaintiffs' state law claims were squarely before 
the federal court; the parties actually litigated those issues; and the federal court's final 
resolution of the issues was essential to that court's section 1983 determination. See 
Discussion, supra, pp. 32-39. Those issue determinations became binding in the 
subsequent state court action. See Oman, 2008 UT 70 at ffl| 32-33. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have not shown that sufficient policy reasons exist to ignore the 
preclusive effect of the federal court's rulings. Plaintiffs urge that the state court 
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"should have viewed [Plaintiffs'] state constitutional claims independently of their 
federal claims," Appnt. Br., pp 42-43, and that by viewing Plaintiffs' state 
constitutional claims against the backdrop of issue preclusion, Judge Fratto subrogated 
Utah's constitution to its federal counterpart. Id. at 37-43, generally. That argument 
misses the mark. 
Judge Fratto, in fact, considered the scope of Plaintiffs' state constitutional claims. 
But the court determined, that in the absence of evidence that Article I, sections 1, 7, 
and 14 provide these Plaintiffs with greater rights as a matter of state law, issue 
preclusion barred relitigation of the claims. See R. 4202-03, Memorandum Decision at 
pp. 4-5; R. 4220, Trans, of Hrg. at pp. 20-21, 27-28, 32-34, 39, 55, 69-72. That 
analysis was proper and was compelled because all of the defendants pled res judicata 
as an affirmative defense to Plaintiffs' remanded state law claims. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has counseled that as a threshold matter, a court must 
review the presented claims to determine the scope of the alleged constitutional right. 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Judge Fratto did that. To determine the 
necessary scope of Plaintiffs' Article I claims, the trial court examined the conduct that 
Plaintiffs maintain violated those rights. But because Plaintiffs, themselves, alleged 
the same conduct in support of their state law claims as they did in furtherance of their 
section 1983 claims, the federal court's final determination of those issues became res 
judicata in the state court. See Oman, 2008 UT 70, <[J 31. The factual underpinnings of 
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Plaintiffs' state law claims being conclusively established, Judge Fratto correctly 
granted summary judgment under the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
C. The Law of Case Precludes This Court From Re-examining Issues 
Determined by the Federal Court 
The doctrine of law of the case also directs the finality of issues and provides that 
"a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages 
of the same litigation." D & KMgmt., 2008 UT 73, \ 26 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). That doctrine, like issue preclusion, "was developed in the 
interest of economy and efficiency to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in 
repetitious contentions and reconsideration or rulings on matters previously decided in 
the same case." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The 
law of the case can be discretionary or mandatory. D &KMgmt.f 2008 UT 73, ^ J 27. 
The law of the case is discretionary when a court is asked to reconsider its own, 
prior ruling or that of a co-equal judge or coordinate court in the same case. See 
Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038; D & KMgmt, 2008 UT 73, \ 27. But when judgment is 
rendered, appealed, and the case remanded, the issues presented to the appellate court 
and the final rulings logically necessary to sustain 
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those conclusions also constitute law of the case. Its application under those 
circumstances is mandatory. D & KMgmt., 2008 UT 73, ^ 28. 
The mandate rule provides that final decisions become the law of the case that must 
be adhered to in subsequent proceedings in the same case. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037-
38. The rule is inflexible and "must be followed even though the lower court 
subsequently addressing this issue may believe that the issue could have been better 
decided in another fashion." Id. 
Here, Plaintiffs sought the state court's review of issues finally determined by the 
federal court - a non-coordinate court. This case thus tends toward the mandate rule. 
To hold otherwise permits a state court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a federal 
court's final decision - something the state court lacks jurisdiction to do. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (West Supp. 2008) (setting out state district court 
jurisdiction). 
But should this Court determine that the mandate rule does not apply, the trial 
court's decision remains sound. Because under the discretionary rule, a court may 
depart from the law of the case only "(1) when there has been an intervening change of 
controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the 
court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a 
manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, ^ J 9, 31 P.3d 543. 
None of those exceptions applies here. 
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Whether under issue preclusion or law of the case, the district court correctly 
found that it was bound by the federal court's final and conclusive determination of the 
issues essential to Plaintiffs' state and federal claims. That decision, by any name, is 
sound. State Defendants ask this to Court to affirm it. 
II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION PROVIDES PLAINTIFFS IN 
THIS CASE WITH NO BROADER PROTECTION THAN 
ITS FEDERAL COUNTERPART. 
Because Plaintiffs' state law claims rest upon the same, essential facts and factual 
underpinnings as their federal claims, should this Court find the federal court's issue 
determinations binding, the Court should refrain from addressing Plaintiffs' state 
constitutional claims. This Court's precedents make clear that whenever possible, the 
Court avoids making a constitutional ruling when another basis exists for deciding. 
See State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Co., 786 P.2d 1343, 
1349 (Utah 1990); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 289 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
In the federal court, Judge Stewart carefully analyzed Plaintiffs' section 1983 
claims and found that even when viewed in a light most favorable to them, the 
material, undisputed facts established no violation of Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. In the district court below, 
Judge Fratto found, in part, that because Plaintiffs established no basis in law or in 
Utah's history that the state constitution affords them greater protections than under the 
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federal constitution, summary judgment was proper. Plaintiffs still cannot make that 
showing nor have they shown that the district court erred. The district court's decision 
should be affirmed.11 
Since deciding Society ofSeparationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 
1993), this Court has continually refined its approach to reviewing claims under Utah's 
Constitution. Most recently, in Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, 184 P.3d 592, the Court 
determined: 
In interpreting provisions of the Utah Constitution, [the Court] beginfs] 
with a review of the constitutional text. [The Court] also informs [its] 
interpretation with historical evidence of the framers' intent.' Finally, 
[the Court] may consider well-reasoned and meaningful decisions made 
by courts of last resort in sister states with similar constitutional 
provisions. 
Id., 2008 UT 29, U 11 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
A. The Text of Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 14 Do Not Create Broader Rights 
as a Matter of State Law. 
Plaintiffs have sued State Defendants under the state's inalienable rights clause 
(Art. 1, § 1), the due process clause (Art. 1, § 7), and the search and seizure clause 
11
 Plaintiffs' opening brief misstates the federal court's conclusion and 
contends that "[b]ecause Judge Stewart ruled that the federal constitution did not 
protect the Jensens at all from the defendants' actions, if this Court concludes that 
the Utah Constitution does afford such protections, by necessity its protections are 
broader than those of its federal counterpart." App. Br. at 37. But Judge Stewart 
did not find that Plaintiffs were entitled to no federal protections; instead, that 
court determined that Plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence establishing that the 
defendants violated any of Plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known. See Add. C, D & O, 2008 WL 
4372933, passim. 
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(Art. 1, § 14). To get to a jury on those claims, Plaintiffs were required, but failed to 
show, that those sections afford them greater protections than the U.S. Constitution. 
Nothing in those sections' text creates new, more expansive, or different rights than 
the fundamental rights that existed in 1896. Instead, the text and plain language of 
each section reflects only the constitutional architects' intent to incorporate 
fundamental rights into the state's constitution. That intent is reflected not only in the 
text of each clause, but in Utah's quest for statehood itself. 
1. Article I, section 1. 
Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution enumerates certain fundamental rights: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances, to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right. 
UTAH CONST., art. I, § 1. Plaintiffs' section 1 claim rests on "the right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties." R.60-61, Compl. fflf 205-07. The text reflects an 
expression of fundamental law that neither expands nor diminishes Plaintiffs' claimed 
right of familial association. But the right is similar to the expression of fundamental 
law found in most state constitutions. 
We shall expect a declaration of rights for the protection of individuals 
and minorities. This declaration usually consists of the following classes 
of provisions: . . . Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the 
citizen; as that all men are by nature free and independent, and have 
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty . . . 
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Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the 
Legislative Powers of the States of the American Union 36-37 (Leonard W. Levy, ed., 
De Capo Press (1868)). The text of section 1, therefore, provides no basis for this 
Court to infer that that section grants Plaintiffs broader rights than those commonly 
recognized in 1896. 
2. Article I, section 7. 
Article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution was also not intended as a unique 
expression of due process rights. Instead, after a single amendment, the drafters copied 
section 7 from the U.S. Constitution for the purpose of incorporating already 
established fundamental rights into the Utah Constitution. See Official Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the Utah Constitutional Convention, 257 (1898 (Star 
Printing Co. 1898)). Section 7 reads, with its sole amendment: "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." UTAH CONST, art. I, 
§ 7. Compare U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. 
3. Article I, section 14. 
Article I, section 14 enumerates Utah's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searched and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
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UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 14. Compare U.S. CONST, amend. IV. Section 14 was approved 
without comment or amendment. See Utah Constitutional Convention at 319. And 
save for two variations in capitalization and an eliminated "and," section 14 is identical 
in text of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, like sections 1 and 7, nothing in the text 
suggests the drafters intended its passage to expand rights beyond those secured by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
B. The History of Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 14 Does Not Support the 
Intent to Create Broader Rights. 
Constitutional rights are not created upon drafting, but they are based upon "'the 
pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought'" in existence at the 
time of drafting. American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, j^ 12, 140 
P.3d 1235 (quoting Cooley, supra, at 36-37). Historical sources thus form a proper 
reference for determining intent. Id. at 1J 10. 
Utah experienced a lengthy struggle toward statehood, with the state drafting the 
first of seven constitutions in March 1849. See John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable 
State Government - The History of Utah 's Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311,317. 
And even from its earliest drafts, one of the most notable aspects of Utah's 
Constitution is its conformity to the other state constitutions that existed at that time. 
See Christine Durham, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, and Kathy Wyer, Utah's Constitution, 
Distinctly Undistinctive at 651, 654-61, published in The Constitutional States of 
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America (George E. Conner, Christopher Hammons, eds. Univ. of Missouri Press 
2008); see also, Flynn, supra, at 324-25 (Utah's Constitution is "a patchwork of bits 
and pieces borrowed from other state constitutions by a gradual process of attempting 
to placate a hostile Congress.") 
Utah's first petition for statehood foundered on issue of slavery. Flynn, supra, at 
316. Its subsequent efforts ran aground on the practice of polygamy. Id. And by the 
time the State submitted its fourth effort in 1872, the drafters began focusing in earnest 
on modeling Utah's constitution after states whose efforts had recently passed muster. 
Id. at 317.12 During this time, Utah experienced both local and national opposition to 
statehood, with the Mormon church being the moving force behind Utah's statehood 
quest. See Society ofSeparationists, Inc., 870 P.2d at 922; Durham, supra, at 651, 654. 
But in the early 1890s the Mormon Church began to retreat from the practice of 
polygamy and to signal an openness toward the non-Mormons who had begun to settle 
the Utah territory. Durham, supra, at 654; see Paul G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and 
the Utah Constitution, The Irrelevance of the Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1,13. At this time, the Mormon church officially renounced the practice of 
polygamy; state-funded non-sectarian schools were established; the Chamber of 
12
 Even the portion of Article I, section 24 that Plaintiffs' underscore, that 
"[f|requent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of 
individual rights and the perpetuity of the government," was borrowed from 
another state's constitution. Durham, supra, at 8 (citing Utah Constitutional 
Convention at 1:362). 
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Commerce began to integrate Mormon and non-Mormon economic interests alike; and 
the Mormon church disbanded its political party in favor of a two-party system. 
Cassell, supra, at 13-14. 
By the time of the successful 1895 constitutional convention, all parties in Utah 
were in pursuit of statehood. Durham, supra at 654. That convention had 107 
delegates - twenty-nine of whom were non-Mormon - who held two primary concerns 
(1) drafting a constitution that would gain Congress' ultimate acceptance, id., and (2) 
promoting an "aura of inclusiveness." Id. at 660. "Thus, while the Mormon people's 
desire for statehood may have originally been motivated . . . by a desire for autonomy, 
the years of struggle ultimately led to a genuine effort to join the mainstream." Id. 
This era of cooperation is echoed in the comments of Caleb West, one of Utah's 
territorial governors, who cautioned delegates not to "plunge into an unexplored field 
or traverse a vast and barren and uninhabited wilderness," but "the nearer you keep" to 
the U.S. Constitution "and follow its enunciations and fundamental principles, the 
nearer you will come to the hearts of the people, and commend the new State of Utah 
to her associates." Official Report, supra, at 11. 
Plaintiffs' claim that Utah's Constitution was drafted for Utah by Utahns is correct. 
But their belief that Utah's constitutional history is bounded only by the Mormon 
majority's experience with religious persecution is not. 
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C. The Common Law Does Not Create Broader Rights as a Matter 
of State Law. 
1. Article I, section 1. 
Article I, section 1 possesses no federal counterpart. But Utah's courts have not 
found that it offers any unique protections. "The Constitution declares in Article 1, 
section 1, men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights 
among which are the pursuing of happiness, and safety, and property." Golding v. 
Schubach Optical Co., Inc., 70 P.2d 871, 875 (Utah 1937). Those rights are not 
absolute and this Court has held that they can be subject to "such reasonable police 
regulation as may be enacted to promote the public good." Id. 
Section 1 thus lays out the general and well-understood notion that people are free. 
And cases interpreting that section typically adhere to federal law interpreting 
analogous provisions of the federal constitution or to cases addressing more specific 
Article I provisions. See, e.g., West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 
1994) (Art. I, §§ 1, 15); State v. Parker Corp., 297 P. 1013 (Utah 1931) (Art. 1, §§ 1, 
25); In re Adoption ofB.O., 927 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Art. I, §§ 1, 25). 
Plaintiffs have not cited nor have State Defendants found any cases that address a 
person's right to familial association under Article I, section l.13 That right has, 
13
 Plaintiffs couch this Court's 1904 decision in Block v. Schwartz, 76 P. 
22, 24-5 (1904), as supporting their claimed liberty interest in the right of personal 
and familial privacy. But the Block court did not examine familial rights. Instead, 
the Court examined the right of persons to hold, sell, or dispose of personal 
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instead, been viewed by Utah's courts under Article I, section 7. 
Article I, section 7. 
u[T]here is nothing in Utah's Constitution that suggests that it provides greater due 
process rights than the United States Constitution." State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, \ 25 n.7, 
127 P.3d 1213. But this Court has recognized that "[decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the U.S. on the due process clause of the Federal Constitution are 'highly 
persuasive' as to the application of that clause of our state constitution." Untermeyer 
v. State Tax Comm % 129 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1942). And Utah's courts generally 
have found that section 7 provides protections equal to the U.S. Constitution.14 
Respecting the substantive rights that Plaintiffs advanced below - a right to familial 
association and to direct their child's medical care - no Utah court has held that Utah's 
Constitution offers broader protections to Utahns than they enjoy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. But in the only cases to have considered those 
property. Id. 
Plaintiffs likewise misapprehend the Court's statements in State v. Kent, 
432 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1964), wherein the Court addressed a criminal defendant's 
claim that by surreptitiously viewing him through a ventilation duct, law 
enforcement violated his right to privacy secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id. Neither case expresses this Court's 
opinion respecting the proper scope of the Article I, section 1 rights at issue here. 
14
 In limited incidents regarding procedural process due to criminal 
defendants, this Court has analyzed section 7 differently than the federal due 
process clause. See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \ 39, 162 P.3d 1006; State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991); Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 
P.2d 734, 734-35 (Utah 1991). Those cases do not aid Plaintiffs. 
55 
rights, the Court has equated them with the rights afforded by federal law. 
For example, in In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), the plaintiff challenged, 
under both the state and federal constitutions, a state statute permitting temiination of 
parental rights upon only a showing that termination was in the child's best interest. 
Id. at 1365-66. This Court noted that a parent's right to the care and custody of his or 
her child is fundamental. Id. at 1372. The Court found that the right is protected under 
the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, but held the right to be no different under each 
constitution: 
[W]e conclude that the Utah Constitution recognizes and protects the 
inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or 
her child under Article I, § 7 and § 25 and that the United States 
Constitution recognizes the same right under the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Id. at 1377 (emphasis added); see also In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 894 (Utah 1955) 
(analyzing claim that child neglect proceeding violated the 14th Amendment and Article 
I, section 7 under the same standard). 
Fourteen years later, the Utah Court of Appeals in In re B.O., 927 P.2d 202 (Utah 
App. 1996), considered the constitutionality of a state statute that permitted parental 
termination upon a showing that the parent exercised only token efforts to maintain a 
parent-child relationship. Id. at 207-09. Following this Court's analysis in In re J.P., 
the Court of Appeals equated a parent's rights under the Utah Constitution with the 
same rights under the U.S. Constitution. Id. 
Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' claim, the only thing that is clear from Utah's case law 
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is that a right to familial association (which encompasses a right to direct medical care) 
exists. But that right mirrors the identical right under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. The right arises from the same common law antecedents, see 
J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372-73, grants Plaintiffs' co-equal protections under both 
constitutions, and is subject to the same level of scrutiny. Id. 
Nor does Plaintiffs' reliance on antiquated decisions of this Court and cases from 
other states aid them. None of the cases Plaintiffs cite on pp. 50-56 of their Brief 
describe the constitutional rights at issue here. See State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, f^ 32, 
996 P.2d 546 (inapposite case examining section 14 rights; no mention of polygamy 
prosecutions at f^ 32 or elsewhere; but see J^ 26 "This state's early settlers were 
themselves no strangers to the abuses of general warrants."); Cooke v. Cooke, 248 P. 
83, 108 (Utah 1926) (inapposite child custody proceeding addressing whether parent, 
accused of adultery on suspect evidence, can properly be denied custody of minor child 
- no constitutional questions raised); Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907) 
(inapposite dicta statement in action challenging constitutionality of lengthy industrial 
school commitment for juvenile delinquent charged with stealing box of cigars). See 
also In re CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. App. 1973) (inapposite case examining 
what constitutes medical neglect, not whether challenged action constituted a 
constitutional violation); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 754-55 (N.J. 1951) (dicta 
statement having no application to case; parents put forth no medical evidence, but 
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proffered religious grounds for refusing blood transfusion; court ruled appointment of 
guardian to authorize medical treatment constitutional); Matter ofHofbauer, 393 
N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (N.Y. 1979) (case analyzing constitutional factors for determining, 
under state statute, whether child had been deprived of adequate medical care; 
constitutionality of state's conduct not at issue); In re Tony Tuttendario, 21 Pa.D. 561 
(Pa. Q. 1912) (inapposite case examining allegation of medical neglect, not 
constitutionality of state action); Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 37 P. 660 
(WA. 1884) (inapposite case regarding challenge by mother for return of custody of 
child whom she voluntarily placed in an orphanage). 
The federal court found that State Defendants violated none of Plaintiffs' 
substantive federal rights. Absent a showing by Plaintiffs of greater rights here, the 
result is the same under the Utah Constitution.15 And because nothing in Utah's 
Constitution or its case law indicates that State Defendants' conduct would be 
considered unreasonable under Utah law, the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment is correct and should be affirmed. 
15
 At best, Plaintiffs have shown that this Court has long construed the state 
and federal due process clauses as substantially the same, but that the Court has not 
ruled out its '"ability to decide in the future that our state constitutional provisions 
afford more rights than the federal Constitution.'" Appnt. Br., p 49 (quoting 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, H 11, 52 P.3d 1158). To establish State Defendants' 
liability for money damages, Plaintiffs must do more than show that this Court 
may, at some date in the future, find that the Utah Constitution offers parties 
broader rights at state law than under the federal constitution. See Spackman v. 
Bd. of Ed., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533 and discussion at Point III, infra. 
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3. Article I, section 14. 
This Court has observed that "federal Fourth Amendment protections may differ 
from those guaranteed our citizens by our state constitution." Brigham City v. Stuart, 
2005 UT 13, ^ 10, 122 P.3d 506 (emphasis added), rehearing denied (July 18, 2005), 
reversed and remanded on different grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006); accord 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, |^ 34. But historically, this Court has "considered the 
protections afforded one and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 
1998). And when the Court has examined an issue independently under the state 
constitution, the Court has adopted Fourth Amendment doctrine. See DeBooy, 2000 
UT 32, f 19 (adopting 4th Amendment "analysis and rationale" to highway 
checkpoints); Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 (finding, that like Fourth Amendment, section 
14 provides no protection against private searches); see also Sims v. Collection Div. of 
Utah State Tax Comm yn, 841 P.2d 6, 10, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion) 
(adopting U.S. Supreme Court reasoning that quasi-criminal proceedings are subject to 
exclusionary rule). 
Defendants have found only one case where a majority of this Court has determined 
that section 14 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. And that case 
is inapposite. In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), this Court held that 
section 14 recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records. Id. at 417-
18. And even then, the protection that this Court recognized was also provided by state 
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statute. Id. The only other case addressing advocating broader section 14 rights 
garnered support from only a plurality of this Court. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 464-71 (plurality) (car thief possesses privacy interest in stolen car). 
Nothing in either analysis suggests that Plaintiffs possess greater protection against 
unlawful seizure under Article I, section 14 than Judge Stewart acknowledged that they 
possessed under federal law. Nor does either case suggest that analyzing Section 14 
claims anew would produce a different result than Judge Stewart reached under the 
federal constitution. 
Moreover, nothing in Utah's unique history supports a broadening of Plaintiffs' 
section 14 rights. Rather, Utah's history reveals no connection between the anti-
polygamy raids and the inclusion of Article I, section 14 in the state's constitution. 
Cassell, supra, at * 2-7. Likewise, the cases that have examined whether Article I, 
section 14 may provide broader protections, have focused not on Utah's unique history, 
but on shielding Utah citizens "from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given 
the fourth amendment by the federal courts." Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8; see also 
Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-17; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. 
Plaintiffs were unable to establish a violation of their federal rights federal court 
and the court below recognized that Plaintiffs were also unable to establish that they 
possessed broader rights under Utah's Constitution. That decision is correct and 
should be upheld. 
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III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL THE FLAGRANT 
VIOLATION TEST FOR HOLDING STATE ACTORS 
LIABLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS. 
Even assuming that Plaintiffs can establish the existence, here, of broader rights 
under the Utah Constitution, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal for 
want of a "flagrant" violation required by Spackman v. Board of Education, 2000 UT 
87, Tj 20, 16 P.3d 533, 537. There, this Court held that before imposing liability on 
individual government employees under the state constitution, the plaintiff must first 
show that the alleged violation was "flagrant." Id. at ^ 23. 
First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a flagrant violation 
of his or her constitutional rights. In essence, this means that a defendant 
must have violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known. To be considered clearly 
established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] was doing 
violates that right. The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be 
flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary 
human frailties of forgetfiilness, distractibility, or misjudgment without 
rendering him or herself liable for a constitutional violation. 
Id. (citations, alterations, and internal quotations marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs' claims fail this test. Plaintiffs have not shown - nor have these 
defendants found - any binding Utah decision or clearly established weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions that establish the contours of Article I, sections 1, 7 and 14 as 
Plaintiffs now allege them. Cf. Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1189 n. 13 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (stating in context of federal constitution, "[f]or the law to be clearly 
established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the 
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clearly established weight of authority from other courts must be as plaintiff 
maintains.") In the absence of such a showing that would have alerted State 
Defendants that their conduct violated Plaintiffs' Article I rights, Plaintiffs fail to meet 
Spackman as a matter of law. 
A. Article 1, section 1. 
No precedent exists for Plaintiffs' assertion that Article I, section 1 creates rights 
broader than the federal constitution. Similarly, no Utah court has applied Article 1, 
section 1 as the basis for an alleged violation of the right to familial association or to 
direct medical care. See Point II.C. 1., supra. In the clear absence of such precedent, 
State Defendants could not have understood, that by advocating the State's parens 
patrie interests in a state juvenile court, they were violating Plaintiffs' section one 
rights. 
B. Article I, section 7. 
Plaintiffs have also not shown that State Defendants flagrantly violated their 
substantive or procedural due process rights secured under Article I, section 7. And 
despite their allegations to the contrary, "there is nothing in Utah's Constitution that 
suggests that it provides greater due process than the United States Constitution." State 
v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, |^ 25 n.7, 127 P.3d 1213. 
1. Procedural Due Process. 
The minimum requirements of procedural due process include "adequate notice and 
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an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.'' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 
68, 100 P.3d 1177. "To be considered a meaningful hearing, the concerns of the 
affected parties should be heard by an impartial decision maker." Id. Juvenile Court 
Judge Yeates was an impartial decision maker when he heard and considered 
Plaintiffs' and State Defendants' arguments during the multiple hearings that he 
conducted. [See R.515 Doctors' Exs. 33A-33K, Juv. Ct. Trans., generally]. 
But Plaintiffs still maintain State Defendants violated their due process rights by 
making material misrepresentations or omissions during the juvenile court proceedings. 
Even if true, Plaintiffs have not shown those actions were "flagrant" under Spackman. 
Plaintiffs cannot point to any decision holding that when a government actor makes 
misstatements, misrepresentations, or omissions in open-court, in a civil proceedings 
where the opponent is represented by counsel, that procedural due process has been 
violated. But see Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1380-85 (10th Cir. 1989), 
cited as authority by Cline v. State, 2005 UT App. 498, 142 P.3d 127, rehearing & 
cert, denied.u 
16
 Plaintiffs set out several, inapposite cases that they maintain support their 
procedural due process claim here. But the federal court considered those cases 
and, notwithstanding, determined that Plaintiffs had not shown how State 
Defendants' conduct, even if true, violated a constitutional right of which those 
defendants would have known. Add. C , D&O, 2008 WL 4372933, * 27; see also 
Spackman, 2000 UT 87, |^ 23 ("To be considered clearly established, the contours 
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he [or she] was doing violates that right.") 
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2. Substantive Due Process 
Plaintiffs also cannot show a flagrant violation of their substantive rights under 
Article I, section 7. To defeat State Defendants here, Plaintiffs were required to show 
State Defendants actions constituted clear and flagrant violations of the Utah 
Constitution. But as discussed at pages 55 to 59, supra, Plaintiffs cannot make that 
showing. 
The only thing that is clear from Utah's case law is that Plaintiffs' rights to familial 
association under the state constitution mirror those same rights under the federal 
constitution. They arise from the same common law antecedents and they extend the 
same measure of protection against unreasonable conduct. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 
1373 (parental rights are rooted not in statutes or constitutions but "in nature and 
human instinct"). The federal court found State Defendants acted reasonably as a 
matter of law when balancing Plaintiffs' particular rights with P.J.'s specialized needs. 
D & O, 2008 WL 4372933, * 22-24. And even where State Defendants mistaken in 
their dealings with Plaintiffs, the law forgives them for such human frailties. See 
Spackman, 2000 UT 87, ^  23 ('The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be 
flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary human frailties of 
forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering him or herself liable for 
a constitutional violation"); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 1996) ("The only 
common feature of all of these cases is that they hold that simple negligence is not 
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sufficient justification for a [constitutional] damages claim.") 
What's more, Plaintiffs also fail to support their claim that Plaintiffs possess a 
separate, protected liberty interest in Utah's child welfare statutes. But these 
defendants have searched and have found no case holding that a state, procedural 
statute provides a party with a substantial, protected liberty interest. Because Plaintiffs 
have failed to comply with Spackman, their Article I, section 7 claims must also fail. 
C. Article I, section 14. 
Plaintiffs cannot show a flagrant violation of Article I, section 14. First, no 
"seizure" resulted from the juvenile court proceedings, and second, the criminal 
charges against the Plaintiff Parents were supported by probable cause. 
Plaintiffs continue to urge this Court to construe the Utah constitution to create 
protection against Plaintiffs' "continued seizure" as result of being a party to the 
juvenile court proceedings. And they continue to cite only the concurring opinion in 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 277-78 (1994), and to ignore that the majority in that 
case or the fact that both the federal court here and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2007), explicitly refused to adopt Plaintiffs' 
theory. See Add. C, Memo D&O, 2008 WL 4372933 at * 28-29; Becker, 494 F.3d at 
915. Because those decisions make clear that Plaintiffs' theory of a continuing seizure 
is not now the law and, more importantly, was not the law in 2003, Plaintiffs cannot 
show that their participation in the state juvenile court proceedings constitutes a 
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flagrant violation of their section 14 claim as required by Spackman. 2000 UT 87, TJ 
23. 
Instead, the only "seizure" that occurred in this case was Daren Jensen's arrest. But 
that arrest - and Barbara Jensen's initial appearance and booking - was well supported 
by probable cause.17 Plaintiffs have adduced no case holding that an arrest (or the 
filing of charges) supported by probable cause constitutes a flagrant violation of the 
Utah Constitution. And State Defendants have found none. Because Plaintiffs also 
cannot establish a flagrant violation of their Article I, section 14 rights, the trial court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
D. Defendant Eisenman is Entitled to Absolute Immunity. 
Finally, Plaintiffs cannot show that Defendant Eisenman committed a flagrant 
violation of their known constitutional rights, because all of Plaintiffs' claims stem 
from Eisenman's job as Assistant Utah Attorney General (AAG), and she is therefore 
17
 On July 28, 2003, the juvenile court entered an order directing that P.J. 
begin treatment by August 8. See Statement of Facts, supra, p 19. The Plaintiff 
Parents were present in court when this ordered issued. Id., pp. 18-19. Parents 
failed to abide by the order and on August 8, the juvenile court issued an order 
giving the State legal custody of P.J. for the purpose of commencing treatment. 
Id., pp. 20-22. Parents were apprised of this order by their counsel and advised to 
comply. Id., p. 23. They did not, but elected to remain with P.J. in Idaho. Id. 
There was thus undisputed probable cause for the criminal charges brought against 
Parents. And despite their contrary assertion, the undisputed evidence fails to 
establish that the criminal charges were predicated upon misrepresentation or 
fraud. Id., pp. 24-25. Moreover, the Plaintiff Parents admitted that the elements of 
each charge were established. Id., pp. 29-30. 
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entitled to absolute immunity. For "[t]he efficient operation of the judicial process 
requires that those closely associated with it be afforded some form of immunity from 
civil liability." Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993) (citation 
omitted). 
Immunity is essential to the integrity of the judicial process. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 
474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985). Utah's courts have adopted that reasoning and recognize 
absolute judicial immunity for persons who perform "functions closely related to the 
judicial process." Sanders v. Leavitt, 2001 UT 78, ^ | 19, 37 P.3d 1052 (applying 
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985)); 
see e.g., Black v. Clegg, 938 P.2d 293, 296 (Utah 1997) ("official immunity applied 
under federal and state law"); Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280 (adopting Supreme Court's 
functional analysis). Absolute immunity extends to state's attorneys, see e.g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-26 (1976); see also Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280, and 
"attaches to [an attorney's] function, not the manner in which [s]he perform[s] it." 
Black, 938 P.2d at 296. Thus, if the "challenged acts fall within the categories 
constituting a prosecutor's duties, the acts are part of [her] official function, even if 
[s]he acts imperfectly." Id. 
Plaintiffs complain that in the course of her representation, Eisenman 
misrepresented or omitted information before the juvenile court, and others and 
personally gathered and disseminated information to others relative to P.J.'s case. But 
67 
Plaintiffs' objections to the manner in which Eisenman perfonned her role as AAG are 
of no consequence and do "not change the fact that [she] acted in the course of [her] 
official duties." Id. 
Whether characterized by Plaintiffs as argument, proffers, or testimony, Eisenman's 
court filings and statements in court are protected. Irnbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n. 34; 
see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489-90, 492 (1991) (prosecutors and other 
lawyers were immune for making false or defamatory statements during judicial 
proceedings); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-35 (immunity for witnesses and 
parties for in-court testimony is well-established). She is also immune from Plaintiffs 
complaints about her contact with Drs. Birkmayer and Albritton and of the letter she 
sent to the Burzynski Clinic. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 ("the duties of a 
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the 
initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom"); see also Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993). Finally, Eisenman's contact with the DA's 
Office were "integral" both to Eisenman's position as AAG and to the "judicial 
process" itself. Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280; see Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-4a-105(6), -
113(l),(2)(a).18 
18
 Utah's DCFS is charged with enforcing the state's child welfare laws, 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a -105 (6) (West 2004), and is authorized to take "all 
legal action that is necessary" to meet that end, id. at § 62A-4a-l 13(1), and to 
"take all initiative in all matters involving the protection of abused or neglected 
children." Id. at § 62A-4a-105(6). And, as an AAG, Eisenman was required to 
enforce those laws. Id. § 62A-4a-l 13(2)(a). Finally, as an officer of the court, 
68 
Eisenman acted as an advocate and officer of the court. She is thus entitled to 
absolute judicial immunity from all of Plaintiffs state law claims. See Bailey v. Bayles, 
2002 UT 58, at fflj 10, 13 (appellate court may affirm on any ground apparent from the 
record). 
i n . PLAINTIFFS HAVE WAIVED ANY ARGUMENTS 
NOT RAISED IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
Plaintiffs make a lengthy recitation of facts allegedly pertaining to Defendant 
Eisenman in their Statement of Facts. But in the body of their Brief, Plaintiffs make no 
mention of Eisenman, nor do they advance any arguments suggesting how she violated 
any of the Plaintiffs' state constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have therefore waived any 
arguments that pertain to Defendant Eisenman and the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment should be affirmed. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, H 23,16 P.3d 540 
(issues "that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not 
be considered by the appellate court."); see also Utah R. App. 24(a)(5), (9). 
Similarly, Plaintiffs advanced two, state common law tort law claims in the trial 
court below. But Plaintiffs make only a glancing reference to those claims in their 
Brief and thereafter ignore those causes of action. Those claims have also been 
waived. Id. 
Eisenman was duty-bound to enforce the juvenile court's custody order. 
69 
Conclusion 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the district court erred when it granted State 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs' state claims. 
That decision is correct and State Defendants ask this Court to affirm the trial court's 
Final Judgment and Order. But to the extent the Court may determine that Plaintiffs 
possess broader constitutional rights as a matter of state law and that the federal court's 
issue determinations are not binding, State Defendants ask this Court to remand the 
matter to the state court for further consideration of the facts and record evidence 
adduced in the first instance. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29th day of October, 2009. 
m 
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JONhwONES 7562 
Attorneys for Appellees Anderson, 
Cunningham and Eisenman 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL pi:frf£C 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,,, _ 
FEflMMW 
Z.tJ 
BARBARA JENSEN et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH; et al., 
Defendants. 
TU\RH DISTRICT COURT 
TSALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 050912502 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant 
Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants Wagner and 
Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Eisemanfs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to the motions on January 26, 2009. Following the 
hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, 
arguments of counsel, as well as the decision of Judge Stewart, 
finds it clear that Plaintiffs have pled the same factual basis 
for their Causes of Action and further, that all the claims arise 
from a single set of operative events. Indeed, the factual 
events pled in the instant mirror those which supported 
Plaintiffs' federal - claims. Moreover, Judge Stewart, after an 
extensive analysis of the facts, made findings and conclusions 
based on the issues underlying Plaintiffs' claims. 
JENSEN v. STATE OF UTAH Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The aforementioned in mind, the Utah Supreme Court in the 
similar case of Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist. , 2008 UT 70, (Utah 2008) 
stated the following: 
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two 
distinct theories: claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion.1' Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 
P 12, 99 P.3d 842. This appeal raises only 
the latter principle of issue preclusion. 
Issue preclusion, which is also known as 
collateral estoppel, "prevents parties or 
their privies from relitigating facts and 
issues in the second suit that were fully 
litigated in the first suit." id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The purposes of 
issue preclusion include "(1) preserving the 
integrity of the judicial system by 
preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes; 
(2) promoting judicial economy by preventing 
previously litigated issues from being 
relitigated; and (3) protecting litigants 
from harassment by vexatious litigation." Id. 
P 14. 
Id. at P28. 
The Oman court continued stating: 
Issue preclusion applies only when the 
following four elements are met: (I) the 
party against whom issue preclusion is 
asserted must have been a party to or in 
privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication must be identical to the 
one presented in the instant action; (iii) 
the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and 
(iv) the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. Collins v. 
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P 
12, 52 P.3d 1267 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
JENSEN v. STATE OF UTAH Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Id. at P2 9. 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, there 
can be no question each of the elements has been satisfied. 
While Plaintiffs argue there was no final adjudication on the 
merits because the federal court never reached the state law 
claims, a review of Plaintiffs' Complaint and the federal court's 
Memorandum Decision demonstrates that the factual contentions and 
issues supporting the state claims are identical to those 
underlying the federal claims and were necessary to Judge 
Stewart's decision- Indeed, in response to a similar argument by 
the plaintiff in Oman regarding his breach of contract claim, the 
Court stated: 
Underlying the § 1983 claim was the 
dispositive issue of whether the District 
breached the Classified Agreement when it 
fired Oman for cause. Indeed, when Oman filed 
his complaint in federal court, his basis for 
the § 1983 cause of action was twofold: (1) 
that the District's "pre-termination conduct 
deprived him of due process rights secured by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution," and (2) that the 
District's "decision to suspend/ and later 
terminate, his employment violated the terms 
of the Classified Agreement." Thus, a 
resolution of the § 1983 claim, as framed by 
Oman, required the federal court to resolve 
the underlying issue of whether the District 
violated the Classified Agreement when it 
fired Oman. The issue was squarely before the 
federal court, was litigated by the parties, 
and was necessary to the court's final 
JENSEN v. STATE OF UTAH Page 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
judgment on the § 1983 claim. Accordingly, 
the federal court made findings and 
conclusions regarding the alleged breach of 
contract--including the previously quoted 
conclusion that the District had a sufficient 
basis for firing Oman for cause under the 
Classified Agreement--and these findings and 
conclusions are binding in subsequent actions 
under the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
Although Oman's breach of contract claim was 
not litigated in the federal court, it is 
based upon the same underlying issue that was 
resolved by the federal court: whether the 
District had a sufficient basis for 
terminating Oman for cause under the 
Classified Agreement. The state district 
court was therefore bound by the federal 
court1s conclusion that "[Oman]'s 
representations to the District regarding his 
work hours provided a sufficient basis for 
termination for cause." Accordingly, even if 
Oman had argued to the district court that 
his conduct did not give the District a basis 
for terminating him for cause, the argument 
would have failed based on the federal 
courtf s prior ruling. 
Id. at P33. 
As noted, the issues in this case arise from a single, 
distinct set of events and as demonstrated by the Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Stewart, the factual contentions that underlie 
the Plaintiffs' state law claims against the Defendants have been 
conclusively decided. 
This said, Judge Stewart's legal conclusions bar Plaintiffs' 
claims under the Utah Constitution because there is no historical 
JENSEN v. STATE OF UTAH Page 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
or textual basis for interpreting Utah's Constitutional 
provisions in this case differently from the Federal 
Constitution. Moreover, no Utah appellate decision supports 
interpreting the Utah Constitution to provide broader or 
different rights in this case. 
In sum, the facts, the alleged harm, and the analysis of 
Plaintiffs' state law claims are the same as those already 
considered and dismissed by Judge Stewart and, there being no 
additional or different rights provided by the Utah Constitution, 
dismissal is appropriate in this forum as well. 
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendant Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants 
Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Defendant Eiseman's Motion for Summary Judgment are^-€tranted. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, by and through 
his parents and natural guardians, BARBARA 
and DAREN JENSEN; BARBARA JENSEN, 
individually; and DAREN JENSEN, ) FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
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Pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Decision issued on February 18, 2009, and for the 
reasons set forth in the defendants' moving papers addressing res judicata, defendants' motions 
for summary judgment are hereby granted and all claims against the defendants are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice on the merjts. /) 
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Addendum B 
ADDENDUM B 
Constitution of the State of Utah 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people of Utah, in order to secure and 
perpetuate the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION. 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights,] All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy 
and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the 
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of 
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 
Sec. 2. [AH political power inherent in the people,] All political power is inherent in the people; and 
all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have 
the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union,] The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land. 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty,] The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall 
be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any 
person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. There 
shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification 
shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in 
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but 
the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by law. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital 
offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption strong. 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines. Cruel punishments.] Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or 
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
rage lot 3 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil 
cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open. Redress of injuries.] All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment. Grand jury.] Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The grand jury shall consist of seven 
persons, five of whom must concur to find an indictment; but no grand jury shall be drawn or summoned 
unless in the opinion of the judge of the district, public interest demands it. 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden. Issuance of warrant] The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press. Libel.] No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In ail criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in 
evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was 
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall 
have the right to determine the law and the fact. 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt. Exception.] There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free. Soldiers voting.] All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 
Sec. 18. [Attainder. Ex post facto laws. Impairing contracts.] No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, 
or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined. Proof.] Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, 
or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason 
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within this State. 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or 
deny others retained by the people. 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the 
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United States District Court, 
D. Utah, 
Central Division. 
P.J., a minor, by and through his parents and natur-
al guardians, Barbara and Daren JENSEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
State of UTAH, et al., Defendants. 
No. 2:05-CV-739 TS. 
Sept. 22, 2008. 
Barton H. Kunz, II, Karra J. Porter, Roger P. 
Christensen, Sarah E. Spencer, Christensen Sc 
Jensen PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiffs. 
Joni J. Jones, Bridget K. Romano, Scott D. Cheney, 
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liams, R. Scott Young, Richard A. Vazquez, Snow 
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT, for 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RE-
MANDING STATE LAW CLAIMS 
TED STEWART, District Judge. 
*1 This § 1983 case arises from a protracted dispute 
between Plaintiffs Daren and Barbara Jensen and 
the State of Utah regarding the proper medical care 
for their son, Plaintiff P.J. Currently before the 
Court are the summary judgment motions of De-
fendants Richard Anderson, Kari Cunningham, 
Susan Eisenman, Dr. Lars Wagner, and Dr. Karen 
Albritton. After carefully considering the parties' 
submissions and having heard oral argument, the 
Court will grant the summary judgment motions 
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with regard to the Jensens' § 1983 claims for the 
reasons discussed below. As the Jensens' state law 
claims involve important issues of Utah law, the 
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
and will remand the state claims to the Utah court 
from which they were removed. 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party 
can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.FNM In considering whether genuine is-
sues of material fact exist, the Court determines 
whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence 
presented.™2 The Court is required to construe all 
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most fa-
vorable to the nonmoving party.™3 
FN1. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
FN2. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
411 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 
924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.1991). 
FN3. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 
(1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. 
Co., 925F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1991). 
II. FACTS 
The following is a summary of the factual back-
ground in this case, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the Jensens: On April 30, 2003, 12-year-old 
P.J. had a small growth removed from the floor of 
his mouth by an oral surgeon named Dr. 
Christensen. The tissue removed by Dr. Christensen 
was sent to Laboratory Corporation of America in 
Kent, Washington for analysis. LabCorp informed 
Dr. Christensen that the sample was malignant. Dr. 
Christensen then referred PJ . to Dr. Harlan Munz 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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at Primary Children's Medical Center ("PCMC") in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Jensens met with Dr. Munz on May 9, 2003. 
After examining PJ ., Dr. Munz referred him to 
PCMCs oncology department where he met with 
Dr. Wagner. Dr. Wagner first met with and ex-
amined P. J. that same day, but could not offer any 
diagnosis until after PCMCs pathology department 
completed its own testing. 
Upon PCMCs request, LabCorp sent P.J.'s tissue 
sample to PCMCs pathology department. On May 
20, 2003, Dr. Lowichik completed the pathology re-
port on PJ.fs tissue, diagnosing the growth as 
"EWING SARCOMA/PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE 
NEUROECTODERMAL TUMOR" FN4 {i.e., 
Ei/wing's Sarcoma). This diagnosis was rendered 
based on immunohistochemical staining and the ap-
pearance of the tumor cells. The pathology report 
indicates that P.J.'s "case was reviewed by [fellow 
pathologist] [Dr. Coffin] who concurs with this in-
terpretation." FN5 The deposition testimony of the 
pathologists likewise indicates that both of them re-
viewed the testing and were confident in the dia-
gnosis. Dr. Lowichik estimated her confidence in 
the diagnosis to be "in the high 90 percent." FN6 
Dr. Coffin reviewed the testing and was also very 
confident that the tumor was Ewing's Sarcoma. In 
fact, Dr. Coffin testified that the diagnosis was 
rendered with near certainty. 
FN4. Docket No. 345, Ex. 32. 
FN5. Id. 
FN6. Docket No. 334, Ex. 4, at 31. 
*2 In addition to immunohistochemical staining, 
Ewing's Sarcoma may be diagnosed through cyto-
genetic and molecular genetic testing. Ewing's cells 
often manifest a chromosomal translocation (an 
"ll;22 translocation"), which may be detected 
through these tests. The presence of an 11;22 trans-
location indicates that a specimen is Ewing's Sar-
coma. Cytogenetic testing may be performed only 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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on fresh or frozen tissue. Where a tissue sample is 
placed in formalin or paraffin, cytogenetic testing is 
not possible. Although not optimal, molecular test-
ing can be performed on tissues samples that have 
been placed in formalin or paraffin. 
In 2003, PCMC would commonly attempt to con-
duct cytogenetic testing on sarcoma tissue samples 
that were excised at PCMC where "there was ad-
equate sample left over after the standard pathology 
examination." FN7 Molecular testing was available 
through an affiliated institution. In 2003, it would 
not have been unusual for a PCMC pathologist to 
send samples out for molecular testing to provide 
further diagnostic information. 
FN7. Docket No. 345, Ex. 15, at 23. 
Because the tissue removed from P.J.'s mouth by 
Dr. Christensen was placed in formalin or paraffin, 
cytogenetic testing could not be performed on that 
specimen. There were still tumor cells in P.J.'s 
mouth, which could have been extracted for this 
purpose. However, this would have required further 
surgery to obtain a sample. In contrast, molecular 
testing could have been performed on the tissue 
sample obtained by Dr. Christensen. 
Dr. Wagner discussed the diagnosis of P.J.'s tissue 
sample with Dr. Coffin. She told him that she was 
confident in the diagnosis and that no further test-
ing was needed. According to Dr. Coffin, where the 
cell appearance and immunohistochemical staining 
fit "the criteria for the diagnosis of Ewing's sar-
coma," it is not necessary to perform cytogenetic or 
molecular testing to establish the diagnosis.FN8 
FN8. Docket No. 334, Ex. 3, at 43-44. 
On May 21, 2003, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens 
for more than an hour. Dr. Wagner expressed his 
confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis and 
explained the need for chemotherapy to begin right 
away. Dr. Wagner further explained the difference 
between localized and non-localized Ewing's Sar-
coma. Specifically, Dr. Wagner informed the Jen-
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sens that the cure rate for localized disease-where 
there is no evidence of cancer in places other than 
where it was discovered-was approximately 70% 
when treated with the recommended chemotherapy, 
but that the cure rate for non-localized (metastatic) 
disease was as low as 20%. Thus, Dr. Wagner ex-
plained the necessity of beginning treatment right 
away to prevent the cancer from spreading 
throughout P.J.'s body. 
That same day, radiographic examinations were 
performed on P.J.'s neck, thorax, chest, and skull to 
determine whether the cancer had spread beyond 
the floor of P.JVs mouth. Each of these tests re-
turned negative. Ms. Jensen testified that at this 
point they asked Dr. Wagner "if there was any oth-
er test he could run to help confirm that it was 
Ewing's and he said no." FN<) "He was sure it was 
Ewing's." FNl° 
FN9. Docket No. 345, Ex. 12, at 127. 
FNlO./tf. at 134. 
*3 During the May 21, 2003 visit, the Jensens 
asked Dr. Wagner to have P.J.'s tissue sample sent 
to the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute at Harvard Uni-
versity for a second opinion. Dr. Wagner informed 
the Jensens that insurance companies often would 
not pay for a second opinion and encouraged them 
to contact their insurance provider. Nonetheless, 
Dr. Wagner agreed to the second opinion and sent 
the tissue sample to Dana-Farber as requested. The 
Jensens ultimately cancelled the Dana-Farber con-
sultation. 
The Jensens met with Dr. Wagner again on May 29, 
2003. At this meeting the Jensens asked Dr. Wagn-
er to order a Positron Emission Tomography 
("PEP1) scan. Dr. Wagner refused to order a PET 
scan, explaining that it would not be useful in P.J.'s 
situation because there was no other evidence of 
metastatic disease. Dr. Wagner further explained to 
the Jensens that a negative PET scan would not 
change the need for chemotherapy. The Jensens 
again asked Dr. Wagner if there were other tests to 
confirm the Ewing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner said no. 
By early June 2003, the Jensens and Dr. Wagner 
differed significantly in their views regarding P.J.'s 
medical care. Accordingly, a meeting between the 
Jensens, Dr. Wagner, Dr. Lemons (head of the on-
cology department), a PCMC social worker, and 
PCMC's head of quality assurance was scheduled 
for June 9, 2003, at PCMC. Dr. Wagner again em-
phasized the need to begin treating P.J. with 
chemotherapy right away in order to prevent the 
cancer from spreading. The Jensens1 statements dur-
ing the meeting are disputed. The Jensens contend 
that they refused to consent to the proposed chemo-
therapy based on their desire for further confirmat-
ory tests. Dr. Wagner contends that they refused 
chemotherapy because they wanted to pursue an al-
ternative treatment called Insulin Potentiation Ther-
apy. Regardless, the parties were unable to resolve 
the impasse. During the meeting, the PCMC head 
of quality assurance told the Jensens that a referral 
to the Division of Child and Family Services 
("DCFS") might be necessary. The Jensens left the 
meeting, telling the PCMC representatives, "You're 
fired." FNM 
FNll./tf, Ex. 13, at 181. 
At some point, Dr. Corwin of Safe and Healthy 
Families-a division of PCMC with the responsibil-
ity of ensuring that patients are not left untreated-be-
came involved in P.J.'s case. Around June 12, 2003, 
Dr. Corwin attempted to make contact with the Jen-
sens. Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen had a lengthy tele-
phone conversation on June 15, 2003, but were un-
able to reach an agreement as to P.J.'s medical care. 
Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attemp-
ted to schedule a further meeting to discuss the situ-
ation. At that point, the decision was made to refer 
P.J/s case to DCFS for medical neglect in refusing 
what the doctors believed was medically necessary 
treatment. 
On June 16, 2003, a regularly-scheduled meeting 
was held at PCMC with representatives from 
DCFS, PCMC, and other community organizations 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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in the child welfare system. Dr. Wagner and Dr. 
Corwin were also present. At this meeting, and in a 
case summary submitted to DCFS, Dr. Wagner 
summarized his interaction with the Jensens. A 
formal referral to DCFS was made that same day. 
The parties dispute whether it was Dr. Corwin or 
Dr. Wagner who actually submitted the referral. For 
purposes of the summary judgment motions, the 
Court must presume the latter. 
*4 DCFS assigned PJ.'s case to Ms. Cunningham, a 
DCFS social worker. Dr. Wagner and Dr. Corwin 
provided Ms. Cunningham with information regard-
ing their understanding of PJ.'s situation, both or-
ally and by written case summaries. Ms. Cunning-
ham was also present at the June 16, 2003 meeting 
at PCMC. Based on communications with Dr. Wag-
ner, Ms. Cunningham was under the impression 
that PJ.'s situation was a medical emergency and 
that something needed to be done within a matter of 
hours or days. 
On June 18, 2003, Ms. Cunningham, through As-
sistant Attorney General Lund, filed a Verified Pe-
tition and Motion to Transfer Custody and Guardi-
anship (the "Verified Petition") in the Third District 
Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, Utah (the 
"Juvenile Court"). Ms. Cunningham filed the Veri-
fied Petition based entirely on the information 
provided to her by Drs. Wagner and Corwin. She 
did not do any independent investigation of PJ.'s 
referral. 
On June 20, 2008, the Jensens first appeared before 
the Juvenile Court. Ms. Eisenman represented 
DCFS in place of Ms. Lund and became the 
primary Assistant Attorney General on PJ.'s case. 
At that hearing, the Jensens' attorney, Mr. Frank 
Mylar, represented that the Jensens were interested 
in obtaining further tests of the tissue sample ex-
cised by Dr. Christensen. The Court continued the 
hearing until July 10, 2003, as the parties indicated 
that a stipulation regarding PJ.'s treatment was pos-
sible. 
Around this time, the Jensens sought out Dr. Birk-
Page4 
mayer, who practiced in Vienna, Austria. After re-
viewing PJ.'s medical records, Dr. Birkmayer in-
dicated to the Jensens that he was not "totally con-
vinced" that P.J. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that 
chemotherapy was not necessary.FN12 The Jensens 
expressed their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer super-
vise PJ.'s treatment. On July 2, 2003, Ms. Eisen-
man sent an email to Dr. Birkmayer in which she 
asked questions regarding, among other things, Dr. 
Birkmayer's qualifications and licensure and wheth-
er Austria had a standard of care similar to that 
used by the American Academy of Pediatrics. After 
receiving Ms. Eisenman's email from Dr. Birkmay-
er, Mr. Mylar instructed Ms. Eisenman not to con-
tact Dr. Birkmayer directly, but to direct inquiries 
regarding Dr. Birkmayer to Mr. Mylar. According 
to Mr. Jensen, the Jensens abandoned their desire to 
have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. at that time because 
DCFS was requiring that PJ.'s medical care be 
provided by a board-certified pediatric oncologist. 
FN12. Docket No. 345, Ex. 48. Notably, 
Plaintiffs represent that they submit Dr. 
Birkmayer's statements only to illustrate 
the effect they had on the Jensens' mental 
state and not for the truth of the matter as-
serted. 
In late June 2003, Dr. Wagner left Utah to pursue a 
new job in Ohio. He informed Ms. Eisenman that 
he was leaving and that she could contact Dr. Lem-
ons or Dr. Albritton if she needed anything. In pre-
paration for the July 10, 2003 hearing, Ms. Eisen-
man disclosed to the Juvenile Court that she inten-
ded to prove her case using three medical experts: 
Drs. Coffin, Wagner, and Albritton. In preparation 
for the hearing, Ms. Eisenman provided Dr. Albrit-
ton with materials related to the case, including Dr. 
Wagner's case summary and a list of questions that 
might be asked. Mr. Mylar objected to the introduc-
tion of testimony at the July 10, 2003 hearing be-
cause the hearing was set for a pre-trial conference 
and not an evidentiary hearing. The Juvenile Court 
affirmed the objection and Drs. Albritton and 
Coffin did not testify at that time. 
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*5 At the July 10, 2003 hearing, the Jensens again 
raised the issue of whether P.J. really had Ewing's 
Sarcoma. The parties stipulated that the Jensens 
would have P.J. examined by doctors at the Chil-
dren's Hospital of Los Angeles ("CHLA") and that 
the Jensens would abide by their treatment recom-
mendations. The Juvenile Court set another pretrial 
conference for July 28, 2003. Per the stipulation, 
the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where P.J. met 
with Dr. Tishler on July 21, 2003. At this meeting, 
Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he was re-
commending chemotherapy based on the prior 
pathology tests, but that CHLA would do its own 
pathology analysis and genetic testing to confirm 
the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis. The Jensens were 
unhappy with this result as they believed that Dr. 
Tishler was not performing an independent evalu-
ation, but was merely deferring to the PCMC doc-
tors. 
Based on this dissatisfaction, the Jensens did not re-
turn again to CHLA, but instead sought medical 
care from Dr. Charles Simone. Dr. Simone initially 
agreed to treat P.J. However, upon learning of the 
legal battle in which the Jensens were entrenched, 
Dr. Simone declined involvement. Nonetheless, the 
Jensens believed that Dr. Simone would still agree 
to treat P.J. if the Juvenile Court would permit it. 
At the hearing on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile Court 
received a report from Dr. Tishler via telephone re-
garding P.J.'s evaluation at CHLA. Dr. Tishler in-
dicated that to his knowledge the CHLA testing was 
not yet complete. However, he also stated that there 
was no question that P.J. had a malignant tumor 
that would require chemotherapy right away and 
that the remaining pathological and radiological 
tests would serve only to clarify what type of tumor 
he had for purposes of tailoring the chemotherapy 
to P.J.'s needs. The Jensens' new attorney, Mr. 
Blake Nakamura, advocated the Jensens' concern 
that not all of the testing had been completed. Non-
etheless, based on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the Ju-
venile Court ordered that P.J. commence chemo-
therapy before August 8, 2003, without regard to 
the CHLA test results. The Juvenile Court also 
provided that should the test results indicate that 
chemotherapy was not needed, the Jensens were 
free to bring that fact to the Juvenile Court's atten-
tion. 
Mr. Nakamura also represented to the Juvenile 
Court at the July 28 hearing that the Jensens were 
not comfortable with Dr. Tishler and would prefer 
that P.J. be treated by Dr. Simone. During the hear-
ing, the Juvenile Court asked Dr. Albritton whether 
Dr. Simone could be the primary treating physician. 
Dr. Albritton answered: 
No, we wouldn't make him the primary oncologist. 
My understanding, in fact, is that he is not board 
certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical 
oncology. He's-from what little I know, he's a 
specialist in complimentary and alternative medi-
cine. So the gist I get is that he would be asking 
someone either in Utah or L.A. to be prescribing 
the chemotherapy and then he would be suggest-
ing the complimentary approaches that might di-
minish side effects and so on. I do not think there 
will be an oncologist in Utah or L.A. who would 
let him prescribe the chemotherapy from New 
Jersey.™13 
FN13. Docket No. 334, Ex. 33-C, 50-51. 
*6 The Juvenile Court also asked Dr. Tishler 
whether P.J.'s primary treating physician needed to 
be a board certified oncologist. Dr. Tishler 
answered: "Definitely. There's no other physician 
that could lead the care and provide the care." 
FNH
 Based on this, the Juvenile Court ordered that 
P.J.'s primary treating physician be a board certified 
pediatric oncologist or hematologist, but that Dr. 
Simone was authorized to work with P.J.'s other 
treating physicians. The Court also scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition for Au-
gust 20, 2003, in the event P.J.'s situation was not 
yet resolved. 
FNH. M a t 53-54. 
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The Jensens never returned to CHLA or PCMC to 
receive the ordered chemotherapy for PJ. Instead, 
they sought evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic in 
Houston, Texas. Around August 6, 2003, the Jen-
sens contacted the Burzynski Clinic to inquiry 
whether it could treat P.J. On August 7, 2003, an 
employee of the Burzynski Clinic called the Jen-
sens to indicate that the Clinic was willing to see 
him. Accordingly, an appointment was set for Au-
gust 12,2003. 
At this point, the Jensens apparently believed that 
they did not have to comply with the Juvenile 
Court's order to begin chemotherapy by August 8, 
2003, and that this would only result in the Juvenile 
Court's holding the August 20, 2003 evidentiary 
hearing on the Verified Petition. Thus, on August 8, 
2003, the Jensens took P.J. and the rest of their 
children to Bear Lake in Idaho to go boating. From 
Idaho, they planned to travel to Houston for PJ. to 
be evaluated at the Burzynski Clinic on August 12. 
Having not received confirmation that P.J.'s chemo-
therapy was underway, Ms. Eisenman sought a 
hearing with the Juvenile Court on August 8, 2003, 
for the purpose of seeking authorization to take PJ. 
into protective custody. Ms. Eisenman called Mr. 
Nakamura to notify him of her intent to obtain a 
protective custody order. Present at the August 8, 
2003 hearing were Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunning-
ham, P.J.'s guardian ad litem, and Mr. Nakamura. 
Mr. Nakamura participated in the August 8 hearing 
by telephone. Mr. Nakamura indicated that P.J. was 
not receiving chemotherapy, that the Jensens did 
not want to initiate chemotherapy, and that they 
were taking PJ. to the Burzynski Clinic for evalu-
ation. In response to the disclosure of the Jensens' 
intent to seek evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic, 
Ms. Cunningham paged Dr. Albritton, who then 
participated in the hearing by telephone. The Juven-
ile Court and counsel asked Dr. Albritton whether 
the Burzynski Clinic was qualified to provide PJ /s 
treatment. Dr. Albritton indicated that Dr. Burzyn-
ski was not a board certified oncologist-hemato-
logist and that his clinic is known for providing ex-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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tremely controversial therapy. Dr. Albritton further 
indicated that she was unaware of any pediatric on-
cologists at the Burzynski Clinic, but would need 
more time to confirm that fact. Finally, Dr. Albrit-
ton testified that the Burzynski Clinic was not an 
appropriate option for a newly-diagnosed cancer 
patient who had not exhausted standard treatment 
options. 
*7 Ms. Eisenman then filed an Application to Take 
a Child Into Protective Custody. This application 
was supported by an affidavit signed by Ms. Cun-
ningham on August 8, 2003. Attached to Ms. Cun-
ningham's affidavit was an affidavit executed by 
Dr. Wagner on July 22, 2003. The Juvenile Court 
signed an order authorizing DCFS to take PJ. into 
protective custody, finding that it was in P.J.'s best 
interest. Ms. Eisenman enlisted the help of Sandy 
City Police Officer Peterson, whom she had contac-
ted earlier that day, to help serve the warrant. Of-
ficer Peterson was unable to serve the warrant be-
cause the Jensens had already left for Bear Lake 
earlier that day. 
Mr. Nakamura informed the Jensens that the Juven-
ile Court had signed a "pickup order" and that P.J. 
was to be placed in DCFS custody to begin chemo-
therapy. Despite this, the Jensens decided to stay in 
Idaho and seek an independent opinion of PJ/s 
condition in preparation for the evidentiary hearing 
scheduled for August 20, 2003. 
On August 13, 2003, P.J.'s guardian ad litem filed a 
motion for an order to show cause. After hearing 
the motion that same day, the Juvenile Court 
entered a bench warrant for the Jensens' arrest and 
ordered them to appear and present P J. However, a 
Juvenile Court clerk told Ms. Eisenman and P.J.'s 
guardian ad litem that a Juvenile Court warrant 
would not be placed on a national database, which 
would require an adult warrant. Perhaps recogniz-
ing this, Ms. Eisenman announced to the Jensens' 
attorneys and P.J.'s guardian ad litem that if the 
Jensens did not cooperate with the Juvenile Court 
orders, she would have to go to local and federal 
law enforcement authorities. 
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Based on information provided by Ms. Eisenman to 
Officer Peterson, the Salt Lake County District At-
torney's Office agreed to screen the Jensen matter 
for criminal charges on August 15, 2003. Ms. Eis-
enman, Ms. Cunningham, and P.J.'s guardian ad 
litem attended the August 15 screening. That same 
day, the District Attorney's Office filed criminal 
charges against the Jensens, including one count of 
custodial interference and one count of kidnaping. 
On August 16, 2003, Mr. Jensen was arrested in 
Idaho where he spent four days in jail before he 
was released on bail. Upon Mr. Jensen's arrest, Ms. 
Jensen left Idaho and took P.J. to Houston in an at-
tempt to meet with the Burzynski Clinic. However, 
the Burzynski Clinic refused to see P.J. because 
Ms. Eisenman and P.J.'s guardian ad litem informed 
the clinic that the State had been granted protective 
custody over P.J. and did not consent to his treat-
ment. 
The Juvenile Court held a non-evidentiary hearing 
on August 20, 2003. In that hearing, Mr. Nakamura 
read a letter written by Mr. Jensen and explained 
that the Jensens wished to have an opportunity to 
present evidence. The Juvenile Court agreed to set 
an evidentiary hearing, but refused to lift the war-
rants. 
Shortly after this hearing, Ms. Eisenman assumed a 
new position in the Attorney General's Office and 
no longer participated in P.J.'s case. Additionally, 
Mr. Anderson, Director of DCFS, was asked by a 
representative of Utah's Governor to personally as-
sist in negotiating a resolution to P.J.'s case. Ac-
cordingly, on August 27, 2003, Mr. Anderson flew 
to Idaho to meet with the Jensens where negoti-
ations continued for several days. 
*8 On September 5, 2003, the parties entered into a 
stipulation in which the Jensens agreed to submit 
P J . to the care of Dr. Johnston-a board-certified pe-
diatric oncologist-of St. Luke's Hospital in Boise, 
Idaho, and to abide by his treatment recommenda-
tions. DCFS agreed to ask the Juvenile Court to re-
turn full custody of P.J. to the Jensens and to vacate 
the warrants. After receiving assurances that the 
Jensens would submit to chemotherapy if Dr. John-
ston recommended it, the Juvenile Court approved 
the stipulation. 
After performing his evaluation, Dr. Johnston con-
cluded that P.J. needed chemotherapy. The Jensens 
again refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy, 
claiming that Dr. Johnston was merely rubber-
stamping the diagnosis of the PCMC doctors. Mr. 
Jensen told Dr. Johnston that if P.J. ever did receive 
chemotherapy at St. Luke's, he would "make sure 
it's a hellish experience for everybody involved." FN,S 
FN15. Docket No. 344, Ex. 11, at 700-01. 
Another hearing was held in the Juvenile Court on 
October 8, 2003. At the October 8 hearing, Dr. 
Johnston testified that he had confirmed P.J. had 
Ewing's Sarcoma and that the Jensens had rejected 
his recommendation that P.J. undergo chemother-
apy. Assistant Attorney General Mark May, who 
replaced Ms. Eisenman on P.J.'s case, indicated that 
the parties would attempt to reach a settlement. 
Having determined that the Jensens would not sub-
mit P J . to chemotherapy under any circumstances, 
DCFS filed a Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition 
on October 22, 2003. In its Motion, DCFS stated 
that its decision to dismiss the Verified Petition was 
made with full recognition that without chemother-
apy P.J.'s chances of survival would fall dramatic-
ally. Nonetheless, DCFS concluded that it was 
simply unworkable to attempt to force a 
13-year-old boy to undergo chemotherapy unwill-
ingly. 
On October 2, 2003, the Jensens entered a plea 
agreement with the State on the criminal charges. 
The Jensens agreed to enter a guilty plea and abey-
ance on the custodial interference charge in ex-
change for the State's promise to dismiss the kid-
naping charge. 
III. DISCUSSION 
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In July 2005, the Jensens filed a Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Utah, against the State of Utah, Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, 
Dr. Wagner, Dr. Corwin, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Albritton, 
and Ms. Eisenman. In their Complaint, the Jensens 
allege the following causes of action: (1) § 
1983-violation of the substantive due process right 
to direct medical care (2) § 1983-violation of the 
substantive due process right to familial associ-
ation; FNI6 (3) § 1983-malicious prosecution under 
the Fourth Amendment; (4) § 1983-violation of the 
Ninth Amendment; (5) violation of article I, section 
1 of the Utah Constitution; (6) violation of article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution; (7) violation of 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; (8) vi-
olation of article I, section 25 of the Utah Constitu-
tion; (9) wrongful initiation; and (10) intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 
sociation is grounded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment concept of liberty") 
(unpublished decision); Suasnavas v. 
Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647, 654 (10th Cir. 
Aug. 25, 2006) ("The right of familial as-
sociation is a substantive due process right 
...."))(unpublished decision); Chatwin v. 
Barlow, 2008 WL 501109, at *4 (D.Utah 
Feb. 20, 2008) ("The Tenth Circuit has re-
cognized that the freedom of familial asso-
ciation is a substantive right guaranteed by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.") (unpublished decision). 
Based on the long line of cases employing 
the standards set forth in Griffen, the Court 
Finds that the Jensens' familial association 
claims arise from and are appropriately 
analyzed under Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
FN 16. In their Complaint, the Jensens al-
lege that Defendants violated their right to 
familial association under both the First 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in 
the Tenth Circuit "the familial right of as-
sociation is properly based on the 'concept 
of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment.' " 
Griffen v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 
(10th Cir .1993). The Court recognizes that 
the Tenth Circuit has, in dictum, recog-
nized a First Amendment right "to enter in-
to and maintain certain intimate or private 
relationships." Grace United Methodist 
Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 
358 (10th Cir.2006) (dealing with express-
ive association). Nonetheless, the Tenth 
Circuit has consistently analyzed familial 
association claims within the substantive 
due process framework, even in cases de-
cided subsequent to the Grace United 
Methodist Church case. See Estate of Her-
ring v. City of Colorado Springs, 233 Fed. 
Appx. 854, 856 (10th Cir. May 18, 2007) 
(recognizing that "the familial right of as-
*9 After removing the case to this Court, the De-
fendants filed motions to dismiss. In an Order dated 
June 16, 2006, the Court dismissed the State of 
Utah on the basis of sovereign immunity and Drs. 
Corwin and Coffin on the basis of absolute im-
munity. The Court also dismissed the fourth and 
eighth causes of action in their entirety and the first 
and third causes of action to the extent they were 
asserted by P.J. IHC has since been voluntarily dis-
missed. 
After the close of discovery on the issue of liability, 
Mr. Anderson, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, 
Dr. Wagner, and Dr. Albritton filed the motions 
presently before the Court, arguing that they are en-
titled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal 
claims based on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, ab-
solute immunity, and qualified immunity. 
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
"Rooker-Feldman precludes federal district courts 
from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction 
over claims 'actually decided by a state court' and 
claims 'inextricably intertwined1 with a prior state-
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court judgment.11 FNI7 The doctrine arises from 28 
U .S.C. § 1257(a), which allows review of state-
court judgments by the United States Supreme 
Court and, by negative inference, precludes lower 
federal courts from exercising such jurisdiction.™18 
FN 17. Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 
F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir .2006) (quoting 
Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 
468, 473 (10th Cir.2002)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
FNI 8. Id. 
Noting that the doctrine had, at times, been applied 
by lower courts far beyond its original contours, the 
Supreme Court declared in the case of Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,Fm9 that ap-
plication of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited 
to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining 
of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings com-
menced and inviting district court review and rejec-
tion of those judgments." FN2° The Tenth Circuit 
summarized the Exxon Mobil holding as follows: 
FN19. 544 U.S. 280(2005). 
FN20. Id. at 284. 
\s the Supreme Court emphasized in Exxon Mobil, 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply 
"simply because a party attempts to litigate in 
federal court a matter previously litigated in state 
court." To the contrary, a party may lose in state 
court and then raise precisely the same legal is-
sues in federal court, so long as the relief sought 
in the federal action would not reverse or undo 
the relief granted by the state court: "if a federal 
plaintiff cpresent[s] some independent claim, al-
beit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state 
court has reached in a case to which he was a 
party ..., then there is jurisdiction....7 " FN21 
FN21. Mo's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237 
(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 
292-94). 
Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman applies only where 
the relief sought in the federal case would "reverse 
or undo the state court judgment." FN22 
FN22. Id. 
Rooker-Feldman has been applied to constitutional 
claims arising from child custody proceedings in 
state courts. For example, in Warnick v. Briggs, 
FN23
 this Court applied the doctrine to a § 1983 
claim alleging various constitutional violations 
against several state actors, seeking review of the 
circumstances surrounding the removal of the 
plaintiffs child by the state without a pre-removal 
hearing.FN24 The Court found that "if it adjudic-
ated Plaintiffs' claims relating to [the child's] re-
moval, [it] would effectively act as an appellate 
court in reviewing the juvenile court's disposition." 
FN25
 Applying Rooker-Feldman in that situation 
made sense as the juvenile court heard and decided 
the issue of whether the circumstances justified the 
child's removal, and the plaintiff did not challenge 
the "integrity of the evidence" before the juvenile 
court.FN26 
FN23. 2007 WL 3231609 (D.Utah Oct. 30, 
2007). 
FN24. Id. at*9-10. 
FN25. Id. a t * 10. 
FN26. Id. 
*10 However, where a plaintiffs federal cause of 
action is for injury sustained as a result of actions 
taken during the course of the custody proceedings 
that are separate from the judgments of the state 
court, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. The case of 
Brokaw v. Weaver*HZ1 of the Seventh Circuit is 
particularly persuasive on this point and is closely 
analogous to the Jensens' case. In Brokaw, the 
plaintiff was removed from her parents and placed 
in state custody by order of a state court after a so-
cial worker and others fabricated a charge of child 
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neglect.FN28 Subsequently, another state court 
found no continuing basis to hold the plaintiff in 
state custody and released her to her parents.™29 
Years later, after reaching the age of majority, the 
plaintiff brought suit in federal court against the so-
cial worker and the others who made up the neglect 
charges, alleging violations of her right to familial 
relations under substantive due process, violation of 
the Fourth Amendment in her removal, and viola-
tion of procedural due process.FN3° The district 
court dismissed the case based on application of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
FN27. 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir.2002). 
FN28. Id. at 662. 
FN29. Id. at 663. 
FN30. Id 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ac-
tions of the defendants "violated her constitutional 
rights, independently of the state court decision." 
FN31
 The court recognized that the plaintiffs injur-
ies would not have happened without the state 
court's order directing her removal and placing her 
in state custody. Nonetheless, the court found that 
the plaintiffs claims were independent of the state 
court judgments, emphasizing that even if the 
plaintiff "would not have suffered any damages ab-
sent the state order ... her claim for damages [was] 
based on an alleged independent violation of her 
constitutional rights. It was this separate constitu-
tional violation which caused the adverse state 
court decision." FM2 Thus, the true cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries was the defendant's actions, even 
though the injuries would not have occurred absent 
the state court's order.FN33 
FN3i./^.at665. 
FN32. Id. at 667; see also Holloway v. 
Borsh, 220 F.3d 767, 778-79 '(6th 
Cir.2000) (finding § 1983 suit against 
caseworker independent of state custody 
proceedings based on actions taken by the 
Page 10 
caseworker during the course of the state 
proceedings). 
FN33. Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 667. 
In this case, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine does not apply to the Jensens' claims, 
as they seek relief independent from any judge-
ments rendered by the state courts. The Jensens do 
not seek to reverse or undo any judgments of the 
state courts. After all, the Verified Petition was ulti-
mately dismissed and full custody of P.J. returned 
to the Jensens. Rather, the Jensens' claims are based 
on the separate conduct of the Defendants previous 
to and during the course of the proceedings in the 
state courts. Although the Juvenile Court was 
surely called upon to balance the parental rights of 
the Jensens with the State's interest in protecting 
P.J.'s welfare, nothing in the record indicates that 
either the Juvenile Court or the state criminal court 
heard and ruled on claims that the Defendants de-
liberately misrepresented and omitted material facts 
to the state courts, to each other, to the District At-
torney's Office, or others involved in the events sur-
rounding P.J.'s medical care in 2003. 
*11 Thus, the Jensens allege independent claims 
similar to those in the Brokaw case. Although much 
of the injury alleged by the Jensens would not have 
resulted in the absence of the Juvenile Court's or-
ders, the Jensens argue that the underlying cause of 
those orders was the Defendants' factual misrepres-
entations and omissions. The Jensens' claims are 
different from those in the Warnick case, where the 
state court entered specific findings of fact on the 
very events complained of by the plaintiffs and 
where there was no challenge to the integrity of the 
evidence. It is true that granting relief to the Jen-
sens in this case might require the Court to enter 
findings that contradict issues decided by the state 
court. However, this does not, of itself, invoke the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.FN34 Thus, the constitu-
tional injury alleged by the Jensens is separate and 
independent from any orders of the state courts, 
precluding application of the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine. 
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FN34. Mo's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237. 
It must be noted, however, that the Jensens' claims 
are properly before this Court only to the extent 
that they allege the Defendants engaged in conduct 
that was not brought before the Juvenile Court or 
conduct that materially affected the integrity of the 
evidence on which the Juvenile Court relied. It is 
not for this Court to decide whether P.J. actually 
had Ewing's Sarcoma or whether the Juvenile Court 
properly balanced the State's interest in protecting 
children and the Jensens' constitutional rights. 
Those issues, and other similar matters, were 
squarely ruled on by the Juvenile Court and could 
only be properly challenged by the Jensens through 
an appeal. 
B. Absolute Immunity 
"The Supreme Court has recognized the defense of 
absolute immunity from civil rights suits in several 
well-established contexts involving the judicial pro-
cess." FN35 "[S]tate attorneys and agency officials 
who perform functions analogous to those of a pro-
secutor in initiating and pursuing civil and adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings are absolutely im-
mune from suit under section 1983 concerning 
activities intimately associated with the judicial ... 
process." FN36 The Tenth Circuit has recognized 
that social workers are entitled to absolute im-
munity when they meet this criteria. FN37 
FN35. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 
(10th Cir. 1990). 
FN36. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908 
(10th Cir.2000) (quoting Pfeiffer v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 
(10th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
FN37. Snell, 920 F.2d at 687-91 (quoting 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 
(1976)). 
The Court applies a "functional approach" to de-
termine whether activities are sufficiently connec-
ted with the judicial process to merit absolute im-
munity. FN38 A prosecutor is entitled to absolute 
prosecutorial immunity "when performing the tradi-
tional functions of an advocate." FN39 Thus, a pro-
secutor enjoys absolute immunity even when he or 
she is accused of making misrepresentations to the 
court, as long as the actions were taken in the role 
of an advocate.FN4° "However, absolute immunity 
does not extend to actions 'that are primarily in-
vestigative or administrative in nature,' though it 
'may attach even to such administrative or investig-
ative activities when these functions are necessary 
so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an 
officer of the court.' " FNm 
FN38. Id. at 686. 
FN39. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 
131(1997). 
FN40. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n. 34. 
FN41. Scott, 216 F.3d at 908 (quoting 
Pfeiffer, 929 F.2d at 1490) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
*12 As a general rule, witnesses who testify in a ju-
dicial proceeding, whether during trial or before, 
are likewise entitled to absolute immunity from suit 
arising from their testimony.™42 However, abso-
lute witness immunity is not available to 
"complaining witnesses"-"the person (or persons) 
who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecu-
tion of the plaintiff'-for testimony "that is relevant 
to the manner in which the complaining witness ini-
tiated or perpetuated the prosecution." FN4X 
FN42. Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 
1400 (10th Cir. 1992). 
FN43.A/. at 1399 n. 2, 1402. 
As explained below, the Court finds that Ms. Eisen-
man and Dr. Albritton are absolutely immune from 
all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims. Ms. Cunningham 
is likewise entitled to absolute immunity with re-
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gard to her decision to file the Verified Petition, but 
is not so entitled with regard to the rest of the con-
duct alleged in the Jensens' Complaint 
Ms Eisenman Ms Eisenman argues that she is ab-
solutely immune from the Jensens' claims arising 
from functions performed in her role as an advocate 
or in fulfillment of her duties as an officer of the 
Juvenile Court The Jensens claim that Ms Eisen-
man engaged in a number of harmful activities out-
side the scope of her advocate role, which are 
grouped as follows for purposes of analysis (I) 
factual misrepresentations and omissions made to 
the Juvenile Court, (2) misrepresentations to Ms 
Cunningham, Mr Anderson, and Utah Attorney 
General Shurtleff, FN44 (3) factual misrepresenta-
tions and omissions made to the District Attorney's 
Office; and (4) other investigative activities Addi-
tionally, although not discussed by the Jensens, Ms 
Eisenman contends that she is immune from claims 
arising from the August 2003 letter to the Burzyn-
ski Clinic in which Ms Eisenman informed the 
Clinic of the custody order and forbade the clinic 
from providing any treatment to P J The Court 
finds that Ms Eisenman is entitled to absolute im-
munity with respect to all of the Jensens § 1983 
claims 
FN44 The Jensens also claim that a mis-
representation was made to the Guardian 
ad Litem, but offer no citation to evidence 
that would support this assertion 
Ms Eisenman is absolutely immune with regard to 
the first group-misrepresentations made to the Ju-
venile Court Even assuming that Ms Eisenman in-
tentionally misrepresented facts to the Juvenile 
Court, those misrepresentations were made in her 
role as an advocate There is no evidence that any 
of the alleged misrepresentations were made under 
oath or as a witness 
The Court likewise finds that Ms Eisenman is en-
titled to absolute immunity with regard to the 
second group-misrepresentations to others involved 
in the Juvenile Court proceedings Ms Eisenman's 
Page 12 
communications with these persons were all dir-
ectly related to the Juvenile Court proceedings Ms 
Cunningham and Mr Anderson from DCFS were 
Ms Eisenman's clients Attorney General Shurtleff 
was Ms Eisenman's co-prosecutor, whose name 
was on the Juvenile Court pleadings The parties 
have not cited, nor has additional research un-
covered, any cases dealing with the question of 
whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute im-
munity for communications with her clients and co-
counsel Nonetheless, these communications are 
directly related to a prosecutor's ability to present 
the State's case, satisfying the guiding principle of 
prosecutorial immunity-proximity to the "judicial 
process and the initiation and presentation of the 
state's case" FN4S A prosecutor must be able to 
freely speak with her chent-the very person for 
whom he is advocating-and the other prosecutors 
assigned to the case without fear that their commu-
nications may later form the basis of a civil suit 
These communications likely include discussions 
of, among other things, trial preparation and 
strategy, discussion of applicable law, as well as 
plea and settlement opportunities Allowing claims 
to proceed against a prosecutor based on informa-
tion shared (or not shared) during the course of dis-
cussions with his client and/or his fellow prosecutor 
would interfere with the prosecutor's ability to 
present the State's caseFN46 Thus, the public 
policy behind the prosecutorial pnvilege-"to allow 
functionaries in the judicial system the latitude to 
perform their tasks absent the threat of retaliatory 
litigation" FN47-fiilly supports Ms Eisenman's en-
titlement to absolute immunity with regard to her 
communications with Ms Cunningham, Mr Ander-
son, and Attorney General Shurtleff 
FN45 Scott, 216 F 3d at 908. 
FN46 Id 
FN47 Snell. 920 F 2d at 686-87 
*13 The Court also finds that Ms Eisenman is en-
titled to absolute immunity with regard to the third 
category-misrepresentations made to the District 
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Attorney. The Jensens have submitted sufficient 
evidence to show that Ms. Eisenman provided the 
District Attorney's Office with factual information 
that led to the criminal charges against the Jensens. 
In the absence of other considerations, this would 
render Ms. Eisenman a complaining witness, ab-
solving her of prosecutorial immunity with regard 
to the criminal case.FN48 However, the Juvenile 
Court had ordered that DCFS take protective cus-
tody of P.J. Despite being apprised by their attorney 
of the Juvenile Court's custody order, the Jensens 
refused to return to Utah and produce P.J. Seeking 
to effectuate the Juvenile Court's order, Ms. Eisen-
man provided information to the District Attorney's 
office which led to the initiation of criminal 
charges. It is clear to this Court that these actions 
were intimately connected with her duties to the Ju-
venile Court.FN49 For these same reasons, Ms. Eis-
enman^ actions in drafting and sending the August 
2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic were also intim-
ately connected with the Juvenile Court proceed-
ings. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Eisen-
man is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to 
the Jensens' claims related to her providing al-
legedly misleading information to the District At-
torney's Office and to her drafting and sending the 
August 2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic. 
FN48. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31. 
FN49. Cf Burrows v. Cherokee County-
Sheriffs Office, 38 Fed. Appx. 504, 506 
(10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2002) (granting im-
munity to prosecutor for his actions in 
seeking extradition order) (unpublished de-
cision). 
With regard to the fourth grouping-investigative 
activities-the Jensens point to two examples of in-
vestigative activities engaged in by Ms. Eisenman: 
(I) providing documents to Dr. Albritton in ad-
vance of a July 10, 2003 hearing; and (2) sending 
an email to Dr. Birkmayer in which she made false 
representations regarding the standard of care for 
Ewing's Sarcoma treatment. Concerning the former, 
the Jensens do not show how providing documents 
to a witness in the course of preparing for a hearing 
is investigative. With respect to the latter, the Jen-
sens offer the following evidence in support of their 
assertion that Ms. Eisenman discovered the stand-
ard mentioned in the email to Dr. Birkmayer 
through her own investigative efforts: (1) Ms. Eis-
enman testified that she could not remember where 
she got the document containing the referenced 
standard; (2) that Dr. Wagner testified that he did 
not give it to her; and (3) that P.J.'s guardian ad 
litem did not recognize the document. Even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Jensens, 
this testimony does not permit an inference that Ms. 
Eisenman obtained the document through her own 
investigative efforts. A number of doctors particip-
ated in DCFS's involvement with PJ. 's situation-
including Drs. Lemons and Albritton, both pediatric 
oncologists-any one of whom might have provided 
this information to Ms. Eisenman. Therefore, the 
Court concludes that Ms. Eisenman is absolutely 
immune from these claims, which are directly re-
lated to Ms. Eisenman's efforts to marshal the evid-
ence and prepare for witness examination. 
*14 Dr. Albritton. The Jensens' claims against Dr. 
Albritton are based on the following allegations: (1) 
that Dr. Albritton stated to Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Mc-
Donald, and the Juvenile Court that only a board-
certified pediatric oncologist was qualified to treat 
P.J.; (2) that Dr. Albritton misrepresented the quali-
fications and services of the Burzynski Clinic to the 
Juvenile Court; and (3) that Dr. Albritton failed to 
disclose to the Juvenile Court and others that genet-
ic testing was routinely conducted at PCMC on 
cases of suspected Ewing's Sarcoma.™50 Each of 
these allegations are directly tied to Dr. Albritton's 
role as an expert witness in which she opined as to 
the medical care required by P.J. and what doctors 
and facilities were capable of providing it. This was 
precisely what Dr. Albritton was subpoenaed to 
testify about. Accordingly, the Court finds that Dr. 
Albritton is entitled to absolute immunity from the 
Jensens' § 1983 claims. 
FN50. In opposing absolute immunity, the 
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Jensens also point to circumstantial evid-
ence that they claims shows Dr. Albritton 
provided false information to Dr. Johnston. 
The Jensens argue that this makes Dr. Al-
britton a complaining witness. However, 
nowhere in their briefs do the Jensens rely 
on this evidence to support their constitu-
tional claims. The Jensens make no effort 
to show how Dr. Albritton's alleged con-
versation with Dr. Johnston violated their 
constitutional rights. 
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens base their § 1983 
claims against Ms. Cunningham on her failure to 
investigate PJ.'s referral before filing the Verified 
Petition and on the factual misrepresentations she 
allegedly made to the Juvenile Court. Ms. Cunning-
ham contends that she is absolutely immune from 
each of the claims asserted by the Jensens because 
she performed only prosecutorial functions. 
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham is entitled to 
absolute immunity, but only with regard to her de-
cision to file the Verified Petition. The Verified Pe-
tition was filed with an accompanying 
"Verification" in which Ms. Cunningham swore un-
der oath that the "matters stated [in the Petition] are 
true." ™51 Although Ms. Cunningham surely ex-
ercised prosecutorial discretion in electing to file 
the petition, she acted outside the scope of any pro-
secutorial function by attesting under oath to the al-
legations in the Verified Petition as a complaining 
witness.™52 Thus, although Ms. Cunningham is 
entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to 
file the Verified Petition, she is not immune from 
the Jensens' claims based their contention that the 
Verified Petition contained misrepresentations and 
omissions. For the same reasons, Ms. Cunningham 
is not immune from the Jensen's claims arising 
from the submission of her August 2003 affidavits, 
which the Jensens claim contained factual misrep-
resentations and omissions. 
FN51. Verified Petition, Docket No. 345, 
Ex. 43, at 6. 
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FN52. Kalina. 522 U.S. at 129-31. 
Finally, Ms. Cunningham is not absolutely immune 
from the Jensens' claims arising from her alleged 
failure to properly investigate PJ.'s referral because 
this duty did not sufficiently relate to the judicial 
proceedings. Certainly, prosecutorial immunity may 
be had for actions in "obtaining, reviewing and 
evaluating evidence" prior to initiation of a crimin-
al action. FNSX However, this is because these in-
vestigative actions "are necessary so that a prosec-
utor may fulfill his function as an officer of the 
court." FN54 Although a judicial proceeding might 
result from its fulfillment, Ms. Cunningham's duty 
to investigate reports of child neglect is for the pur-
pose of protecting the children who are the subject 
of those reports. FN55 Therefore, it cannot be said 
that fulfillment of this duty is intimately associated 
with the judicial process. Accordingly, the Court 
will deny Ms. Cunningham's request for summary 
judgment based on absolute immunity. 
FN53. Snell, 920 F.2d at 693. 
FN54. Id. 
FN55. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-409. 
C. Qualified Immunity 
*15 Each of the Defendants also asserts qualified 
immunity with respect to the Jensens' § 1983 
claims. Where a state actor raises a qualified im-
munity defense in a motion for summary judgment, 
"the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a strict 
two-part test: first, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant's actions violated a constitutional or stat-
utory right; second, the plaintiff must show that this 
right was clearly established at the time of the con-
duct at issue." FN56 "If, and only if, the plaintiff 
meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear 
the traditional burden of the movant for summary 
judgment-showing that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact and that he or she is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." FN57 
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FN56. Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 
1222 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Nelson v. 
McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th 
Cir.2000). 
FN57. Id 
A right is clearly established where "it would be 
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 
unlawful in the situation.11 ™S8 This determination 
must be made "in light of the specific context of the 
case, not as a broad general proposition.11 ™59 
That a right was clearly established can be shown 
by controlling case law in the Tenth Circuit or by 
the weight of authority in other circuits.™60 Not-
ably, though, the Supreme Court has held that 
"officials can still be on notice that their conduct 
violates established law even in novel factual cir-
cumstances.11 ™61 
FN58. Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 
1114 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). 
FN59. Id. (quoting Katz, 533 U.S. at 201). 
FN60./rf.at 1114-15. 
FN61. Id. at 1115 (quoting Hope v. Peizer, 
536 U.S. 730,741(2002)). 
In their § 1983 claims, the Jensens allege that De-
fendants violated their substantive due process 
rights and their rights to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
I. Substantive Due Process 
In their first and second causes of action, the Jen-
sens ™62 claim that each of the Defendants en-
gaged in substantive due process violations of the 
Jensens' rights to familial association and to direct 
P.J.'s medical care. 
FN62. In its June 2006 Order, the Court 
dismissed P.J.'s claims for violation of his 
right to refuse unwanted treatment. Thus, 
P.J. proceeds only on his familial associ-
ation claim. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state 
may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law ." ™6' In ad-
dition to procedural protections, the Due Process 
Clause also provides two forms of "substantive11 
protection: (1) protection against government action 
that "shocks the conscience11 and (2) protection of 
fundamental liberty interests.™64 In the case of 
Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, the Tenth Circuit re-
cently clarified that these two "strands of the sub-
stantive due process doctrine11 are not mutually ex-
clusive.™65 Rather, "by satisfying either the 
'fundamental right1 or the 'shocks the conscience1 
standards, a plaintiff states a valid substantive due 
process claim." FN66 The Seegmiller court admon-
ished: "Courts should not unilaterally choose to 
consider only one or the other of the two strands. 
Both approaches may well be applied in any given 
case.11 FN67 
FN63. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1. 
FN64. Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 
F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir.2008). 
FN65. Id at 767, 769. 
FN66. Id. at 767. 
FN67. Id. at 769. 
A substantive due process claim based on arbitrary 
and oppressive government action is established 
where the conduct in question is so egregious that it 
"shocks the conscience of federal judges.11 FN68 
Mere negligence is clearly insufficient to meet this 
standard.™69 For that matter, even an intentional 
or reckless abuse of power that causes the plaintiff 
injury does not, of itself, meet the "shocks the con-
science11 standard.FN7° Rather, there must be "a 
degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of poten-
tial or actual harm that is truly conscience shock-
ing.11 ™7« 
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FN68. Ward v. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929, 
938 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Moore v. Gu-
thrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th 
Cir.2006)) (internal quotations marks omit-
ted). 
FN69. Id. at 937. 
FN70. Id. at 937-38. 
FN71./rf. at 938. 
*16 A substantive due process plaintiff asserting a 
fundamental liberty interest must narrowly articu-
late its scope.™72 The Court must then determine 
whether the asserted interest is "objectively, deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed." FN73 Should both of these hurdles be 
cleared, the plaintiff must then show that the gov-
ernment actor's conduct infringed on the plaintiffs 
fundamental liberty interest and was "not narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." FN74 
FN72. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 769 
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702,721 (1997)). 
FN73. Id. (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 
538 U.S. 760, 775-76 (2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
FN74. Seegmiller, 528 FJd at 767. 
The Jensens claim that Defendants infringed on 
their right to direct P.J.'s medical care and their 
right to familial association. The Supreme Court 
has recognized that the Due Process Clause 
"protects the fundamental right of parents to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control 
of their children." FN75 This "fundamental right" 
encompasses both of the liberty interests asserted 
by the Jensens, calling for application of the com-
pelling interest/narrowly tailored standard. In 
Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,™16 the Tenth Circuit 
reversed a district court for applying the "shocks 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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the conscience" standard to the substantive due pro-
cess claims of two parents against the state for in-
fringing on their right to direct the medical care of 
their children.FN77 Although it ultimately declined 
to delineate the applicable standard due to the scant 
record before it, the court included a parent's right 
to direct the medical care of his or her children 
among those fundamental rights for which a sub-
stantive due process claim may be stated without 
meeting the "shocks the conscience" standard.™78 
FN75. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 
(2000) (plurality opinion). 
FN76. 336 FJd 1194 (10th Cir.2003). 
FN77. Id at 1202-03. 
FN78. Id. 
Dr. Wagner contends that the Jensens have not nar-
rowly articulated their right to direct P.J.'s medical 
care and, therefore, are not entitled to application of 
the compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard. 
More specifically, Dr. Wagner argues that the Jen-
sens' claim to absolute autonomy in directing the 
medical care decisions of their son conflicts with 
the " 'Constitution's notions of ordered liberty,' 
which have always protected a child's right to treat-
ment whenever it has been unreasonably denied by 
a parent." FN79 The Court agrees with this general 
proposition. However, with a few notable excep-
tions that are discussed below, the Court does not 
read the Jensens' claimed right so broadly. The Jen-
sens do not claim a right to direct P.J.'s medical 
care free of any State interference. Rather, they 
claim that the State cannot interfere with their right 
to direct P.J.'s medical care by making deliberate 
and material factual misrepresentations and omis-
sions to state courts and other decision makers dur-
ing the process by which that interference is accom-
plished. As the Court recognized in its June 2006 
Order, when the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s med-
ical care is placed in this context, it is not only fun-
damental, but is also clearly established ,FN8° 
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FN79. Docket No. 381, at 2. 
FN80. Docket No. 52, at 22, 34, 41 (citing 
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 
1297-99 (10th Cir.2004); Dubbs, 336 F.3d 
at 1202-03). 
*17 The proper standard for claims of familial asso-
ciation is more complicated. As a fundamental 
liberty interest,™81 the right to familial associ-
ation between a parent and his or her child would 
logically be governed by the same standard applic-
able to other fundamental rights. However, the 
Tenth Circuit has consistently applied a balancing 
test to claims for infringement of the familial asso-
ciation right.FN82 In Griffen v. Strong, the Tenth 
Circuit called for a balancing test to determine 
whether a state actor's conduct "constituted an un-
due burden" on a plaintiffs right to familial associ-
ation.™83 A court applying the undue burden test 
should balance the plaintiffs right to familial asso-
ciation against the relevant interests of the state, 
considering the "severity of the alleged infringe-
ment, the need for the defendant's conduct, and any 
possible alternatives." FN84 This standard clearly 
involves lower scrutiny than the compelling in-
terest/narrowly tailored test applicable to other fun-
damental rights. Indeed, the Griffen test requires 
the plaintiff to show that the state actor directed his 
conduct at the familial relationship "with know-
ledge that the ... conduct will adversely affect that 
relationship." FN85 
FN81. Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 
1127 (10th Cir.2006) (reciting parents' fun-
damental right to "care, custody and con-
trol of their children" in removal context). 
FN82. See, e.g., Griffen v. Strong, 983 
F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir.1993) (applying 
"undue burden" balancing test to substant-
ive due process claim based on right of fa-
milial association between husband and 
wife); Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 
647, 656 (10th Cir.2006) (applying Griffen 
undue burden test) (unpublished decision). 
FN83. Griffen, 983 F.2d at 1547. 
FN84. Id. at 1548. 
FN85. Id. 
In its June 2006 Order, the Court opted to apply the 
Griffen standard as it remains good law in the Tenth 
Circuit, but noted the conflict between the compel-
ling interest/narrowly tailored and undue burden 
standards. As the Seegmiller decision had no occa-
sion to specifically consider the right to familial as-
sociation in the child-welfare context or the long 
line of Tenth Circuit cases applying the undue bur-
den test, the Court will continue to apply the Grif-
fen standard to the Jensens' familial association 
claims. 
Clearly, "the right to associate with one's family is 
a very substantial right." FN86 However, this right 
"has never been deemed absolute or unqualified." 
FN87
 It is clear that the state may interfere with the 
right to familial association, even without prior no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard, where such ac-
tion is needed to ensure the safety of a child. FN88 
Thus, the Court must weigh the State's interest in 
protecting children against the Jensens' interest in 
familial association, given the factual record 
presented, to determine whether the State's interfer-
ence constituted an undue burden on the Jensens' 
right to familial association. 
FN86./& 
FN87. Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 
1490 (10th Cir. 1994). 
FN88. Gomes, 451 F.3d at 1128-29. 
With this framework in mind, the Jensens' substant-
ive due process claims against Dr. Wagner, Ms. 
Cunningham, and Mr. Anderson are considered be-
low. FN89 
FN89. As discussed above, Ms. Eisenman 
and Dr. Albritton are entitled to absolute 
immunity on all of the Jensens' § 1983 
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Dr. Wagner. The Jensens claim that Dr. Wagner vi-
olated their substantive due process rights based on 
the following allegations: (1) Dr. Wagner refused to 
perform genetic and molecular testing despite the 
Jensens' requests; (2) Dr. Wagner made this de-
cision because of his desire to enroll P.J. in a clinic-
al trial, which he did not disclose to the Jensens; (3) 
Dr. Wagner discouraged the Jensens from seeking a 
second opinion and then attempted to influence that 
opinion; (4) Dr. Wagner did not inform Dr. Lem-
ons, Dr. Albritton, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Lowichik, Dr. 
Corwin, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, or the 
Juvenile Court of his refusal to order genetic and/or 
molecular testing; and (5) Dr. Wagner told Ms. 
Cunningham that P.J. could be dead in five days in 
order to persuade her to skip the normal investigat-
ive process. 
*18 Having closely examined the record, the Court 
finds the Jensens have not established that Dr. 
Wagner violated their substantive due process 
rights. It is undisputed that Drs. Lowichik and 
Coffin diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's Sarcoma after 
performing imrnunohistochemical testing. Accord-
ing to Dr. Coffin, this diagnosis was rendered with 
near certainty. Dr. Lowichik estimated her level of 
certainty "in the high 90 percent." FN90 Dr. Coffin 
told Dr. Wagner that she was confident in the dia-
gnosis and that no further testing was needed. This, 
according to Dr. Wagner, coupled with the need for 
immediate treatment, was the reason he did not or-
der additional testing. When the Jensens would not 
agree to begin treatment that he believed was ne-
cessary to save P.J.'s life, Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s 
case to DCFS. The Jensens offer no competent 
evidence to place these facts in dispute. Rather, the 
Jensens ask the Court to draw a number of unreas-
onable inferences, which the record plainly will not 
support, in order to attribute a more dubious pur-
pose to Dr. Wagner's actions. 
FN90. Docket No. 345, Ex. 16, at 31. 
First, the Jensens point to the fact that Dr. Wagner 
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was an administrator of a clinical trial for which 
P.J. might have been eligible, arguing that this was 
the reason behind Dr. Wagner's refusal to order 
more testing and his insisting on immediate chemo-
therapy treatment. Even assuming that it was inap-
propriate to refuse further testing and that Dr. Wag-
ner did refuse the testing with the study in mind, 
the Jensens were free, at that point, to take P.J. to 
another facility and another doctor for further test-
ing. Thus, Dr. Wagner's refusal to order further 
testing did not, of itself, violate the Jensens' right to 
direct P.J.'s medical care free from unreasonable 
state interference. 
Moreover, outside of P.J.'s possible eligibility to 
participate in the trial, the Jensens have produced 
no evidence that Dr. Wagner's decisions were mo-
tivated based on a desire to enroll PJ. in the trial. 
Indeed, the record would not permit such an infer-
ence. It is undisputed that the trial required enroll-
ment within 30 days of the diagnostic biopsy-
which, in P.J.'s case, occurred on May 2, 2003. 
Thus, on June 2, 2003, P.J. was no longer eligible 
to participate in the trial. If Dr. Wagner's refusal to 
order the tests and his push to immediately begin 
chemotherapy were motivated by a desire to enroll 
P.J. in the clinical trail, surely his efforts would 
have ceased or changed course after June 2, 2003. 
However, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner's efforts 
to ensure that P.J. received chemotherapy continued 
after this date. It was not until after June 2, 2003, 
that Dr. Wagner involved Dr. Corwin. At the June 
9, 2003 meeting at PCMC, Dr. Wagner again em-
phasized the need for P.J.'s chemotherapy to begin 
immediately before the cancer spread throughout 
his body. Finally, it was not until June 16, 2003, 
that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS. In 
light of these undisputed facts, it is entirely unreas-
onable to infer that Dr. Wagner's motivation for not 
ordering further testing and seeking immediate 
treatment was to enroll P.J. in the clinical trial. 
*19 The Jensens next contend that Dr. Wagner dis-
couraged them from seeking a second opinion and 
then attempted to interfere with that opinion. In 
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support of this claim, the Jensens testified that Dr. 
Wagner told them that insurance companies would 
often not pay for a second opinion, which would re-
quire the Jensens to pay for it. The Jensens also cite 
an email sent by Dr. Wagner to the oncologist who 
was to perform the second opinion, in which he 
stated, 
Dear Dr. Grier, 
( am a pediatric oncologist sat [sic] the University 
of Utah, and I was wondering if you could 
provide consultation for a patient being followed 
in our clinic. This 12-year-old boy underwent ex-
cision of a dome-shaped lesion at the floor of the 
mouth. After careful review by Cheryl Coffin and 
other pathologists here in Salt Lake, the diagnosis 
of Ewing's sarcoma has been made. Supporting 
this diagnosis are the presence of small round 
blue cells which stain for 0 1 3 , FLI-1, and vi-
mentin. There is a weak positivity of S-100. De-
smin and actin are negative, as are epithelial 
markers, CD3, and CD45. There was no fresh or 
frozen tissue to send for RT-PCR for Ewing's 
translocations, although this possibly could be 
done on archival paraffin-embedded tissue. If 
there is significant diagnostic uncertainty, addi-
tional fresh tissue could likely be obtained by re-
excision, as the margins were clearly positive. 
[ have discussed these results with the family, and 
expressed my confidence in the thorough histolo-
gic work-up that has been done by expert person-
nel. However, the family is interested in pursuing 
a second opinion, and has requested that we sed 
[sic] the tslides [sic] and tissue block to you for 
further review. I have explained that you are an 
oncologist and not a pathologist, etc., and that 
further consultations will delay the start of ther-
apy (the child is now 19 days post-resection, as 
the tissue was initially sent to a pathologist in 
Washington who made a diagnosis of "poorly dif-
ferentiated malignancy" after performing a lim-
ited immunihistovemocal [sic] work-up). Never-
theless, at their request, I am sending by FedEX 
the tissue to your institution addressed to you. I 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
would greatly appreciate your help in expediting 
pathologic review so we can commence with 
treatment for this young man.FN9! 
FN91. Docket No. 345, Ex. 41 , at LMW 8. 
This evidence does not rise to the level of a uncon-
stitutional infringement of the Jensens' right to dir-
ect P.J.'s medical care. Whatever his motivations, 
the Jensens have offered no evidence that Dr. Wag-
ner's statement regarding the likelihood of insur-
ance coverage was false. Although Dr. Wagner 
clearly expressed confidence in the Ewing's Sar-
coma diagnosis, along with his desire to quickly be-
gin treatment, the above email does not support a 
reasonable inference that Dr. Wagner attempted to 
interfere with the second opinion sought by the Jen-
sens. 
Finally, and most important to their substantive due 
process claims, the Jensens claim that Dr. Wagner 
did not tell others involved in P.J.'s case-including 
Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, and the Juvenile 
Court-of his refusal to order further diagnostic tests 
despite the Jensens' requests and that he falsely told 
Ms. Cunningham that P.J. would be dead within 
five days. With respect to the former, even assum-
ing that Dr. Wagner did in fact fail to tell others 
about his refusal to order the genetic and/or mo-
lecular tests, there is no evidence that he did so de-
liberately. Rather, as outlined above, the record 
demonstrates that Dr. Wagner believed that those 
tests were unnecessary and would delay needed 
treatment based on the diagnosis of Drs. Coffin and 
Lowichik. To the extent the Jensens claim substant-
ive due process rights that would impose liability 
on Dr. Wagner for failing to disclose seemingly ir-
relevant facts, such rights are not implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, do not 
merit protection under the compelling interest/ 
narrowly tailored standard. 
*20 With respect to the latter, it is undisputed that 
Dr. Wagner communicated the emergency nature of 
P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS. The Jensens have 
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not provided any evidence that Dr. Wagner did not 
actually believe this to be true. Instead, they con-
tend that Dr. Wagner convinced Ms. Cunningham 
to forgo normal investigatory procedures by over-
stating the immediacy of P.J.'s medical needs, 
telling her that P.J. would be dead within five days. 
The Jensens base this assertion entirely on Mr. An-
derson's deposition testimony. However, Mr. An-
derson did not testify that Dr. Wagner made this 
statement, but that someone told Ms. Cunningham 
that P.J. would die within five days. Although Mr. 
Anderson agreed that it was likely the referring 
doctors, he "never verified who ... made the state-
ment." FN92 More important, Mr. Anderson's testi-
mony on this point is inadmissible hearsay and, 
therefore, must be disregarded.FN93 Accordingly, 
the record merely shows that Dr. Wagner commu-
nicated his belief to Ms. Cunningham that P.J. re-
quired immediate medical treatment to give him the 
best chance possible of surviving Ewing's Sarcoma, 
as diagnosed by the pathologists at PCMC. 
FN92. Docket No. 345, Ex. 2, at 321. 
FN93. Argo v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 
Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.2006). 
In summary, the Jensens ask the Court to find that 
Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process 
rights to familial association and to direct P.J.'s 
medical care based on unreasonable inferences that 
stretch the record far beyond its actual content. This 
does not satisfy their burden of establishing a viola-
tion of their constitutional rights. 
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct in 
providing medical care for P.J. and referring his 
case to DCFS after the Jensens would not consent 
to P.J.'s treatment were narrowly tailored to serve 
the State's compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren. The record demonstrates that Dr. Wagner re-
ferred P.J.'s case to DCFS after the Jensens refused 
to consent to chemotherapy treatment which Dr. 
Wagner reasonably believed was necessary to save 
P.J.'s life. There were, perhaps, additional measures 
that Dr. Wagner could have taken that might have 
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avoided the need to involve DCFS. For example, he 
might have ordered the additional tests despite his 
belief that they were unnecessary and would delay 
needed treatment. However, the constitution does 
not place an affirmative duty on him to do so where 
he reasonably believed P.J.'s life was in danger. To 
the extent the Jensens claim to the contrary, their 
substantive due process rights are no longer within 
the boundaries of fundamental rights and, therefore, 
are only entitled to protection under the shocks the 
conscience standard-which Dr. Wagner's conduct 
does not do. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds it im-
portant that any actual interference with the Jen-
sens' substantive due process rights was accom-
plished by referring the case to DCFS, filing the 
Verified Petition, and presenting P.J.'s case to a 
neutral judge-not by simply removing P.J. from his 
parents and forcing him to undergo chemotherapy. 
Indeed, the Jensens received ample opportunities to 
present their side of the story to the Juvenile Court. 
They were represented by counsel throughout the 
Juvenile Court proceedings. The Jensens correctly 
contend that the Constitution would not permit in-
terference with their substantive due process rights 
by means of intentional misrepresentations to the 
Juvenile Court. However, as outlined above, the 
Jensens have simply not submitted evidence from 
which the Court can conclude that Dr. Wagner de-
liberately misrepresented the events and circum-
stances surrounding P.J.'s medical care to either the 
Juvenile Court or others involved in P.J.'s case. 
*21 For these same reasons, the Court finds that Dr. 
Wagner's conduct did not unduly burden the famili-
al association rights of the Jensens and P.J. Dr. 
Wagner's decision to refer P.J. to DCFS minimally 
infringed the Jensens' familial association rights, 
preserving ample opportunity for the Jensens to 
present their interests to the Juvenile Court. Perhaps 
further discussion might have led to a more amiable 
solution, but in light of the perceived need for im-
mediate treatment, it was entirely reasonable to 
submit P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS authorities. 
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Again, the Jensens are correct that intentional and 
material factual misrepresentations and omissions 
on the part of Dr. Wagner to either DCFS repres-
entatives or the Juvenile Court would surely have 
interfered with their associational rights on a much 
grander scale. However, the record simply does not 
sustain these allegations. Accordingly, the Court 
will grant Dr. Wagner's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment with respect to the Jensens' substantive due 
process claims. 
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cun-
ningham violated their substantive due process 
rights in two ways: (I) by failing to properly invest-
igate PJ.'s referral; and (2) by making deliberate 
factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Ju-
venile Court. 
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham did not viol-
ate the Jensens' constitutional rights by failing to 
investigate the representations of Drs. Wagner and 
Corwin. The Jensens' claims have important simil-
arities to the Eighth Circuit case of Thomason v. 
SCAN Volunteer Services, /nc.FN94 The plaintiff in 
Thomason brought a substantive due process claim 
against a state social worker for violation of her 
right to "the care, custody and management" of her 
infant child.FN95 The social worker received a re-
port from a doctor who was treating the plaintiffs 
child, including two letters and an article from the 
Journal of Pediatrics, which stated his concern that 
the plaintiff might be suffering from a psychologic-
al disorder that causes her to partially suffocate her 
child in order to garner the attention of health care 
professionais.FN% Without investigating the alleg-
ations, the social worker removed the child from 
the plaintiffs custody and "arguably mischaracter-
ized" the doctor's report in an affidavit to the juven-
ile court. FN97 The Eighth Circuit held that the so-
cial worker's failure to investigate did not violate 
the parent plaintiffs constitutional rights where she 
relied on the doctor's "reasonable suspicion that 
life-threatening abuse [was] occurring in the 
home." FN98 
FN94. 85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir.1996). 
FN95. Id. at 1370. 
FN96. Id. at 1368. 
FN97.W. at 1372. 
FN98./tf. at 1373. 
Similar to the social worker in Thomason, Ms. Cun-
ningham relied on the information provided to her 
by PJ.'s treating physician in filing the Verified Pe-
tition. The Jensens have produced no evidence that 
Ms. Cunningham had reason to suspect the inform-
ation and opinions given to her by Drs. Wagner and 
Corwin were misleading. Rather, the Jensens con-
tend that if Ms. Cunningham would have fulfilled 
her duties under Utah law to investigate PJ.'s refer-
ral, she would have discovered the misrepresenta-
tions and omissions allegedly made to her by the 
doctors. However, any duty to investigate that Ms. 
Cunningham may have had under State law cannot 
form the basis of a § 1983 claim for violation of 
substantive due process.FN99 
FN99. See Jones v. City and County oj 
Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th 
Cir.1988) ("Section 1983 does not, 
however, provide a basis for redressing vi-
olations of state law, but only for those vi-
olations of federal law done under color of 
state law."). 
*22 In this emergency situation, like the one in 
Thomason, Ms. Cunningham was reasonable in re-
lying on the information provided to her by the doc-
tors, even in the absence of any further investiga-
tion. Dr. Wagner communicated to Ms. Cunning-
ham that PJ.'s situation was a medical emergency 
and that PJ.'s life was in danger, thus implicating 
the State's compelling interest in PJ.'s safety. The 
means used by Ms. Cunningham to address the 
State's compelling interest in the emergency medic-
al situation were narrowly tailored. Ms. Cunning-
ham did not seek to immediately remove PJ. from 
the home. Rather, she filed the Verified Petition, 
thus instituting a state court proceeding where the 
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Jensens would have an opportunity to rebut the 
doctor's allegations If the situation had been rep-
resented to Ms Cunningham as something less than 
an urgent medical emergency, perhaps a duty to in 
vestigate could be constitutionally required Such a 
duty may be needed in non emergency situations in 
order to curb "overzealous suspicion and interven-
tion on the part of health care professionals and 
government officials," which "may have the effect 
of discouraging parents and care takers from com-
municating with doctors or seeking appropriate 
medical attention for children with real or poten-
tially hfe-threatenmg conditions" FNI0° However, 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that Ms 
Cunningham did not reasonably believe the doctors' 
contentions that P J 's life was in danger and imme-
diate action was necessary to ensure his welfare 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have 
not established a constitutional violation of either 
their right to familial association or their right to 
direct P J's medical care with respect to Ms Cun-
ningham's actions in failing to investigate P J 's re-
ferral and in filing the Verified Petition 
FN 100 Thomason, 85 F 3d at 1373 
The Court also finds that the Jensens have not es-
tablished a constitutional violation based on Ms 
Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and omis-
sions to the Juvenile Court As an initial matter, the 
Court notes that the Jensens have failed in their op 
position memorandum to point out the specific fac-
tual misrepresentations and omissions on which 
they base their claim against Ms Cunningham As 
the Jensens bear the burden of establishing a consti-
tutional violation of the their substantive due pro-
cess rights, this failure alone entitles Ms Cunning-
ham to qualified immunity FNl01 
FN 101 "Judges are not like pigs, hunting 
for truffles buried in briefs" US v 
Gnebel. 2008 WL 1741503, * 4 (10th Cir 
Apr 14, 2008) (quoting Gross v Burggraf 
Constr Co, 53 F 3d 1531, 1546 (10th 
Cir 1996)) 
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Nonetheless, having carefully reviewed their op-
position memorandum, the Jensens appear to base 
their substantive due process claims on three in-
stances in which they contend Ms Cunningham 
made factual misrepresentations and omissions to 
the Juvenile Court (1) the Verified Petition, and (2) 
an August 8, 2003 affidavit, and (3) an August 18, 
2003 affidavit The Jensens have not brought forth 
any evidence that Ms Cunningham knew that the 
information contained in the Verified Petition was 
misleading or deficient As outlined above, Ms 
Cunningham had no constitutional duty to investig-
ate the information provided her by PCMC doctors 
before filing it Thus, Ms Cunningham's statements 
in the Verified Petition do not establish a violation 
of the Jensens' substantive due process rights Ac-
cordingly, the Jensens' substantive due process 
claims depend entirely on the misrepresentations 
and omissions allegedly made by Ms Cunningham 
in her August 2003 affidavits 
*23 Assuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the 
"misrepresentations and omissions" made by Ms 
Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits do not 
establish a constitutional violation The Jensens 
claim that Ms Cunningham made the following 
misrepresentations and omissions in both her Au-
gust 8 and August 18 affidavits (I) stating that a 
sample of P J 's tumor was sent to Dana-Farber for 
a second opinion without stating that the second 
opinion was never given, (2) stating that P J under-
went a CT and Bone Scan without stating that these 
tests were normal, (3) stating that the Jensens 
wanted to use IPT to treat P J when they were actu-
ally no longer interested, (4) omitting to state that 
the "controlling" genetic tests were not yet com-
plete, (5) omitting to state that she had not actually 
spoken with Dr Coffin, (6) referring to Dr Birk-
mayer as a man rather than as a doctor, and (7) stat-
ing that Dr Tishler recommended in the July 28, 
2003 hearing that P J should begin chemotherapy 
when Dr Tishler had actually reserved his final 
opinion until all the testing was complete 
Upon close inspection of the circumstances in 
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which Ms. Cunningham submitted her August 2003 
affidavits, the alleged misrepresentations and omis-
sions were of little, if any, consequence. Of the al-
leged misrepresentations and omissions listed 
above, only numbers 4 and 7 have any potential 
significance. However, the record clearly reveals 
that they cannot support the Jensens' claims. 
In the hearing held on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile 
Court clearly ordered that P.J. begin chemotherapy 
by August 8, 2003. The Jensens did not begin P.J.'s 
chemotherapy by that date. Ms. Cunningham's Au-
gust 2003 affidavits were submitted with the State's 
application to take P.J. into protective custody as a 
result of the Jensens' failure to begin P.J.'s chemo-
therapy. 
The hearing transcript shows that Dr. Tishler did in 
fact recommend that P.J. begin chemotherapy at the 
July 28 hearing and that any burden to place further 
test results before the Juvenile Court was on the 
Jensens. At the July 28 hearing, Mr. Nakamura 
clearly advocated the Jensens' concern that some of 
the testing was not yet completed. Dr. Tishler indic-
ated that there was no question that P.J. had a ma-
lignant tumor that would require chemotherapy and 
that the remaining pathological and radiological 
tests would merely serve to clarify what type of tu-
mor he had. Upon hearing and accepting this, the 
Juvenile Court ordered that P.J.'s chemotherapy be 
commenced before August 8, 2003, without regard 
to the test results. The Juvenile Court also stated in 
the July 28 hearing that should the test results in-
dicate that chemotherapy was not needed, the Jen-
sens were free to bring that to the court's attention. 
Thus, numbers 4 and 7 were not misrepresentations 
or omissions at all, as demonstrated by the hearing 
transcript itself. 
The other alleged misrepresentations and omissions 
were plainly immaterial. Numbers one, two, and 
three are listed in Ms. Cunningham's August 18 af-
fidavit as information provided to her by Dr. Wagn-
er around June 16, 2003. Although this information 
provided useful background information, it was 
clearly not material to the issues before the Juvenile 
Court in mid-August 2003. Those issues centered 
on the Jensens' failure to comply with the Juvenile 
Court's order that P.J. begin chemotherapy by Au-
gust 8, 2003. With respect to number 5, Ms. Cun-
ningham did not state that she spoke with Dr. 
Coffin. Rather, she merely states that according to 
Dr. Coffin, the Jensens had Dr. Christensen do a 
second oral surgery on P.J.'s mouth resulting in an 
additional sample that was sent to the University of 
Washington-a fact that the parties do not dispute. 
Finally, and exemplary of the "misrepresentations 
and omissions" the Jensens allege Ms. Cunningham 
made, Ms. Cunningham's reference to Dr. Birkmay-
er as a man rather than a doctor was not material to 
the matters before the Juvenile Court at that time. 
*24 The Court finds that the misrepresentations and 
omissions allegedly made by Ms. Cunningham 
were completely immaterial to the issues before the 
Juvenile Court and, therefore, did not interfere with 
the Jensens' substantive due process rights, even 
under the compelling interest/narrowly tailored 
standard.™102 As outlined above, Ms. Cunning-
ham instituted process before a State court of com-
petent jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of medic-
al neglect against the Jensens. In this proceeding, 
the Jensens' fundamental rights to direct the cus-
tody, care, and control of their son were carefully 
balanced by a neutral judge. There is simply insuf-
ficient evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately 
misrepresented or omitted material facts to the Ju-
venile Court. 
FN 102. Accordingly, the Court also finds 
that Ms. Cunningham's actions did not vi-
olate the Jensens' substantive due process 
rights under the undue burden and shocks 
the conscience tests. 
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens allege that Mr. Ander-
son violated their rights to familial association and 
to direct P.J.'s medical care by (1) interfering with 
their ability to select their doctors; (2) refusing to 
withdraw the Verified Petition; (3) intentionally 
failing to disclose material facts to the Juvenile 
Court; and (4) failing to properly train and super-
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vise DCFS case workers. The Court finds the Jen-
sens have not established that Mr. Anderson viol-
ated their substantive due process rights. 
First, the Jensens claim that Ms. Anderson violated 
their right to direct PJ.'s medical care by insisting 
that the State select the doctor who would treat PJ. 
According to the Jensens, a parent is entitled to 
choose the doctor who will provide medical treat-
ment to their child as long as the alternatives are 
reasonable. They contend that Mr. Anderson "took 
the position that the State could force the parents to 
go to the court and let the court decide which physi-
cian was 'better,' " FNI03 thus preventing the Jen-
sens from placing P.J. under the care of either Dr. 
Birkmayer or Dr. Simone. 
FN103. Docket No. 340, at 9. 
The Court finds, based on the circumstances of the 
case, that this does not amount to a constitutional 
violation of the Jensens' right to direct PJ.'s medic-
al care. Mr. Anderson's involvement with PJ.'s case 
did not begin until late August 2003. By this time, 
the Juvenile Court had already held a number of 
hearings to determine the medical care that was in 
PJ.'s best interest. To that end, the Juvenile Court 
ordered PJ. to begin chemotherapy administered by 
a board-certified pediatric oncologist by August 8, 
2003. The Jensens did not meet this deadline and 
the Juvenile Court granted protective custody of 
P J. to the State. It was at this point that Mr. Ander-
son become involved in the case, attempting to ne-
gotiate a mutually agreeable solution. In his negoti-
ations, Mr. Anderson took the position that PJ. 
must be treated with chemotherapy by a board-
certified pediatric oncologist. This position was in 
accord with both the Juvenile Court's order and the 
opinion of Dr. Tishler who had evaluated P J. Most 
important, as even the Jensens' acknowledge, Mr. 
Anderson's position was that if the Jensens wanted 
a different doctor, they could make their request to 
the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court was readily 
available to hear and determine whether the Jen-
sens' desire to have a different doctor treat PJ. was 
in his best interest. In light of these undisputed 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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facts-particularly the fact that the negotiations were 
conducted during the course of the Juvenile Court 
proceedings, which provided ample process-Mr. 
Anderson's "position" that having a board-certified 
pediatric oncologist treat PJ. was in his best in-
terest was narrowly tailored to serve the State's 
compelling interest in protecting PJ. Accordingly, 
such does not amount to a constitutional violation. 
*25 The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson viol-
ated their constitutional rights by refusing to with-
draw the medical neglect allegations despite his ad-
mission that the Jensens were not neglectful par-
ents. The Jensens base this assertion on their depos-
itions, in which they testified that during negoti-
ations with Mr. Anderson in late August 2003, Mr. 
Anderson said, "I understand you're a great parent. 
I can see that, but we can't let you go. We can't 
have it over. It's gone too far." FNI04 The Jensens 
ask the Court to infer from this that Mr. Anderson 
knew the Jensens were not guilty of medical neg-
lect but chose to maintain the Verified Petition any-
way for political reasons. 
FNI04. Docket No. 345, at % 382. 
These statements do not establish a violation of the 
Jensens' substantive due process rights. The negoti-
ations between the Jensens and Mr. Anderson 
began in late August 2003, after the Juvenile Court 
had already granted protective custody of PJ. to the 
State and ordered that he undergo chemotherapy to 
treat the cancer that multiple medical professionals 
indicated he had. Mr. Anderson traveled to Idaho in 
an attempt to negotiate an amiable resolution with 
the Jensens. The above statements were allegedly 
made during the course of these negotiations. Upon 
this background of undisputed facts, the Court can-
not reasonably infer from Mr. Anderson's alleged 
statements that the medical neglect allegations were 
baseless, that Mr. Anderson knew it, and that he ad-
mitted as much to the Jensens. Mr. Anderson's at-
tempt to negotiate a workable solution to the out-
of-hand situation in no way interfered with the Jen-
sens' right to familial association or their right to 
direct PJ.'s medical care. 
im to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported m F Supp 2d, 2008 WL 4372933 (D Utah) 
(Cite as: 2008 WL 4372933 (D.Utah)) 
Page 25 
The Jensens also allege that Mr Anderson violated 
their substantive due process rights by intentionally 
failing to inform the Juvenile Court of the follow-
ing (I) definitive testing had never been performed 
on P J ' s tissue, and (2) Dr Johnston had materially 
breached his agreement to refrain from rendenng a 
diagnosis before completing the independent test 
mg 
These allegations provide neither a factual nor legal 
basts to find that Mr Anderson violated the Jen 
sens' substantive due process rights With regard to 
first alleged omission, the Jensens have not directed 
the Court to evidence that Mr Anderson knew the 
Juvenile Court was unaware of the possibility for 
genetic testing or that genetic tests were 
"definitive" Rather, they cite to the deposition 
testimony of P J 's guardian ad litem in which she 
indicates that she was unaware of the possibility for 
genetic testing until September 4, 2003 This does 
not show that Mr Anderson intentionally withheld 
information about genetic testing from the Juvenile 
Court Moreover, the Jensens repeatedly stated their 
desire for further testing during the Juvenile Court 
proceedings 
With respect to the second alleged omission, the 
Jensens contend that Mr Anderson was aware that 
Dr Johnston had determined to recommend chemo-
therapy before receiving the results of the genetic 
tests in violation of the September 5, 2003 stipula-
tion and that Mr Anderson failed to inform the Ju-
venile Court of this fact Mr Anderson testified that 
he understood Dr Johnston would perform an inde-
pendent evaluation of P J 's medical condition, in-
cluding independent testing, before rendenng a fi-
nal treatment recommendation Mr Anderson also 
testified that he was aware the genetic tests were 
not finished when Dr Johnston determined to re 
commend chemotherapy However, there is no 
evidence that Mr Anderson understood that render 
mg a diagnosis before completion of the genetic 
testing breached the September 5 stipulation The 
deposition testimony cited by the Jensens only 
refers to "independent testing" FM0S There is no 
indication in either Mr Anderson's testimony, or in 
the wntten stipulation, that Dr Johnston could not 
have sufficiently confirmed the diagnosis through 
independent testing, like the pathological testing 
conducted by Dr Coffin, even though the genetic 
testing was not complete Moreover, there is no 
evidence showing that Mr Anderson intentionally 
withheld the fact that the genetic testing was in-
complete from the Juvenile Court The Court can-
not find that Mr Anderson was deliberately with-
holding information from the Juvenile Court based 
merely on the fact that he knew the genetic tests-
which Dr Johnston testified were immaterial to his 
treatment recommendation-were not yet complete 
Most important, the Jensens have failed to show 
how Mr Anderson's alleged failure to disclose this 
information interfered with their right to direct 
P J 's medical care The Jensens refused to follow 
Dr Johnston's treatment recommendations, which 
lead to DCFS's decision to dismiss the case shortly 
thereafter The only action taken by the Juvenile 
Court subsequent to Dr Johnston's recommendation 
was to dismiss the case 
FN 105 Docket No 345, Ex 2, at 249 
*26 Finally, the Jensens argue that Mr Anderson 
should be liable for failure to adequately train and 
supervise DCFS case workers Presumably, al-
though it is far than clear, the Jensens claim that 
Mr Anderson is liable for the injuries resulting 
from Ms Cunningham's actions in failing to prop-
erly investigate P J 's referral because he failed to 
tram her The Jensens cite to the case of City of 
Canton v Hams™106 for the proposition that a 
supervisor who acts with deliberate indifference in 
failing to train and supervise subordinates is subject 
to liability under section 1983 
FN106 489 U S 378(1989) 
The Jensens' failure to tram and supervise claim 
fails for two reasons First, the Jensens have not 
brought any evidence to the Court's attention that 
could show Mr Anderson acted with "deliberate in-
difference" FN107 to the nghts of others in failing 
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to train Ms. Cunningham. Second, the Jensens have 
not established that Ms. Cunningham's conduct vi-
olated their constitutional rights, a prerequisite to 
Mr. Anderson's liability for failure to train her. FN,°8 
FN107.A/.at388. 
FN108.A/. at39l. 
In sum, the Court finds that none of Mr. Anderson's 
actions during his involvement with P.J.'s case in-
terfered with the Jensens' substantive due process 
rights. 
2. Procedural Due Process 
The Jensens claim that each of the Defendants viol-
ated their procedural due process rights. Ms. Cun-
ningham, Ms. Eisenman, and Mr. Anderson present 
argument on these claims. Dr. Wagner incorporates 
these arguments by reference. However, as Ms. Eis-
enman and Dr. Albritton enjoy absolute immunity, 
the Jensens' procedural due process claims against 
them are not discussed. 
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cun-
ningham violated their procedural due process 
rights by failing to properly investigate P.J.'s refer-
ral and by intentionally misrepresenting facts to the 
Juvenile Court. 
At its most basic level, due process ensures that a 
person may not be deprived of an interest in life, 
liberty, or property without "the opportunity to be 
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner." FNI09 As noted by the Court in its June 
2006 Decision, the Due Process Clause also re-
quires that "the notice and hearing ... be fair." 
FNno Accordingly, in considering the Defendants' 
motions to dismiss in June 2006, the Court found 
that the Jensens' allegation that "[Ms. Cunningham] 
intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts in the 
Jensens' case, including the status of allegedly con-
firmatory tests, to the Utah juvenile court" was suf-
ficient to state a claim for violation of their rights to 
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procedural due process/"*m 
FN 109. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
FNI 10. Docket No. 52, at 23 ("[T]he Due 
Process Clause also encompasses ... a 
guarantee of fair procedure.") (quoting 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 
(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
FNlll./rf. 
However, as set forth above, the Jensens have 
failed to submit evidence that Ms. Cunningham de-
liberately made material misrepresentations and 
omissions to the Juvenile Court. Rather, the Jensens 
merely nitpick Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 af-
fidavits. These alleged misstatements are not the 
type of intentional falsities that would render an 
otherwise procedurally sound judicial proceeding 
"unfair." FNn2 Rather, these misrepresentations, 
which dealt with facts known to the Jensens, were 
more properly addressed by the Jensens' counsel at 
the August 8, 2003 hearing before the Juvenile 
Court. For example, the Jensens' counsel could, if 
desired, easily have pointed out to the Juvenile 
Court that Dr. Birkmayer was more than just a 
"man." Thus, the Jensens have not established a vi-
olation of their procedural due process rights with 
regard to the alleged factual misrepresentations and 
omissions. 
FNI 12. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (finding due pro-
cess violation where witness gave perjured 
testimony that he had received no promise 
in return for his testimony when in reality 
he had). 
*27 Additionally, the Court finds that the Jensens' 
had no liberty interest in the investigation of child 
abuse claims required of DCFS case workers under 
Utah law and, therefore, cannot establish a viola-
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tion of their procedural due process rights by virtue 
of Ms. Cunningham's failure to carry out that in-
vestigation. "Protected liberty interests may arise 
from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and 
the laws of the States." FNN3 A State may create a 
liberty interest "by establishing substantive predic-
ates to govern official decision-making ... and by 
mandating the outcome to be reached upon a find-
ing that the relevant criteria have been met." FN"4 
Both of these elements are necessary for the cre-
ation of a liberty interest. Thus, where state law re-
quires the fulfilment of specified substantive pre-
dicates but does not mandate a certain outcome, 
there is no liberty interest.™115 
FN 113. Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 
490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (quoting Hewitt 
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN114. Id. at 462 (quoting Hewitt, 459 
U.S. at 472) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
FNl 15./rf. at 464-465. 
"State-created procedures ... do not create such an 
entitlement where none would otherwise exist." 
FN! i6 A S stated by the Supreme Court: "Process is 
not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to 
protect a substantive interest to which the individu-
al has a legitimate claim of entitlement." FNM7 
For example, in Pierce v. Delta County Department 
of Social Services, the plaintiffs argued that Color-
ado's Child Protection Act created a liberty interest 
by mandating that acts of child abuse be reported 
and properly investigated.™118 The court rejected 
this contention, finding that the Colorado statutes at 
issue merely mandated procedure without dictating 
"a particular substantive outcome or guarantee." FNM9 
FN 116. Pierce v. Delta County Dept. oj 
Soc. Servs., 119 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1152-53 
(D.Colo.2000). 
FN 117. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 
238,250(1983). 
FNl 18. Pierce, 119 F.Supp.2d at 1153. 
FNll9./tf. 
The Jensens contend that Utah law, by statue, im-
poses mandatory duties to perform specific invest-
igative actions before doing anything that might af-
fect parental rights. Even assuming that this is the 
case, the Jensens merely assert a liberty interest in 
process, not in substantive outcomes. The Jensens 
do not point to any section of the Utah Code that 
sets forth a specific substantive predicate that, when 
fulfilled, dictates a specific substantive outcome. 
This does not create the sort of entitlement protec-
ted by the Due Process Clause. 
Thus, the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. 
Cunningham violated their procedural due process 
rights. 
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens claim that Mr. Ander-
son implemented a policy whereby case workers 
would not investigate allegations of medical neglect 
when made by doctors from PCMC and that this 
policy violated their due process rights. FNi2° The 
Jensens also claim that this policy violated their 
right to equal protection. However, because they 
did not plead an equal protection claim, and appar-
ently asserted it for the first time in the summary 
judgment briefing, the Court will not consider this 
argument. 
FN 120. At some point, the Jensens also 
claimed that Mr. Anderson made factual 
misrepresentations and omissions to the 
state courts. However, the Jensens have not 
pursued this theory in their summary judg-
ment briefing and have submitted no evid-
ence to support it. 
The Jensens have failed to submit any evidence that 
DCFS actually had a policy of not investigating 
medical neglect allegations if they were made by 
PCMC doctors. Rather, the Jensens ask the Court to 
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infer that such a policy was instituted by Mr. An-
derson based on the following: (I) Ms. Cunning-
ham did not investigate PJ.'s referral; (2) Ms. Cun-
ningham testified that she believed her actions were 
consistent with DCFS policy; and (3) Ms. Cunning-
ham testified that Mr. Anderson told her she 
handled P.J.'s case appropriately. This evidence is 
simply not enough to show that DCFS had a policy 
of never investigating medical neglect allegations 
made by PCMC doctors. Ms. Cunningham's alleged 
failure to investigate PJ.'s referral took place in a 
situation that was represented to her by Dr. Wagner 
as a medical emergency requiring prompt action. 
To the extent that her alleged failure to investigate 
did represent DCFS policy, it merely shows that 
DCFS policy allowed case workers to File a custody 
petition with a juvenile court of competent jurisdic-
tion without further investigation when presented 
with objectively reasonable allegations of emer-
gency medical neglect made by a doctor charged 
with the child's medical care. As explained in detail 
above, such a policy would not violate a parent's 
rights under the Due Process Clause. Moreover, 
even if DCFS did have a policy of never investigat-
ing referrals submitted by PCMC doctors, such a 
policy did not harm the Jensens in P.J.'s emergency 
case. Thus, the Court finds the Jensens have failed 
to establish that Mr. Anderson violated their pro-
cedural due process rights. 
*28 Dr. Wagner. As the Jensens received ample no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard, any procedural 
due process claims against Dr. Wagner must be 
based on his alleged misrepresentations and omis-
sions. However, as set forth above, the Jensens 
have not submitted competent evidence that Dr. 
Wagner deliberately misrepresented or omitted ma-
terial facts to the Juvenile Court or others involved 
in the case. Moreover, any misrepresentations and 
omissions allegedly made by Dr. Wagner did not 
make the Juvenile Court proceedings unfair. The 
record demonstrates that the Jensens received 
ample opportunity to present their desire for further 
testing in the Juvenile Court. In fact, these desires 
were heard and decided upon by that court. The 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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Jensens have not established that Dr. Wagner viol-
ated their procedural due process rights. 
3. Malicious Prosecution 
In their third cause of action, the Jensens FNI21 al-
lege that each of the Defendants FNM22 violated 
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from un-
reasonable seizures by instituting and continuing a 
"malicious prosecution." Each of the Defendants 
has moved for summary judgment on this claim. 
Notably, the Jensens have failed to respond to Mr. 
Anderson's motion on this point. Accordingly, the 
Court will grant his motion with respect to the 
Fourth Amendment claim. 
FN121. As the Court dismissed P.J.'s 
Fourth Amendment claim in its June 2006 
Order, Mr. and Ms. Jensen proceed without 
him on this claim. 
FNI22. The Jensens' malicious prosecution 
claims against Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Al-
britton are not discussed in light of their 
absolute immunity. 
Under Tenth Circuit law, analysis of a § 1983 claim 
for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is guided by the elements of the com-
mon law tort of malicious prosecution.™123 
However, "the ultimate question in such a case is 
whether plaintiff has proven the deprivation of a 
constitutional right." FNI24 As recently stated by 
the Tenth Circuit in Wilkins v. DeReyes, 
FN 123. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 
913-14 (iOthCir.2007). 
FN 124. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 
797 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Novitsky v. 
City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1257-58 
(10th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution 
claim includes the following elements: (1) the de-
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fendant caused the plaintiffs continued confine-
ment or prosecution; (2) the original action ter-
minated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable 
cause supported the original arrest, continued 
confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant 
acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained 
damages.™125 
FN125.W. at799. 
The Jensens seek damages for malicious prosecu-
tion arising from both the Juvenile Court proceed-
ings and the criminal case. 
a. Juvenile Court Proceedings. 
To establish a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecu-
tion under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff 
must show that a seizure actually occurred.™126 
In Becker v. Kroll, the Tenth Circuit considered a § 
1983 plaintiffs claim that she was seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though she 
"was never arrested, incarcerated, or otherwise 
placed under the direct physical control of the 
state." FNl27 The plaintiff-who was charged with a 
felony offense in a state court-argued that investig-
ation into her alleged criminal activity "imposed 
burdens on her time, finances, and reputation by re-
quiring her to travel to and attend meetings, pay 
legal costs, and eventually, face criminal charges" 
and, therefore, constituted a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.™128 The court declined 
"to expand Fourth Amendment liability in cases 
where the plaintiff has not been arrested or incar-
cerated." FNl29 Specifically, the court noted that 
were it to impose Fourth Amendment liability in 
cases that lacked a traditional seizure, "every char-
ging decision would support a § 1983 malicious 
prosecution-type claim no matter the context." FN,3° 
FN126. Becker, 494 F.3d at 914. 
F N 1 2 7 . M a t 9 1 5 . 
FN128.A/. at 914. 
FN129. W. at 915. 
FNl30. Id. 
*29 It is undisputed that neither Mr. Jensen nor Ms. 
Jensen was arrested, incarcerated, or otherwise 
placed under the direct physical control of the State 
as a result of the proceedings in the Juvenile Court. 
Recognizing this, the Jensens argue that the Court 
should expand the Fourth Amendment concept of 
"seizure" to accord with that proposed in Justice 
Ginsberg's concurrence in Albright v.. 
Oliver.™1*1 The Jensens contend that they 
suffered "significant, ongoing deprivation[s] of 
liberty as a result of the Juvenile Court proceed-
ings," which constitute a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, as follows: 
FN13L 510 U.S. 266(1994). 
rhe Jensens were unable to return to the state of 
Utah (their home) without the threat of arrest and 
removal of their child. They were unable to take 
their child for an evaluation in Houston, and to 
other physicians of their choosing, because the 
State forbid it. They were subjected to mandatory 
court appearances. They were ordered to give up 
their passports. [Mr. Jensen] lost his job, and was 
exposed to serious diminishment of other em-
ployment prospects, both because he was termin-
ated from his previous job, and because he had to 
devote his time, finances, energy and efforts to 
attempting to protect his and his family's rights. 
The Jensens were subjected to close media scru-
tiny and held up to public ridicule and contempt. 
Finally, the Jensens endured the horrible financial 
and emotional strain of defending their family 
from neglect proceedings that were based entirely 
upon misrepresentations and deceit. ™'32 
FN 132. Docket No. 342, at 15-16. 
Although acknowledging the burdens experienced 
by the Jensens in defending themselves, the Court 
simply cannot find that they experienced a Fourth 
Amendment seizure as a result of the Juvenile 
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Court proceedings Tenth Circuit precedent clearly 
mandates the contrary Accordingly, the Court Finds 
that the Jensens have failed to establish a Fourth 
Amendment violation related to the Juvenile Court 
proceedings 
b Criminal Case 
With regard to the criminal case, the Defendants fo-
cus their challenges on the first and third prongs 
above causation and probable cause Because it is 
clear that neither Dr Wagner nor Ms Cunningham 
caused the prosecution of the criminal action 
against the Jensens, analysis of probable cause is 
unnecessary 
In order to establish a constitutional violation, the 
Jensens must show that Dr Wagner and Ms Cun-
ningham "caused the plaintiffs continued confine-
ment or prosecution" FNm In Pierce, the Tenth 
Circuit held that this element reaches more than just 
those who actually initiate a criminal action FN134 
Surveying both the common law and cases inter-
preting the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the 
court concluded that a forensic analyst who fabric-
ated inculpatory evidence and withheld exculpatory 
evidence, thereby leading prosecutors to indict and 
prosecute" the plaintiff, sufficiently caused the 
plaintiffs continued prosecution for purposes of the 
plaintiffs § 1983 claim, even though she did not 
formally initiate the chargesFNM5 In each of the 
examples used by the Pierce court to reach this 
conclusion, the state actor's conduct was closely 
connected to either the initiation or continuation of 
the prosecutionFNI36 Notably, the principles de-
scribed by the Pierce court closely resemble the 
definition of a complaining witness provided in An-
thony v Baker*^1 for purposes of determining 
the applicability of prosecutorial immunity "The 
term 'complaining witness' describes the person (or 
persons) who actively instigated or encouraged the 
prosecution of the plaintiff" FN,3S 
FN133 Wdlans. 528 F 3d at 799 
FN 134 Pierce. 359 F 3d at 1291-92 
FN135 Id at 1291-94 
FN 136 Id at 1292 ("[A] private person 
who takes an active part in continuing or 
procuring the continuation of criminal 
proceedings initiated by himself or by an 
other is subject to the same liability for 
malicious prosecution as if he had initiated 
the proceedings") (citing Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 655), id (citing Robinson 
v Maruffi, 895 F 2d 649, 655-56 (10th 
Cir 1990) (finding "sufficient evidence for 
the jury to find that the [defendant police 
officers] purposefully concealed and mis-
represented material facts to the district at-
torney which may have influenced his de-
cision to prosecute [the plaintiff]")), id 
("If police officers have been instrumental 
in the plaintiffs continued confinement or 
prosecutions, they cannot escape liability 
by pointing to the decisions of prosecutors 
or grand jurors, or magistrates to confine 
or prosecute him") (quoting Jones v City 
of Chicago, 856 F 2d 985 (7th Cir 1988)) 
FN137 955 F 2d 1395 (10th Cir 1992) 
FN138 Id at 1399 n 2 
*30 The Court finds that Dr Wagner did not cause 
the initiation or continued prosecution of the crim-
inal case The Jensens' claims with regard to Dr 
Wagner relate entirely to information provided to 
DCFS, its representatives, Ms Eisenman, and the 
Juvenile Court In fact, Dr Wagner moved to Ohio 
in late June 2003 during the pendency of the Juven-
ile Court proceedings and before any change in 
P J's legal custody Dr Wagner's final involvement 
with the Juvenile Court proceedings was his execu-
tion of an affidavit dated July 22, 2003, outlining 
basically the same information provided previously 
to DCFS in his case summary Dr Wagner ex-
ecuted the affidavit at Ms Eisenman's request The 
affidavit was to be used in connection with the Ju-
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venile Court proceedings. There is no evidence that 
Dr. Wagner ever had contact with anyone from the 
District Attorney's Office. Initiation and continu-
ation of the criminal case were dependant on mul-
tiple intervening events, including, most notably, 
the Jensens failure to comply with the Juvenile 
Court's orders. Thus, Dr. Wagner did not cause the 
initiation or continuation of the criminal case based 
solely on his referral of PJ.'s case to DCFS and his 
limited participation in the Juvenile Court proceed-
ings. 
The Court likewise Finds that Ms. Cunningham did 
not cause the initiation or continued prosecution of 
the criminal case. The Jensens argue that Ms. Cun-
ningham's participation in the criminal case is 
shown by the fact that her name appears on the 
probable cause statement on which the criminal 
charges were based and that Ms. Eisenman testified 
that Ms. Cunningham provided information to Of-
ficer Peterson, who authored that statement. Even if 
this were true, FNI39 it does not provide an evid-
entiary basis on which the Court could conclude 
that Ms. Cunningham caused the prosecution of the 
criminal case. The Jensens do not indicate what in-
formation Ms. Cunningham may have provided nor 
its relevance to the criminal charges-nor do they in-
dicate the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham 
provided the information. Accordingly, the Court 
finds the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. 
Cunningham caused the initiation or continuation 
of the criminal prosecution. 
FN 139. In reality, the Court cannot assume 
Ms. Eisenman so testified because the de-
position pages cited by the Jensens were 
left out of their exhibits, despite receiving 
an opportunity to supplement the record. 
See Docket No. 375 (ordering the Jensens 
to provide any materials inadvertently 
omitted from their exhibits). 
The Jensens argue that the Court should apply prin-
ciples of concurrent causation to hold all of the De-
fendants liable for the malicious prosecution. In the 
§ 1983 context, "[w]here multiple forces are act-
ively operating ... plaintiffs may demonstrate that 
each defendant is a concurrent cause by showing 
that his or her conduct was a substantial factor in 
bringing [the injury] about." FN,4° Where concur-
rent causation is established, the burden of proof 
shifts to each defendant to prove that his conduct 
was not the cause of the harm.FN,4, Should a de-
fendant fail to do so, he is liable for the whole in-
jury under principles of joint and several liability.™142 
FN 140. Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 
1219 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Northington 
v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1568-69 (10th 
Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
FN141. Northington, 102 F.3d at 1568. 
FN142. Id. at 1569. 
The Jensens have not shown that principles of con-
current causation should apply to their Fourth 
Amendment claim. The Jensens have not submitted 
any evidence that Dr. Wagner or Ms. Cunningham 
provided information to the District Attorney's Of-
fice or that their involvement in the Juvenile Court 
case led to the initiation or continuation of the 
criminal charges. In fact, this is not even consistent 
with the Jensens' version of the facts: "Eisenman 
was driving the criminal charges effort, not Mc-
Donald or Cunningham." FNI43 Accordingly, there 
is no evidentiary basis on which to apply principles 
of concurrent causation and joint and several liabil-
ity to the Jensens' claim for malicious prosecution 
of the criminal case. Therefore, the Court finds that 
the Jensens have not established that Dr. Wagner 
and Ms. Cunningham violated their Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 
FN143. Docket No. 342, at 20. 
D. State Law Claims 
*31 The Court does not have original jurisdiction 
over any of the Jensens' state law claims. As this 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Order disposes of all of the Jensens' federal claims, 
and as their Utah constitutional claims present im-
portant questions of state law, the Court declines to 
further exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state law claims and will remand them to the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, from which this case was removed.FNI44 
D.Utah,2008. 
P.J., ex rel. Jensen v. Utah 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 4372933 
(D.Utah) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
FN 144. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1367(c)(1), (2); 1447(c). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendant Richard Anderson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 324], 
Defendant Kari Cunningham's Motion for Summary 
Judgment [Docket No. 326], Defendant Susan Eis-
enman's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 
No. 329], and Defendants Wagner and Albritton's 
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 332] 
are GRANTED IN PART with respect to Claims 1, 
2, and 3 of the Complaint. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendant Susan Eisenman's Mo-
tion to Strike Plaintiffs' Consolidated Statement of 
Fact [Docket No. 349], Defendant Wagner's and 
Albritton's Motion to Strike References to P.J.'s 
Current Condition [Docket No. 353], Defendants 
Wagner's and Albritton's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Hearsay [Docket No. 356], and Defend-
ant Wagner's and Albritton's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Attempts to Rebut Medical Evidence 
Without Expert Testimony [Docket No. 358] are 
DENIED AS MOOT. It is further 
ORDERED that the Jensens' state law claims 
(Claims 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10) are REMANDED to the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. It is further 
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed 
to close this case forthwith. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Plaintiffs Parker, Barbara, and Daren Jensen hereby submit the following Memorandum 
in Opposition to (1) Defendants Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) 
Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion for Summary Judgment; (3) Defendant Kari Cunningham's 
Motions for Summary Judgment; and (4) Defendant Richard Anderson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment.l 
INTRODUCTION 
In their motions, Defendants argue that the Court has no discretion in ruling on their 
motions, that this Court 4s decision on plaintiffs' state law claims has already been made by the 
federal court judge when he ruled on plaintiffs' federal law claims. Had Judge Stewart actually 
addressed any of plaintiffs' state law claims, defendants might have a point. But he expressly 
declined to do so, stating that Plaintiffs' "Utah constitutional claims present important questions 
of state law," and remanding those questions to state court for determination. Stewart Ord. at 62. 
When viewing the disputed facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of 
Plaintiffs as the Court must do, Quaid v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2007 UT 27, U 8, 158 P.3d 525, it 
is apparent that the conduct of all of the named Defendants herein violated of Article I, Sections 
1, 7, and 14, of the Utah Constitution, and that Defendants caused intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and wrongful initiation of civil and criminal process against the Jensens. At 
the very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists, and summary judgment should be denied. 
1
 A consolidated memorandum reflects the fact that most of the defendants' arguments apply to 
all defendants, and defendants have incorporated by reference each other's arguments. It also cut 
out several pages of duplication. 
v 
FACTS 
Only defendants Cunningham and Eisenman have submitted a numbered statement of 
facts as required by U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(A).2 Pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(B), plaintiffs have 
submitted a verbatim restatement of those facts that are controverted. See Exhibits A and B 
hereto. Also pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3))(B), plaintiffs have filed a separate Statement of 
Additional Facts in dispute. (Due to the length of the additional statement of facts, which 
encompasses all five defendants, the statement has been filed as a separate document and is 
incorporated herein pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 10(c).) 
2
 Wagner & Albritton and Anderson attach their federal court memoranda (which did set forth 
separate fact paragraphs) as exhibits to their motions for summary judgment before this Court. 
Although this is not compliant with Rule 7, for clarity of the record, Plaintiffs attach as Exhibits 
C and D their disputations of Defendants Wagner & Albritton's and Defendant Anderson's 
federal court motions for summary judgment statements of fact. 
vi 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS (1) WAGNER & ALBRITTON AND 
(2) ANDERSON SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THEY HAVE FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(C)(3)(A), WHICH REQUIRES 
THE MOVING PARTY TO SET FORTH A SEPARATELY STATED AND 
NUMBERED STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
SUPPORTED BY CITATION. 
Under U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(A), a party moving for summary judgment "shall" set forth an 
independently numbered statement of individual material facts for which that party claims there 
is no dispute. Each factual statement is required to be "supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Id. There are reasons for this requirement. 
It is essential to the identification of material fact disputes, and without it, the Court and other 
parties are forced to sift through unsupported narrative. Utah appellate courts have repeatedly 
recognized that it is well within a trial court's discretion to enforce the plain language of Rule 
7(c)(3). Bluffdale City v. Smith, 156 P.3d 175, 2007 UT App 25, ^ 8-12 (Utah App. 2007). 
Accordingly, the Court should deny Wagner & Albritton and Anderson's motions under Rule 7. 
3
 By failing to provide a record upon which this Court may rely in resolving the pending motions, 
defendants Wagner, Albritton, and Anderson have chosen an all-or-nothing position with respect 
to their motions: The Court must either defer entirely to the federal court, without engaging in 
an independent evaluation and assessment of the record under U.R.C.P. 56(c), or deny the 
defendants' motions. There is no middle ground. Therefore, because res judicata does not apply 
to the "important questions of state law" that Judge Stewart expressly declined to address (see 
infra), Wagner & Albritton and Anderson's motions must be denied. 
1 
IL RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' STATE LAW 
CLAIMS. 
A. The Utah Constitution Provides Broader Protection than Its Federal Counterpart. 
The primary argument in defendants' motions is that plaintiffs' state law claims are all 
barred by Judge Stewart's rulings on the federal law claims. While it suffers from other defects 
(see pp. 23-37, infra), a fundamental problem with defendants' argument is that it incorrectly 
assumes that the Utah Constitution offers no greater protection than the federal constitution when 
applied to rights of familial association, the direction of a child's medical care, and to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Citing Oman v. Davis School District, 194 P.3d 956, 2008 UT 70, defendants argue that 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that their rights guaranteed under the Utah constitution are greater 
than and separate from those protected by their federal counterparts. While Oman does not 
actually stand for such a proposition (claims under the Utah Constitution were not even at issue 
in that case), defendants' arguments fail because the rights and guarantees under Utah's 
Constitution are separate and distinct from, and greater than, the protections offered to Plaintiffs 
under the federal constitution. 
i. Utah Constitutional Analysis in general. 
In earlier days, evaluation of state constitutional claims typically began with an analysis 
of federal law, followed by a determination of whether any particular reason existed to stray 
from whatever federal courts had opined at the time. This variation on the "lockstep" theory (in 
which state constitutions are presumed to have the same meaning and scope as their federal 
2 
counterpart) was initially endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 
803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) (recommending analytical process from State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 
236-38 (Vt. 1985)); Christine M. Durham, "Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah 
Courts," UTAH BAR JOURNAL 25, 26 (Nov. 1989), citing concurrence of Justice Handler in State 
v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 959-969 (N.J. 1982)); . Both Jewett and Hunt began with the federal 
constitution, then applied various criteria to decide whether a different result was called for 
under the state constitution. See also State v. Gunwall, 720 P.3d 808, 811-13 (Wash. 1986).4 
Over time, state courts began to recognize the inappropriateness of abdicating the 
responsibility to construe their own state's constitution to a court charged with construing a 
national constitution. See Christine M. Durham, "What Goes Around Comes Around: The New 
Relevancy of State Constitution Religion Clauses;' 38 VA. U. L. REV. 353, 366, 369 (2004) 
("When state courts rely on their own constitutions to provide substantive protections for 
individual rights, they are reinforcing the sovereignty of the individual state in its power to 
guarantee to its citizens freedoms greater than those protected under federal law alone"); 
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 16 (Tex. 1992) ("Our Texas Forbears surely never 
contemplated that the fundamental state charter, crafted after years of rugged experience on the 
Various factors cited in the analysis of state constitutional claims have included: textual 
differences in the federal and state constitutions; legislative history; state law predating U. S. 
Supreme Court decisions; differences in federal and state constitutional structures; whether the 
subject matter is of particular state or local interest; particular state history or traditions; and 
public attitudes in the state, Hunt, supra; "historical and textual evidence, sister state law, and 
policy arguments," Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n. 6 (Utah 
1993); and "the common law, our state's particular . . . traditions, and the intent of our 
constitution's drafters." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994). A 
number of those factors are addressed below. 
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frontier and molded after reflection on the constitutions of other states, would itself veer in 
meaning each time the United States Supreme Court issued a new decision"); State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the 
vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts"). 
A state court construing its own construction "do[es] not share the strong limitations 
perceived by [the U. S. Supreme Court] in its ability to enforce constitutional protections 
aggressively. Those limitations arise from the structure of our federal system, the Court's role as 
final arbiter of at least the minimum scope of constitutional rights for a vastly diverse nation, and 
the Court's lack of familiarity with local conditions. These difficulties do not similarly limit 
state courts." Hunt, 450 A.2d at 359; see also John W. Shaw, "Principled Interpretations of State 
Constitutional Law-Why Don't the Primacy States Practice What They Preach," 54 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 1019, 1028 (1993) ("Primacy allows strategic tailoring of state constitutional protections to 
match the values of the state citizenry that created the state constitution, rather than enforcing the 
lowest common denominator of broadly shared national values"). 
ii. "Legislative " history and intent of the Framers. 
Relatively little history is available regarding adoption of the 1895 Utah Constitution, and 
particularly the Declaration of Rights. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 929 ("There was 
little discussion or controversy regarding any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights"). 
Those rights were so fundamental, so uncontroversial, that there was nothing to debate. 
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Utah's Declaration of Rights is not identical to that of any of the other forty-four state 
constitutions, copies of which had been provided to each of the delegates. The Utah Supreme 
Court has concluded that much of the final document derives from earlier Utah constitutions and 
those of other states, Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New York in particular. Id. at 928; see 
also John J. Flynn, "Federalism and Viable State Government-The History of Utah's 
Constitution," 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311,311 (Illinois, New York, Nevada, Washington, and Iowa); 
Paul Wake, Comment, "Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights, and Free Government: Do 
Utahns Remember How to Be Free?" 1996 UTAH L. REV. 661 (Washington); Kenneth R. 
Wallentine, "Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 14," 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 267, 267 (1991) (Nevada, Iowa, Illinois, New York and 
Washington). 
The Framers' foremost concern was achieving statehood after a frustrating and painful 
forty-year quest. Delegates knew that noncompliance with Congress's expectations would put 
statehood at risk. "It is natural, under such circumstances, for men to proceed with caution." 
State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986, 990 (1898). Accordingly, the Framers borrowed 
heavily from the constitutions of other states that had been approved by Congress. 
From that fact, defendants the suggestion has been made that it is difficult to say the 1895 
Constitution was written by Utahns for Utah. See C. Albert Bowers, "Divining the Framers' 
Intentions: The Immunity Standard for Criminal Proceedings under the State Constitution," 
2000 UTAH L. REV. 135, 148 (summarizing contention). That does an injustice to the Framers. 
Rather than simply copying verbatim from a single constitution, the Framers carefully selected 
5 
and rejected portions of various documents as suited their frame of mind. See, e.g., 1 Official 
Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention at 423 (1898) (B. H. Roberts, 
questioning adoption of Wyoming's provision on female suffrage rather than that of Virginia, 
New York, Ohio, or Indiana); 483 (John Murdock: "I don't wish to refer to what older states 
have done; they have done as they pleased, and I hope the people of Utah will do as their best 
judgment will dictate to them, and I am not afraid of innovation"); 776 (David Evans: 
mentioning constitutions of Kentucky, North Dakota, Maine, Colorado, and California). 
Choosing from among different options reflects intent, just as a court's choice of 
quotations from other cases is no less a statement of its own intent. Moreover, some Framers 
expressed a view that Utah was unlike any other state, and/or that their goal was for Utah to be 
more progressive than other states. See, e.g., id. at 433-34 (Andrew S. Anderson: urging 
delegates to "show to the world that Utah is in the advance march of progress and civilization, 
and in those life-endearing principles of liberty and justice"); 545 (Andrew Kimball: "the people 
of Utah through their circumstances are different to any other people in the United States"). 
When it came to basic human liberty, the Framers were unwilling to sacrifice their 
principles even at the cost of the great prize. Including women's suffrage in the State 
Constitution would "dig a grave for statehood," Representative B. H. Roberts warned. Id. at 
425-28. Such concerns for expediency could "go to the dogs," delegates declared: 
They tell us woman suffrage in the Constitution will imperil statehood. I do not 
believe it. But if it should, what of it? There are some things higher and dearer 
even than statehood. I would rather stand by my honor, by my principles, than to 
have statehood, if I must sacrifice my honor and my principles to obtain it. If 
Utah is to be immolated for standing by her principles, for enlarging the borders 
6 
of liberty, let the sacrifice be made, let her be bound upon the altar, let the high 
priest of tyranny come forth and plunge the knife into her breast. She cannot 
perish in a nobler cause than that of freedom and equal rights. 
Id. at 738 (Orson F. Whitney); Id. at 499 (Alma Eldredge) ("[D]o I want statehood at the 
sacrifice of honor?"). 
The Framers of the Utah Constitution did not see their months-long labor as makework 
(as it would be if construction of the federal Constitution were always dispositive). The Framers 
viewed and intended the state constitution to be the supreme fundamental law of the State of 
Utah. See, e.g., id. at 434 (Samuel Thurman); 479-80 (Charles Varian); 502 (Eldredge); 561 
(Karl G. Maeser); 572 (Charles Crane); 737 (Whitney); State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986, 
987 (1898) (Framers intended state constitution to constitute the "fundamental law of the state"); 
Eldredge, 76 P. at 339 (state constitution is the "will of the sovereignty expressed in the supreme 
law.") 
The assumption that the Utah Constitution would form the primary basis of protection for 
Utah residents is reinforced by the fact that, at the time of the Convention, none of the 
protections of the Bill of Rights had been applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The first to be applied was in 1897. Chicago B. & O.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226 (1897) (takings). First Amendment protections, for example, were not held applicable to the 
states until 1925; the Fourth Amendment not until 1949. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 
(1925); Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
To reinforce their intent, the Framers retained a provision, first adopted in 1882 in the 
shadow of polygamy prosecutions, that was contained in relatively few other constitutions (and 
7 
not in the federal Constitution), which provides: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles 
is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government." Article I, 
§ 27. When the purpose of such a provision was questioned, future governor Heber Wells 
explained the committee's view that it was necessary "because the tendency of the times might 
be as it has been in the past, not to recur very often to fundamental principles. When the people 
are oppressed and do not get their rights, it may be necessary to recur to fundamental principles." 
1 Proceedings at 362. 
Consistent with the intent of the Framers, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that the federal Constitution sets the floor, but not the ceiling, of constitutional protections for 
Utah residents. See, e.g., Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 940; Anderson v. Provo City 
Corp., 2005 UT 5, % 17, 108 P.3d 701; West, 872 P.2d at 1007 ("Above this floor, states may 
balance the need to redress injuries to reputation with guarantees of free expression in a distinct 
way, thereby accounting for the unique history, needs, and experiences of their residents"). 
The Jensens' state constitutional claims should thus be reviewed independently of the 
federal claims. See, e.g., West, 872 P.2d at 1007 (adopting "primacy" approach in free speech 
claim under state constitution, accepting federal law only to the extent it is persuasive). This 
approach is more consistent with the intent of the drafters, who sought to place as much power as 
possible in the hands of the state's residents. The Framers, who had fought so long for home 
rule, intended that "the agencies by which power was to be exercised should be brought as close 
as possible to the subjects upon which the power was to operate . . . ." State v. Eldredge, 27 
Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 339-40 (1904) ("'Local self-government/ says Judge Cooley, 'having 
8 
always been a part of the English and American systems, we shall look for its recognition in any 
such instrument.'"). Matters involving the family are of exclusively local interest, In re Burrus, 
136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850 (1890), as are concerns about the integrity of a state's judicial system. 
Hunt, 450 A.2d at 366.5 
From the time of its ratification, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the state 
constitution is to be construed liberally. "A constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or 
technical principles, but liberally, and on broad, general lines, in order that it may accomplish the 
object of its establishment, and carry out the great principles of the government." North Point 
Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896); 
Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829, 830 (1964) (court must "give recognition in the 
highest possible degree to all of the rights assured by all of the Constitutional provisions"). 
There is little substantive difference in wording between Article I §§ 1, 7, and 14 and 
their federal counterparts. The key structural distinction between the two constitutions, however, 
is that the federal Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the government, whereas the 
provisions of state constitutions are limitations upon sovereign power. Courts typically 
characterize this difference in the state constitution as "a guarantee of those rights rather than as 
a restriction on them." Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812. 
iii. Article I § I (inherent and inalienable right to liberty) 
5
 As the Framers were aware, it is easier to amend a state constitution than the United States 
Constitution. See, e.g., 1 Proceedings at 500 (Eldredge; constitution could be amended). 
9 
Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, "All men have the inherent and 
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties[.]" 
The Utah Supreme Court has not construed the meaning of "happiness'" as used in 
Section 1. However, the court deems instructive the interpretation of similar provisions by other 
courts. State v. BriggsL 46 Utah 288, 146 P. 261 (1915)). The right to pursue happiness as 
guaranteed by a state constitution has been recognized as "include[ing] the right of privacy, the 
right to marital privacy and choice . . . [and] the right to protect one's health." 16A CJ.S. 
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS § 737 (citations omitted). 
In Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a claim that a statute violated Section 1 and Section 7 of Article I. With respect to 
both sections, the court wrote: 
These constitutional provisions constitute the supreme law of the commonwealth 
upon this subject. To that law the executive, the legislative, and the judicial 
departments of the government alike must bow obedience, as well as every 
subject. It forbids the abridgment by the state of the privileges and immunities of 
all citizens. Under its mandate no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law, and every person is entitled to the equal 
protection of the laws, and may acquire property, possess and protect it, as well 
as defend his life and liberty. These are inherent and inalienable rights of 
citizens, and are constitutional guaranties. 
76 P. at 24; see also id. at 25 (forbidding an individual or class the right of acquisition or 
enjoyment of property "in such manner as should be permitted to the community at large would 
be to deprive them of liberty in particulars of primary importance to their 'pursuit of 
happiness'"), 26 (right to pursuit of happiness includes right to pursue business or vocation). 
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These rights are implicated when a government actor impinges upon an individual's 
liberty. Golding v. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937) ("These [Section 1] 
rights are invaded when one 'is not at liberty to contract with others respecting the use to which 
he may subject his property (or use or employ his time or talents), or the manner in which he 
may enjoy it"). 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the right of "liberty" encompassed within Section 1 
as not just the absence of physical restraint, but as "a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces 
not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, but 
also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights[.]" Block, supra, at 24-25. See also 
State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 69 (1964) (The right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, "and as a corresponding and accompanying right, the right to privacy in his own 
home," is a "just claim, God given, or innate as a human"). 
From the facts set forth in plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Facts and reasonable 
inferences therefrom, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants' deliberate misrepresentations 
and omissions prevented Plaintiffs from seeking medical care, maintaining their familial 
relationship, and otherwise pursuing their right to happiness under Section 1. Defendants' 
misconduct would be deemed a violation of Section 1 for the same reasons that it violated Article 
I, § 7 (see pp. 40-69, infra, summarizing aspects of defendants' conduct). 
iv. Article I § 7 (due process) 
Article I, Section 7 provides, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." Section 7 is a "constitutional guarantee," one of the "inherent and 
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inalienable rights of citizens." Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24-25 (1904). 
"Liberty," as employed in Section 7, "is not restricted to mere freedom from imprisonment, but it 
embraces the right of a person to use his God-given powers, employ his faculties, [and] exercise 
his judgment in the affairs of life . . . The word 'liberty,' as thus employed in the Constitutions 
and understood in the United States, is a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces not only 
freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, but also all our 
religious, civil, political, and personal rights . . . . '* Id. 
It has long been recognized that the Utah and federal due process clauses are not co-
extensive: 
The prohibition of this amendment is directed to the constitution, and cannot 
mean the state must observe the due process of the law of some other jurisdiction 
over which it has no control. Neither can it refer to due process of law under the 
law of the United States, for the United States has only stated offenses limited to 
the subjects over which it has jurisdiction. The constitution of the United States 
cannot, as to the states, be held to be the sole unbending rule as to the method of 
procedure, when dealing with the life, liberty, and property of individuals in the 
several states. Such a rule would deprive the states of their right to regulate its 
procedure, laws, and rules of practice in their own courts, so as to protect life, 
liberty, and property by such due process of law as should be enacted with 
reference to the constitution of the United States which was "framed for an 
undefined and expanding future, and for people gathered, and to be gathered, 
from many nations and many tongues. 
In re McKee, 19 Utah 231, 57 P. 23, 26-27 (1899); see State v. Briggs, P.3d , 2008 WL 
5191446, 2008 UT 83, U 24 ("While the text of the two provisions is identical, we do not 
presume that federal court interpretations of federal Constitutional provisions control the 
meaning of identical provisions in the Utah Constitution. In fact, we have not hesitated to 
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interpret the provisions of the Utah Constitution to provide more expansive protections than 
similar federal provisions where appropriate.)(internal citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is an accepted premise in American 
jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is 
fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice.'" Walker v. 
State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981). The same principle applies to use of such testimony to 
interfere with the parent-child relationship. 
It has also been held repeatedly that Section 7 "guarantees parents a fundamental right to 
sustain relationships with their children." In the Matter ofK.B.E., 740 P.2d 292, 294 (Utah App. 
1987) ("the Supreme Court has declared that under the Utah Constitution the parental interest is 
a 'fundamental' right to be invaded only to the extent necessary to promote a 'compelling' state 
interest"); In the Matter of the Adoption of B.B.D^ 1999 UT 70, % 10, 984 P.2d 967; Wells v. 
Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah 1984). 
This recognition is consistent with the intent of the Framers that the common law be 
employed to interpret the state constitution. American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 
1235, 2006 UT 40, % 43, 48; Deseret Irr. Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398, 52 P. 628, 629 (1898). 
Under the common law, no relationship was afforded greater protection than that of parent and 
child. A right that has "strong roots in the common law" suggests greater protection under the 
state constitution. West, 872 P.2d at 1013. 
Unlike any other state in the West, "Utah was settled primarily by two-parent families . . . 
." Carrie Hillyard, "The History of Suffrage and Equal Rights Provisions in State Constitutions," 
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10 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 122 (1996). From the time of the constitution, Utah recognized a 
presumption that a parent will fulfill his duties 
by reason of the love and affection he holds for his offspring and out of regard 
for the child's future welfare. . . . Indeed, the common law based the right of the 
father to have custody and dominion over the person of his child upon the ground 
that he might better discharge the duty he owed the child and the state in respect 
to the care, nurture, and education of the child. Before the state can be 
substituted to the right of the parent it must affirmatively be made to appear that 
the parent has forfeited his natural and legal right to the custody and control of 
the child by reason of his failure, inability, neglect, or incompetency to discharge 
the duty and thus to enjoy the right. 
Mill v. Brown,, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907). The Framers shared that view. See I Proceedings at 
450 (Richards: "In the brute world we find the mother's love for offspring more strong than the 
instinct for self preservation. This is an unfailing passion throughout the whole course of organic 
life, whether brute or human"). 
Both prior to and after ratification of the Utah Constitution, a child could be removed 
from the home in Utah only upon a showing of his parent's "habitual intemperance, and vicious 
and brutal conduct, or from vicious, brutal and criminal conduct towards said minor child." 
Laws 1851 to 1870, Chapter XVII, § 9. This standard was re-enacted by the first state 
legislature, see Rev. Stat. 1898, Title 3, § 82, indicating that it was consistent with the Framers' 
intent. See P.LE. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1988) 
(noting that many of the first legislators were delegates to the constitutional convention); Salt 
Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 526 (1908) (re-enactment of statute is 
evidence that framers intended the law to remain as it was). 
14 
In Washington, to which the Framers looked when drafting the 1895 Constitution, the 
supreme court had expounded a year earlier on the principle that a child cannot be removed from 
their parents unless the parents are affirmatively unfit, not merely because the state would prefer 
they make different choices. Love 11 v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9 Wash. 419, 37 P. 660, 661 
(1894) ("There is such a diversity of religious and social opinion, and of social standing and of 
intellectual development and of moral responsibility, in society at large, that courts must exercise 
great charity and forbearance for the opinions, methods, and practices of all different classes of 
society; and a case should be made out which is sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong 
to meet the condemnation of all decent and law-abiding people, without regard to religious belief 
or social standing, before a parent should be deprived of the comfort or custody of a child"). 
At the time of the 1895 Convention, nearly 90 percent of Utah's population were 
members of the LDS Church. Richard D. Poll et al., eds., Utah's History (Provo, Utah: Brigham 
Young University Press, 1978), p. 393. Three-quarters (79) of the 107 delegates to the 
constitutional convention were Mormon. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928. It is thus 
relevant and appropriate to discuss the background and views of Mormon church members at the 
time of the convention. See id. at 929 n. 31 (discussing Joseph Smith's attitude toward American 
government); P. Bobbit, Constitutional Fate Theory of the Constitution (1984) at 9-11 (relevant 
history includes prevailing sentiment at time of adoption); Jewett, 500 A.2d at 236 (relevant 
history includes social and political setting in which the constitution was adopted). 
LDS Church founder Joseph Smith had expressed concerns about weak constitutional 
protections: 
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The only fault I find with the Constitution is, it is not broad enough to cover the 
whole ground. Although it provides that all men shall enjoy religious freedom, 
yet it does not provide the manner by which that freedom can be preserved, nor 
for the punishment of Government officers who refuse to protect the people in 
their religious rights . . . . Its sentiments are good, but it provides no means of 
enforcing them. It has but this one fault. Under its provision, a man or a people 
who are able to protect themselves can get along well enough; but those who 
have the misfortune to be weak or unpopular are left to the merciless rage of 
popular fury. 
Larry E. Dahl and Donald Q. Cannon, ed., Encyclopedia of Joseph Smith's Teachings, p. 144 
(quoting Sabbath address, Nauvoo, 15 October 1843). 
The Framers had strong concerns about government intrusion into the family. For 
decades, LDS Church members had experienced what they viewed as persecution by a 
government intent on imposing its own values on the Mormon family structure, culminating in 
the famed polygamy prosecutions. See State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, \ 32, 996 P.2d 546 
(citation omitted) (mentioning prosecutions in construing Section 7). 
"[M]any of Utah's constitutional convention delegates had either been pursued 
by federal authorities or were well acquainted with people who had. Because of 
widespread newspaper coverage, the vast majority of Utah's population was 
aware of the prosecutions, and the delegates to the constitutional convention had 
an intimate awareness of the problems posed by systematic oppression by the 
federal government. . . . Prior to becoming a state, the framers of the Utah 
Constitution suffered heavily at the hands of the federal government. These 
memories were fresh in the minds of the framers . . . ." 
"Divining the Framers' Intent," 2000 UTAH L. REV. at 151, 169. For example, the President of 
the Convention, John H. Smith, an apostle in the LDS Church, had himself been the target of a 
polygamy prosecution. See Wallentine, supra. 
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The anti-polygamy campaign was directly targeted at the disruption of families, and was 
pursued to devastating effect. Fathers, mothers, and sometimes children were imprisoned. 
Children were left without support when their parents were jailed or forced into hiding. 
Conditions were harsh for those targeted by the government. See Martha S. Bradley, "'Hide and 
Seek': Children on the Underground," 51 UTAH HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (1953), pp. 133-153. 
In 1882, as deprivations caused by the prosecutions were on the rise, a new provision was 
added to the state's draft constitution, declaring that "The blessings of free government can only 
be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and 
frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." This language was restated in the 1887 version. 
Significantly, when its inclusion was questioned in 1895, Heber Wells stated the committee's 
view that it was needed in light of the abuses "in the past." 
That the Framers would have been repulsed by the state forcing particular health care 
providers on a parent is further suggested by the writings of the Hon. Thomas Cooley of the 
Michigan Supreme Court, considered "the foremost constitutional authority in the world, 
perhaps," by the drafters. 1 Proceedings at 447 (Richards); American Bush, 2008 UT 40 at f^ f 
13, 49 n. 16, 51 (citing Judge Cooley).6 
In Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 128 (1878), a family committed the plaintiff to 
an insane asylum. Concurring in a decision to order a new trial, Judge Cooley wrote, "I cannot 
admit that because one is a practitioner of medicine, it is therefore proper or safe to suffer him to 
6
 The "eminent jurist" Cooley had been cited in 35 Utah cases prior to ratification of the Utah 
Constitution, and was cited an additional 35 times in the next five years. Cooley was also cited 
by the Framers. See, e.g., I Proceedings at 464, II Proceedings at 1739. 
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decide upon mental disease, and consign people to the asylum upon his judgment or certificate." 
If "differences of opinion among those who are called to give scientific evidence" exist, he 
wrote, it would be intolerable for the patient's fate to hinge on whether "one physician rather 
than another happened to be called in as the adviser." Id. at 132. 
Consistent with common law and statutory history in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court held 
long ago that, to be constitutional, removal of a child from his parent's custody requires an 
affirmative showing of unfitness. Mill, 88 P. at 613; Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 
(1926) ("[T]he unfitness which deprives a parent of the right to the custody of the child must be 
positive and not merely comparative, or merely speculative"); In re B.R., et ai, 2006 UT App 
354, f 87, 144 P.3d 231 (Under Utah Constitution, "a parent is entitled to a showing of unfitness, 
abandonment, or substantial neglect before his or her parent rights are terminated") (court's 
brackets omitted), rev'd on other grounds, In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 171 P.3d 435. See also pp. 
60-63, supra (similar holdings by sister states).7 
Construing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the 
defendants knew that their sole complaint was comparative in nature {i.e., that the Jensens 
preferred to follow the recommendations of a health care provider other than Wagner). They 
knew that they could force the removal of Parker under that standard. Accordingly, they 
employed misrepresentation and half-truth in order to create an appearance of positive unfitness. 
7
 The defendants were not seeking permanent termination of the Jensens' parental rights. 
However, they were seeking transfer of physical and legal custody, and for a purpose that was 
permanently life altering and potentially lethal. 
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In view of the common law, statutory, and constitutional history of Utah's due process provision, 
the Utah Supreme Court would unquestionably find a state actor's attempt to establish parental 
neglect through misrepresentations and material omissions prohibited under Section 7. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized a separate protected right of children in 
their familial relationship. Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) (recognizing right of 
minor "to be a member of the father's family, to be with her little sister, and ultimately to reap 
the fruits of that relationship, whatever they may be"). The above analysis would apply with 
equal or greater force to Parker's own constitutional rights. 
B. Article I, Section 14 (search and seizure) 
The right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures "is one of the most cherished 
rights guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 
UT 13, % 15. The Utah Constitution's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is 
'"the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men' that demands an independent and proper judicial determination." State v. 
DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, f 32, 996 P.2d 546 (citation omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated on several occasions that the scope of protections 
afforded by Article I, Section 14 are greater than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. See, e.g., DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^ 12 (citations omitted); State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
Commentators concur. In "Divining the Framers' Intentions," supra, at 147, for 
example, C. Albert Bowers argues that "several unique facets of Utah's history" suggest that 
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state constitutional requirements for testimonial immunity do not mirror the federal. "Most 
important is Utah's early settlement by religious refugees and the subsequent tension between 
the local territorial government and the United States government. Additionally, many 
prominent territorial citizens witnessed first-hand the problems that arise when the government 
can compel testimony from a witness without adequate protection." 
As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "Mormon delegates likely viewed the 
territorial government-controlled by federally appointed non-Mormons-as oppressive. They had 
experienced the attempted control and suppression of their religious beliefs and practices by the 
federal government, often operating through territorial officials. . . . Both groups of delegates 
could claim that some form of authority, be it federal or local, had denied them freedom of 
conscience, and both were acutely aware of the threat government power presented to that 
freedom." Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 935. 
The employment of falsehoods by government officials, as alleged here, would have been 
especially disturbing to the Framers. From their perspective, LDS Church members had suffered 
extraordinary harm as the result of false testimony. In 1838, for example, Missouri governor 
Lilburn Boggs issued the notorious "extermination" order expelling Mormons from the state 
three days after the execution of a false affidavit by Thomas B. Marsh and Orson Hyde that 
claimed, among other things, that Joseph Smith intended to conquer the United States. Gary J. 
Bergera, "The Personal Cost of the 1838 Mormon War in Missouri: One Mormon's Plea for 
Forgiveness," MORMON HISTORICAL STUDIES (Spring 2003), p. 139. A month later, Missouri 
officials used the affidavit as a basis to jail Smith for treason. Id. 
20 
Seven years later, Smith was again pursued by government officials, this time in Illinois. 
In reliance upon a promise of security by Governor Ford, Smith and other Mormon leaders 
voluntarily surrendered. Instead, Smith and his brother Hyrum were allowed to be murdered in 
their jail cell in Nauvoo. See Whitney, History of Utah, Vol. 1, pp. 228-30; History of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(Deseret News: 1932), Vol. VII, p. 172 (Smith was arrested through "false pretense"). 
In 1857, William Drummond, an appointee to the territorial supreme court, made a false 
report to the attorney general that Brigham Young had murdered territorial leaders, and that the 
Mormons had burned territorial records and committed acts of treason. He urged immediate 
military intervention. See Andrew L. Neff, History of Utah (ed. Leland H. Creer, Salt Lake 
City: Deseret News, 1940), Vol. 1, pp. 448-51. President Buchanan, with whom LDS Church 
leaders were already at strife, cited Drummond's assertions as evidence that the Mormons were 
in rebellion, and dispatched the Army to Utah to replace Young as governor by force. Id. 
Young issued a proclamation decrying, again, deception by government officials: "For 
the last twenty five years we have trusted officials of the Government, from Constables and 
Justices to Judges, Governors, and Presidents, only to be scorned, held in derision, insulted and 
betrayed." Proclamation, August 5, 1857; id. ("We know these aspersions are false, but that 
avails us nothing"). More than 30,000 Mormons evacuated northern Utah in anticipation of 
invading forces. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Utah 1540-1886 (San Francisco, The History 
Company: 1889), p. 535. 
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In 1871, Brigham Young was indicted by territorial officials for an 1857 murder based 
upon the false affidavit of a man named William Hickman, who was "in collusion with the 
crusading officials to bring trouble upon his former brethren". Whitney, History of Utah, pp. 
629-640. Young was refused bail and spent four months under house arrest; two of his alleged 
co-conspirators spent six months in jail. Bancroft, History of Utah, pp. 663-64. 
These and other examples of victimization through government falsehoods would have 
lent special force to the Framers' adoption of the requirement in Article 14 that searches and 
seizures be "supported by oath or affirmation." Utah Supreme Court opinions predating the 
constitution also reflected a need for protection from fabricated testimony of government 
officials. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 8 Utah 29, 28 P. 957, 958 (1892) ( "We think no man 
can be found guilty of a fraud against the government on the mere certificate of any officer of the 
government, even if a statute of the congress authorizes it. Such statute is in violation of natural 
right, and of that clause of the constitution that provides that a man cannot be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law; for it is not due process to find a man guilty of a 
fraud without any evidence whatever of his guilt"); see also Merchants' Nat. Bank of Kansas 
City v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 P. 985 (1892) (person who signs a certificate of stock containing 
false information is liable; "[t]hese views are so fundamental, and so consonant with honesty and 
fair dealing, that they need no authority in their support"). 
The federal constitution is only a "floor," a minimum level of constitutional protection. 
See, e.g., Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 940; Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, 1^ 
17, 108 P.3d 701; West, 872 P.2d at 1007. In this case, Sections 1, 7, and 14 of Article I provide 
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protection that is separate and greater than the federal constitution. Accordingly, there is no 
basis for defendants' argument that the federal court's rulings on federal law bind this Court's 
hands on state law. 
III. CLAIM PRECLUSION IS INAPPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN ANY EVENT. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' state law claims are barred under the doctrine of claim 
preclusion, a subset of the doctrine of res judicata. Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In re 
General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water), 1999 UT 39, % 15, 982 P.2d 65 
("[R]es judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion."). "In general terms, 
claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully 
litigated previously." Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 
2005 UT 19 {quoting Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, \ 12, 44 P.3d 642). 
When a party asserts the application of claim preclusion based upon a prior federal judgment, 
Utah courts apply federal res judicata law to the determination of whether claim preclusion 
applies. See Massey v. Board of Trustees of Ogden Area Community Action Comm., 86 P.3d 
120,2004UTApp27,TI6-7. 
Under federal law, claim preclusion only applies if the party asserting the doctrine 
satisfies three elements: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) identity of 
parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause of action in both suits." Pelt v. 
Utah, 539 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. (Utah) 200S)(quoting MACTEC Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 
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831 (10th Cir.2005). In the present case, claim preclusion is inapplicable for at least three 
independent reasons. 
A. There was no earlier action. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion looks to the causes of action that were filed in an earlier 
proceeding. Pelt, supra, at 1281; see Oman, 2008 UT 70, [^ 31. Here, there was no "earlier 
proceeding." All of the claims were filed in the same lawsuit in the same court at the same time. 
It was Defendants who elected to remove the matter from state court to federal court. That did 
not somehow convert this single case into two cases. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 
F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998)(reversing federal district court application of res judicata to 
claims removed to federal court based on state court's dismissal of other claims before removal, 
concluding that "this situation does not involve two separate lawsuits, one in state court and 
another in federal court. Rather, it involves one suit that originated in state court and that was 
removed to federal court."); Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 
2000)("Res judicata does not speak to direct attacks in the same case, but rather has application 
in subsequent actions.") Because the claims presently pending before this Court were filed at the 
inception of this action, they do not constitute, after remand, a subsequent proceeding. As a 
result, claim preclusion is inapplicable. 
B. There was no "final judgment on the merits" on Plaintiffs' state law claims. 
If this Court believes that claim preclusion applies despite the existence of only one case, 
the test for claim preclusion nonetheless is not satisfied because there was no final judgment on 
the merits of Plaintiffs' state law claims. Defendants assert, with no supporting analysis, that 
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Plaintiffs' state law claims were the subject of a final judgment on the merits in the federal court 
proceeding. However, it has long been recognized that res judicata does not apply if a court 
dismissed the prior claims for want of jurisdiction, or if the claim was disposed of on any ground 
that did not go to the merits of the action. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. 232, 71 
U.S. 232, 18 L.Ed. 303(1866). 
In other words, "jurisdictional dismissals are not 'on the merits,'" and as a result, claim 
preclusion does not bar the subsequent litigation of claims dismissed on such basis. Park Lake 
Res. Ltd Liab. Co. v. USD A, 378 F .3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2004)(quoting Nilsen v. City of 
Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Whitesell v. Newsome, 138 S.W.3d 393 
(Tex.App.2004)("...we reject Whitesell's argument that the federal court's dismissal of the state-
law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction - acknowledging that the state-law claims 
could be pursued in state court - was equivalent to a final judgment on the merits.'')(c//mg Home 
Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir.1998); Thacker v. 
City of Kyatsville, 762 A.2d 172 (Md. App. 2000) ("As a general rule, when a federal court 
dismisses federal claims on the merits before trial, and then declines to exercise its supplemental 
jurisdiction over related pendent state claims that were removed along with the federal claims, 
principles of res judicata or claim preclusion do not bar litigation of the remanded state claims in 
state court."); Benton v. Louisiana Pub. Facilities Authority, 672 So.2d 720, 722 (La.App. 1996) 
(reversing state trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor on defendants based on claim 
preclusion, concluding that, where federal court had dismissed state law claims for lack of 
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pendent jurisdiction, "[t]here ha[d] never been a ruling, nor the opportunity for a ruling, on the 
merits of the state law claims.") 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held that, where a federal district court 
dismisses a plaintiffs state constitutional and common law claims without prejudice and declines 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, neither claim or issue preclusion applies. Snyder v. 
Murray City Corporation, 73 P.3d 325, 2003 UT 12, ^ [ 36. Here, the federal court never reached 
the merits of Plaintiffs' state law claims; rather, it expressly declined jurisdiction to do so. 
Stewart Ord. at 62. Because the federal court's remand was premised on a jurisdictional ground 
that did not resolve the substantive merits of Plaintiffs' state law causes of action, claim 
preclusion does not apply, and the federal court decision cannot be invoked to defeat Plaintiffs' 
state law claims pending before this Court. 
C. Plaintiffs' state law causes of action presently pending before this Court are 
separate and distinct from the federal law causes of action ruled upon by the federal court. 
Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' state law causes of action are identical to the 
federal causes of action dismissed by the federal court is without merit. Defendants argue that, 
because Plaintiffs rely on the same underlying facts to support their claims under the Utah 
Constitution as were relied upon in federal court, the causes of action under state and federal law 
must be "identical," thus meriting the application of claim preclusion to bar Plaintiffs' state law 
claims. However, plaintiffs have more than met their burden of analyzing how and why the Utah 
Constitution is different and broader from the federal constitution in this case. See State v. Earl, 
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716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) ('it is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on 
relevant state constitutional questions"). 
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's analysis of claim preclusion utilizes the "transactional 
approach" to defining a cause of action, which "provides that a claim arising out of the same 
'transaction, or series of connected transactions' as a previous suit, which concluded in a valid 
and final judgment, will be precluded." Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th 
Cir.l999)(emphasis added). "What constitutes the same transaction or series of transactions is 'to 
be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and 
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding 
or usage.'" Id. {quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)). Therefore, "[u]nder 
the transactional test, a new action will be permitted only where it raises new and independent 
claims, not part of the previous transaction, based on the new facts." Hatch v. Boulder Town 
Council, 471 F.3d 1142, 1150(Utah 2006)(emphasis added). 
If Plaintiffs were attempting to bring new claims after the federal claims had been 
dismissed, defendants' argument might have merit under the transactional approach. But this 
aspect of claim preclusion is inapplicable when there is only one case, one Complaint, one 
record, and where the state constitutional and common law claims were filed at the same time as 
the federal claims. Defendants have been on notice from the inception of the litigation that they 
would be required to defend against the state law claims, and had to know that the federal court 
was unlikely to take upon itself the resolution of "important questions of state law." 
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D. The policy justifications behind the doctrine of claim preclusion are not present in 
this case. 
'The fundamental policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion) 
are finality, judicial economy, preventing repetitive litigation and forum-shopping, and 'the 
interest in bringing litigation to an end.'" Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 
2000)(quoting May v. Parker-Abbott Transfer & Storage, Inc., 899 F.2d 1007, 1009 (10th 
Cir. 1990)). These fundamental policies are not achieved in this case. First, any policy related to 
finality is not implicated by the procedural stance of this case, because Plaintiffs' state law 
claims have been pending since the inception of the case, and have never been ruled upon by any 
court. 
Neither is judicial economy at risk. Plaintiffs do not seek to waste scarce judicial 
resources; Plaintiffs ask only for their day in court on their state law claims. No judicial energy 
was expended on Plaintiffs' state law claims by the federal court, as the state law claims were not 
addressed. As to the policy of preventing repetitive litigation and forum shopping, plaintiffs 
have filed only one action in one court. It was not Plaintiffs who sought to remove this case to 
federal court (a tactic more akin to "forum shopping"), but rather Defendants. Finally, the policy 
related to "bringing litigation to an end" is inapplicable here, because Plaintiffs' state law claims 
have been pending since the inception of this case, and were never considered by the federal 
court. Plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court, and claim preclusion should not be applied to 
deprive them of that entitlement. 
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Finally, in cases involving state constitutional claims, such as the case at present, a state 
court interpreting the state constitution must always undertake an independent analysis when one 
of the parties attempts to assert res judicata based on a federal court's decision. The need for 
independent evaluation is particularly cogent when other case has not made it though the 
appellate process. Here, the Jensens are appealing the federal court's decision. Accordingly, 
because interpretation of this state's highest law is at issue, and because the federal decision is 
being appealed, policy justifications mandate that this Court engage in its own independent 
evaluation and analysis of Plaintiffs' state constitutional and common law claims. 
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IV. ISSUE PRECLUSION IS INAPPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
Defendants also argue that the second prong of res judicata, issue preclusion, should bar 
plaintiffs' state law claims. "Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage, issue preclusion, 'means 
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.'" 
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) {quoting Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)). Again, however, this 
component of res judicata does not apply because this is the same case in which the federal court 
claims were originally filed, and there have been no prior or subsequent proceedings. There is no 
"future lawsuit" - it is the same lawsuit. 
The elements of issue preclusion would not be met in any event. As noted earlier, federal 
res judicata law applies if a party is attempting to bind a state court to a federal court ruling. 
Under Tenth Circuit law, issue preclusion has four requirements: 
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action 
in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the 
party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, 
to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. 
Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, the issues presented for review are not 
identical to the issues decided by the federal court, the prior action was not finally adjudicated on 
the merits, and policy justifications do not support applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
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A. The issues presented for review in this action are not identical to the issues 
decided by the federal court. 
Foremost, the legal issues before this Court are different than the legal issues considered 
and applied in the federal court proceeding. The federal court applied federal law of absolute 
immunity, qualified immunity, substantive and procedural due process under the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and malicious prosecution under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Here, this Court is applying state law, including 
Article I, Sections 1, 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, and the common law of this state 
applicable to intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful initiation of civil and 
criminal process. 
Additionally, as discussed above, the Utah Constitution offers broader protections than 
the federal counterpart when applied to the fundamental right to associate with one's family and 
to direct the medical care of one's child's. Because the federal court dismissed the Utah claims 
without consideration of the merits, and because the rights guaranteed under the Utah 
Constitution are broader, the logical conclusion is that the issues pertinent to the additional scope 
of protection under the Utah Constitution have not been determined, and as such, are not 
identical to any issues decided by the federal court. 
Furthermore, the factual issues that were considered by the federal court, and which 
defendant urge this Court to follow, are not identical to the factual issues presented in the case at 
bar. Factual issues are necessarily implicated by reference to legal standards. In other words, 
without reference to a law or legal standard, it is impossible for a Court to determine whether a 
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particular fact is material or not. (For example, a statement might be material to a claim for 
defamation, while immaterial to a claim for breach of contract) 
Consequently, when dealing with causes of action arising under an entirely distinct legal 
theory and source of right, the factual issues implicated are different. Therefore, because the 
factual issues implicated by Plaintiffs' state constitutional and common law claims are different, 
issue preclusion does not apply. 
B. The "prior action" was not "finally adjudicated on the merits." 
As discussed above, there was no "prior action" but rather a single case, so this threshold 
element of issue preclusion fails. Moreover, again there was no final adjudication on the merits, 
at least with respect to Plaintiffs' state law claims, because the federal court never reached those 
claims. Accordingly, issue preclusion does not apply. 
C. Policy considerations militate against applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
The Tenth Circuit recognizes that in certain instances issue preclusion should not be 
applied, namely, where the application of issue preclusion "would cdo[ ] nothing to vindicate two 
primary policies behind the doctrine, conserving judicial resources and protecting parties from 
'the expense and vexation' of relitigating issues that another party previously has litigated and 
lost.'" Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian Gaming Com'n, 327 F.3d 1019, 
1030, (10th Cir. (Okla.) 2003). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "collateral estoppel can yield an 
unjust outcome if applied without reasonable consideration and due care." Buckner v. Kennard, 
2004 UT 78, T| 15, 99 P.3d 842. Accordingly, courts "must carefully consider whether granting 
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preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate." Id. at \ 15. "Collateral estoppel cis not an 
inflexible, universally applicable principle^] ... Policy considerations may limit its use where ... 
the underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors.' " Id. (alterations in original) 
{quoting Jackson v. City of Sacramento, 117 Cal.App.3d 596, 172 Cal.Rptr. 826, 829 (1981)). 
Such policy considerations are present in this case. The Utah Constitution is the 
"supreme law" of the state of Utah. Under the Supreme Court's "primacy" approach, it routinely 
examines state constitutional issues first, and considers federal law of no more persuasive weight 
than case law from a sister state. State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 2007 UT 49 ^ 33 ("This 
court, not the United States Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to interpret Utah's 
constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we owe federal law no more 
deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical state language."); State 
v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397, 2007 UT 47, ^ 15. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court would not consider a state court bound by the 
federal court ruling in this case because certain findings in that ruling would be impermissible by 
a state court judge. As the Supreme Court has noted, the standard for summary judgment in state 
court is different from that in federal court, including the parties' evidentiary burdens. See, e.g., 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.2d 600 (Utah has not adopted federal Celotex standard with 
respect to moving party's burden of production ("While this has been the law in the federal 
courts for over two decades now, it is not Utah law"); unlike in federal court, in state court a 
moving party's own evidence must conclusively establish absence of any fact issues). 
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Under Utah law, on a motion for summary judgment, "the facts and all reasonable 
inferences [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference, 2008 UT 88, f^ 12. "[A] reasonable 
inference is a conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning. This conclusion must be a rational 
and logical deduction from facts admitted and established by the evidence, when those facts are 
viewed in the light of common experience.'" D Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 
\992){quoting Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah App.l987))(internal quotations 
omitted). 
A state court is precluded from granting summary judgment "if the facts shown by the 
evidence on a summary judgment motion support more than one plausible but conflicting 
inference on a pivotal issue in the case ... particularly if the issue turns on credibility or if the 
inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent." IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K 
Management, Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 2008 UT 73, U 18 (Utah 200S)(quoting Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. 
v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ^ 19, 179 P.3d 786 (emphasis added) (quoting 73 Am.Jur.2d. Summary 
Judgment §46 (2001)). 
"Moreover, on summary judgment, the trial court [is] required to construe c[d]oubts, 
uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of fact ... in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment.'" Wasatch Oil & Gas, supra at Tl 35 (quoting Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984)). Issues 
involving an actor's state of mind are factual in nature. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 2000 UT 
58,U17. 
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Here, the federal court made certain factual determinations that would be impermissible 
on summary judgment in Utah. For example,8 with respect to Defendant Cunningham, the 
federal court concluded that, although she did indeed make misrepresentations and omissions in 
her August 18, 2003 affidavit, those misrepresentations were not material to the issues before the 
juvenile court, and hence had no impact on Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has said that, under Utah law, the question of materiality is generally one best left 
for the jury. See, e.g., Yazd v. Woodside Homes Co., 2006 UT 47, ^ 28, 143 P.3d 283; Prudential 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291 (Utah 1980); Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C v. 
Reott, 163 P.3d 713, 2007 UT App 223, \ 43 (reversing district court grant of summary 
judgment, where district court improperly weighed facts and evidence to determine defendants' 
lack of fraudulent intent). 
The federal court also found that, although Cunningham made numerous 
misrepresentations in sworn legal documents, there was no evidence that she deliberately 
misrepresented any facts. This conclusion reflects a failure to draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of Plaintiffs, as is required on a motion for summary judgment, and specifically to draw the 
reasonable inference that, given the sheer number and context of misrepresentations and 
Because Plaintiffs are before this Court on their state constitutional and common law claims, 
Plaintiffs have not set forth in full herein each instance of the federal court's findings of fact that 
would not be permitted by a state court judge. The examples provided are some of the more 
patent examples, offered to explain why this Court must engage in its own independent analysis 
and evaluation of the facts and law. The federal court's decision is presently on appeal before 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
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omissions, Cunningham's actions were deliberate, or at the very least, an issue of fact exists in 
that regard. 
As further examples, the federal court incorrectly concluded that the record evidence 
does not permit a reasonable inference that Defendant Wagner deliberately misrepresented facts 
about Parker, or the purported diagnosis of Ewing's, to anyone involved in the case. However, 
when viewing the record and the evidence (albeit circumstantial) regarding Wagner's 
involvement, one rational and logical deduction from those facts is that Wagner deliberately or 
recklessly interfered with Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
Wagner did not simply fail to conduct genetic and molecular testing on Parker's tissue, 
he falsely told the Jensens that there were no confirmatory tests. He told DCFS that the Jensens 
had canceled their final meeting when he knew that he had canceled it. He told DCFS that 
Parker would be dead in "five days" if treatment did not commence, in order to persuade them to 
forgo the required investigation before institution of a juvenile court medical neglect petition. 
(Wagner now denies this.) He attempted to influence the second opinion that the Jensens wanted 
from Dana Farber. There is evidence - quite a lot, actually - from which a jury could conclude 
that his refusal to perform confirmatory testing and other actions were because the opportunity to 
enroll Parker in a clinical trial was about to expire. See, e.g., Pis' Statement of Additional Facts, 
ffl| 45-86, 109, 136. 
At the very least, the evidence presented by Plaintiffs raised a dispute of fact on 
Wagner's intent, motivation, credibility, and state of mind. This Court cannot defer to factual 
determinations that do not construe "c[d]oubts, uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of 
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fact ... in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment^]'" Wasatch Oil & 
Gas, supra at ^ 35. 
The federal court's factual findings, particularly with respect to Defendants Wagner and 
Cunningham, improperly resolved credibility issues involving the state of mind of Defendants in 
favor of Defendants. Conversely, the federal court refused to draw inferences in favor of 
Plaintiffs, all of which hinged upon the subjective thoughts and intents of Wagner and 
Cunningham. The evidence presented by the parties at the very least shows "more than one 
plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case," thus precluding summary 
judgment. D & K Management, Inc., supra, at [^ 18. 
Plaintiffs recognize there is no "smoking gun" to present to this Court, because, not 
surprisingly, none of the Defendants have admitted to any malicious motive regarding their 
dealings with the Jensens, and nor would they be expected to do so. In such circumstances, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence to show a reasonable inference that the 
defendants acted with the requisite intent rising to the level of violating the Jensens rights 
guaranteed under the Utah Constitution.9 
This Court should independently evaluate the record and factual and legal issues before it 
in resolving the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
"'It is well established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence/" State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, U 21, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991))). 
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IV. THE SPACEMAN REQUIREMENTS FOR PLAINTIFFS' STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE SATISFIED, AND THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANTS 
FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS GUARANTEED 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, OR ALTERNATIVELY, THERE 
IS A DISPUTE OF FACT IN THAT REGARD. 
Under Spackman v. Bd. Of Ed. Of Box Elder County Sch. DisL, 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533, 
a plaintiff suing under one of Utah's constitutional provisions must satisfy a three-part test before 
proceeding on the constitutional claim: first, that the constitutional violation was "flagrant;" 
second, that "existing remedies" do not redress his injuries; and third, that "equitable relief, such 
as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her 
injuries. 
A. Flagrancy of Constitutional Violations of Article h Section 1 & 7 
In Spackman, the Court explained the meaning of a "flagrant" constitutional violation: 
In essence, this means that a defendant must have violated "clearly established" 
constitutional rights "of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To be 
considered clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 
that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 
L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted). 
Spackman, supra at f 23. 
10
 A plaintiff is also required to show that the particular state constitutional provision is self-
executing. Before proceeding on a claim for damages arising out of a violation of the Utah 
Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the constitutional provision is "self-executing." 
See Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996); Spackman at U 19. Judge Cassell ruled 
previously that Sections 1, 7, and 14 are self-executing, P.J. ex rel. Jensen v. Utah, 2006 WL 
1702585 at * 14 (D.Utah 2006), and defendants do not claim otherwise in their pending motions. 
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For well over thirty years, it has been clearly established in Utah that Article I, Section 7 
of the Utah Constitution guarantees both procedural and substantive due process rights. Wells v. 
Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984). The right of a parent to associate 
with his own child is protected under Section 7. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982)("...we 
conclude that the Utah Constitution recognized and protects the inherent and retrained right of a 
parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child under Article I, s 7 and s 25...") Furthermore, 
because the Supreme Court defined the right of 'liberty" encompassed within Section 1 as not 
just the absence of physical restraint, but also, as "a term of comprehensive scope[] ... 
embracing] not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of 
person, but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights[,]" Block v. Schwartz, 27 
Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904), the right to associate with one's family is also guaranteed under 
Article I, Section 1. 
Shortly after deciding In re J.P., the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that "the fundamental 
right of parenthood" is protected under Article I, Section 7, and articulated that a violation of that 
section is subject to the strict scrutiny standard: a violation results unless the governmental actor 
establishes "a compelling state interest" in the result and that the means utilized are "narrowly 
tailored" to that compelling interest. Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206-07 
(Utah 1984) {quoting In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1981). 
It goes without saying that the State has a compelling state interest in protecting the 
health and well-being of children. See In re J.P., supra. However, there is no compelling state 
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interest in falsifying or misrepresenting evidence to a juvenile court, nor do defendants cite any 
authority suggesting otherwise. 
Additionally, the Jensens' entitlement to a procedurally sound involvement with DCFS 
and the juvenile court is also clearly established under Article I, Section 7. Section 7 has been 
interpreted not only to guarantee the substantive right to association with one's family, but also 
procedural rights, "notably, notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order 
to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." Wells, supra at 204, {citing 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); State v. Casarez, Utah, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 
1982); Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1982); Lindon 
City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981)). "The general test for the 
validity of such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness." Id. 
Both the substantive and procedural protections of Article I, Sections 1 and 7 were so 
clearly established at the time of Defendants' conduct that objective persons in their shoes would 
have plainly recognized the unconstitutionality of their actions. The procedural protections of 
Article I, Section 7 were so well known in 2003 that "a reasonable official would [have] 
understood] that what he is doing violates that right." Spackman at \ 23. Facts illustrating the 
flagrancy of each Defendant's conduct are set forth below. 
i. Wagner & Albritton 
With respect to Defendant Wagner, Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of Facts establishes: 
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1. that Dr. Wagner refused common, definitive testing to confirm a diagnosis of 
Parker's condition, even though such testing was routinely conducted at PCMC and was even 
recommended by the same pathology report upon which he claims to have relied; 
2. that Wagner refused definitive testing in spite of the Jensens' requests for such 
testing and their stated concerns about the diagnosis, and in spite of the fact that everything about 
this alleged case of Ewing's Sarcoma was odd, i.e., Parker's case was not consistent with the 
clinical presentation of Ewing's observed in the vast majority of other people - location in soft 
tissue, location in the mouth, slow/no growth, lack of symptoms, etc.; 
3. that Wagner refused to request the genetic or molecular testing because it would 
have jeopardized a 30-day deadline for enrolling Parker Jensen in a clinical trial for which he 
was a co-investigator; 
4. that when the Jensens asked for a second opinion from Dana-Farber, Wagner first 
attempted to discourage the request, then secretly attempted to influence the opinion; 
5. that Wagner concealed his true motivations from the Jensens; 
6. that Wagner concealed his refusal to order definitive diagnostic testing from his 
superior, Dr. Lemons, as well as from Dr. Albritton, from Dr. Coffin, from Dr. Lowichik, from 
Dr. Corwin, from DCFS caseworker Cunningham, and from Assistant Attorney General 
Eisenman; and, 
7. that Wagner falsely told Kari Cunningham/DCFS that Parker could be dead in 
"five days," in order to persuade Cunningham to skip the normal DCFS investigative process. 
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With respect to Defendant Albritton, Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of Facts 
establishes: 
1. that Albritton urged and stated that only a board-certified pediatric oncologist was 
qualified to treat Parker, while intentionally or recklessly failing to disclose that the reporting 
doctor (Wagner) was not himself board-certified in pediatric oncology; 
2. that, as part of the process for obtaining custody and warrants, Albritton 
misrepresented to the juvenile court the qualifications and services of the Burzynski Clinic, from 
which the Jensens wanted to obtain an evaluation; 
3. that Albritton knew, and intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose to the court 
and others, that genetic testing was routinely conducted at PCMC on cases of suspected 
Ewing's Sarcoma. 
These facts demonstrate that Wagner and Albritton's conduct amounts to a flagrant 
violation of both the substantive and procedural protections of Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the 
Utah Constitution, because any reasonable person in Wagner or Albritton's situation would know 
that his or her conduct violated the Utah Constitution. 
Wagner and Albritton attempt to frame the issue as one of child protection (their actions) 
versus child neglect (the Jensens' actions). All they did was make a diagnosis, they say. They 
had to report the Jensens when the parents refused life-saving treatment for their son, they say. 
In other words, the Defendants want this Court to rule as a matter of law not only what their 
actions were, but also what their motives were. The Jensens have presented evidence that 
Wagner and Albritton misrepresented P.J.'s condition to the juvenile court, refused to order 
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specific medical tests that would have conclusively identified PJ.'s cancer, ignored or 
misrepresented evidence that was inconsistent with their diagnosis, and falsified or 
misrepresented evidence to the juvenile court. (See PI.St.Facts, fflj 45-59, 68-81, 102-107, 126, 
132-146, 261-263, 283-284, 322-325.) This conduct amounts to a flagrant violation of the 
Jensens' substantive rights guaranteed under Article I, Sections 1 and 7. 
By misrepresenting and omitting critical material information from the individuals 
involved in the juvenile court proceedings, Wagner and Albritton deprived the Jensens of their 
entitlement to "fairness" in that proceeding. Defendants make much over the fact that the 
Jensens purportedly had their day in court before a neutral, objective, and independent decision 
maker. What Defendants fail to recognize is that, where that neutral decision maker has nothing 
to rely on in reaching his decision but material misrepresentations of fact, the proceeding can 
never be "fair." As a result, such conduct violates the procedural component of Article I, Section 
7. 
ii. Eisenman. 
With respect to Defendant Eisenman, Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of Facts 
establishes that Eisenman violated Plaintiffs' procedural and substantive rights guaranteed under 
Article I, Section 7. 
1. Eisenman misrepresentations and material omissions related to the 
juvenile court proceedings violated Article I, Sections 1 and 7. 
The record evidence demonstrates that Eisenman: 
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1. Knew, and failed to disclose, to the court, the DCFS case worker, and the 
guardian ad litem, that additional diagnostic tests were available to confirm Parker's diagnosis. 
(See PLSt.Facts, ^ 249.) 
2. Knew, and repeatedly failed to disclose, to (a) the juvenile court and (b) the DCFS 
case worker, that defendant Wagner was not a board-certified pediatric oncologist. This was a 
material omission because the Jensens were ultimately required to consult only with a board-
certified pediatric oncologist, which requirement precluded the Jensens from retaining Dr. 
Simone as their primary physician, and instead forced them to choose L.A. Children's and Dr. 
Johnston. (PLSt.Facts, ffl{ 235-236, 284-285, 322.) Cunningham testified that she considered 
important the fact (which she learned only after this lawsuit was filed) that Dr. Wagner was not a 
board-certified pediatric oncologist, and would have alerted the juvenile court had she known 
that he lacked that certification. (PLSt.Facts, ^ 285.) 
3. Intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose to the court that Dr. Wager was 
directing Parker's care under the provisions of a Clinical Trial Protocol. Although Eisenman 
claims she was not aware of the real Clinical Trial Protocol, a jury could conclude otherwise 
based upon the fact that she affirmatively represented to the juvenile court that another document 
was the standard of care under which treatment was being sought. (PLSt.Facts, f^ 76 n.6.) 
4. Intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose to the juvenile court on August 8 that 
the "controlling" test results from L.A. Children's were not back. (PLSt.Facts, ffl[ 273, 287, 290.) 
Eisenman knew the test results were not complete because she had been in communication with 
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Dr. Tishler of L.A. Children's on August 4, and he never said that that testing was completed. 
(Pl.St.Facts, 1| 290.) 
5. Intentionally or recklessly made numerous factual misrepresentations on or about 
August 29, 2003, to DCFS director Richard Anderson, who relied on such representations. 
Eisenman knew that Anderson and had the authority to terminate DCFS's juvenile court petition, 
had he been given accurate information. (Pl.St.Facts, f 384.) Eisenman's misrepresentations to 
Anderson included the following (see ^ 385): 
a) Omission of all facts known to Eisenman indicating that the Jensens were 
questioning the diagnosis after May 20, 2003, and instead implying that the Jensens' sole 
objection was limited to Dr. Wagner's treatment plan; 
b) A misleading implication that the Jensens were pursuing IPT as the sole 
treatment for Parker as of July 10, 2003, when she had in actuality been informed more than a 
week earlier by the Jensens' attorney that the Jensens were not committed to IPT, and were 
instead considering all treatment options; 
c) A misrepresentation that a second opinion was not obtained from Dana 
Farber because the Jensens "declined to pay the consultation fee," which was not true; 
d) A misrepresentation that as of May 29, 2003, the Jensens "want[ed] to use 
'Insulin Potentiation Therapy,'" and that the referring doctor, Dr. Wagner, asked for time to do 
research, which was untrue. PCMC records said otherwise, that it was the Jensens who asked 
Wagner to "look into" IPT; 
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e) A misrepresentation that neither Dr. Wagner nor Lara Neiderauer from 
Huntsman could find "any reliable research about the therapy," which was a mischaracterization 
of the content of Neiderauer's e-mail; 
f) Omission of all discussions at the June 9 meeting evidencing that the 
Jensens had questions about the diagnosis of Ewing's; 
g) A misrepresentation that Dr. Thomson at LDS Hospital had performed "a 
PET scan and other tests," when he had performed no tests at all, and a misrepresentation that 
she (Eisenman) had no records of this consultation, when a copy of a letter from Dr. Thomson 
was in DCFS's own file, and the Jensens' attorney had given her a letter from Dr. Thomson 
shortly after June 19; 
h) A misrepresentation that Dr. Wagner did not contact DCFS or the PCMC 
child protection team until June 12, when DCFS's own records plainly showed that contact was 
made as early as June 2; 
i) A misrepresentation that the Jensens had refused to meet with Drs. Corwin 
and Wagner, when in fact it was Wagner who refused to have the meeting; 
j) Omission of all statements by the Jensens' attorney at the June 20, 2003 
hearing that the Jensens were seeking additional diagnostic testing, again intentionally creating 
the impression that treatment was the only issue; 
k) A misrepresentation that she thought the July 10, 2003 hearing before the 
juvenile court "was set for evidentiary hearing," when the court's record stated to the contrary, 
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and the Jensens' attorney had reminded Eisenman a week earlier that the scheduled appearance 
was not an evidentiary hearing; 
1) A misrepresentation that oncologists at PCMC did not know that a second 
excision was going to be performed on Parker's tissue, when Wagner had been told of the 
Jensens' intent, and the procedure had been cleared with Dr. Muntz at PCMC ahead of time; 
m) An omission that Jensens objected to the juvenile court conducting an 
evidentiary hearing on July 10 on Eisenman's petition for removal because Eisenman was 
improperly attempting to convert what had been scheduled for a pretrial conference into a full-
blown evidentiary hearing, without complying with the juvenile court statutes and rules 
regarding notice, and further omitting that the juvenile court refused to conduct her sought 
hearing; 
n) An omission that the reason the Jensens were no longer using Dr. 
Birkmayer was because Eisenman had taken the inflexible position that only a physician licensed 
in the United States was qualified to be Parker's primary care physician, when she knew that the 
State was not permitted to take that position; 
o) An omission that, before the Jensens were required to begin treatment, 
L.A. Children's was to complete an independent evaluation of Parker's tissue, including genetic 
testing, the disclosure of which fact would also have required Eisenman to reveal that the Jensens 
were questioning the diagnosis; 
p) A misrepresentation that Parker's lost tissue was found by PCMC "within 
48 hours," when Eisenman knew it had been missing for nearly two weeks; 
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q) An omission that L.A. Children's "controlling" test results were not back 
at the time she obtained bench warrants in juvenile court on August 8, and that she was on notice 
of that fact by virtue of an e-mail from Dr. Tishler at L.A. Children's on August 4 that did not 
indicate that results were back; 
r) A misrepresentation that Eisenman contacted the Sandy City Police after a 
hearing in juvenile court on August 12 [13], implying it was the police who contacted the 
District Attorney's office, when Eisenman herself contacted the police and the D.A.'s office 
before the hearing (which was on August 13, not August 12); 
6. Making misrepresentations to her supervisor, Utah Attorney General Mark 
Shurtleff, who had the ability to intervene and/or terminate Eisenman's activities had he learned 
the truth. (See Pl.St.Facts, 1f 377): 
a) Failing to disclose that DCFS/Kari Cunningham had merely rubber 
stamped the reporting doctors' allegations, which Shurtleff would have known to be improper; 
b) Failing to disclose that neither DCFS/Cunningham nor Eisenman had 
conducted an objective, thorough, accurate, fair or independent investigation of the medical 
neglect allegations, which Shurtleff would have known to be improper; 
c) Failing to disclose that the Jensens had asked for cytogenetic testing at 
PCMC and been refused, and that a chromosome (genetic) test was one way of definitively 
diagnosing Ewing's; 
d) Misrepresenting to Shurtleff that the Jensens had voluntarily decided not 
to use Dr. Birkmayer, which was untrue; 
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e) Misrepresenting to Shurtleff that the Jensens had declined a second 
opinion from Dana-Farber because they had been told their insurance would not pay for it, which 
was untrue; 
f) Omitting that Dr. Wagner's decisions regarding Parker Jensen, including 
the refusal to conduct genetic testing and the intention to leave allegedly cancerous cells in 
Parker's mouth, were being driven by the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial, which a jury could 
reasonably conclude was known to Eisenman; 
g) Misrepresenting to Shurtleff that the Jensens had "fled" the state after 
warrants were issued, which Eisenman knew to be untrue.11 
7. Misrepresenting to the juvenile court on August 13, when seeking warrants for the 
Jensens, that the Jensens were not responding to messages on their cell phones, when no such 
messages were ever left. (Pl.St.Facts, f^ 339.) 
8. Misrepresenting to the juvenile court on August 13 that she had not been in 
communication with Dr. Tishler at L.A. Children's, when she had in fact received a lengthy e-
mail from him just the week before. This omission was material because, in that e-mail, Dr. 
Tishler (a) did not mention any test results being completed, and (b) made numerous 
inflammatory statements about the Jensens and their lawyers that Eisenman knew would reveal 
These misrepresentations and omissions were material because they were contrary to 
Shurtleff s instructions to his assistant attorneys general to "do everything we can to respect the 
rights of parents and preserve families," (Shurtleff depo., pp. 157-158), and because they would 
have cast serious doubt on the integrity of Eisenman's actions toward the Jensens. 
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him to be unobjective and having formed opinions not based upon the results of independent 
testing, as required under the July 10 stipulation. (Pl.StFacts, ffl[ 290, 339.) 
2. Eisenman misrepresentations and material omissions related to the 
criminal court proceedings violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article 
I, Sections 1 and 7. 
The record contains evidence from which a jury could find that Eisenman: 
1. Misrepresented to the District Attorney's office that the Jensens had fled the state 
after the August 8 warrant was issued, which she knew was untrue. (Pl.St.Facts, ffl[ 344-345, 
364.) This misrepresentation was material, as evidenced by the testimony of Deputy D.A. 
Angela Micklos, who said that the felony child-kidnapping charges were based in part on that 
information. (Id^347.){2 
2. Failing to disclose that, at the time the Jensens were alleged to have violated a 
juvenile court order, no such order had been entered. (Pl.St.Facts, % 343.) 
Arrest warrants were activated nationally only for the felony kidnapping charges. 
(Pl.St.Facts, TJ 349.) But-for those charges, therefore, Daren Jensen would not have been arrested 
in Idaho, and Barbara Jensen would have been able to join her family there. 
13
 Eisenman has taken the position that it was immaterial whether an order had actually been 
entered, because the judge had made oral statements from the bench. While this ignores Utah 
law, Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) (order has no effect until entered), 
there is also a practical reason why written directives are required: because parties - and even 
attorneys - often have conflicting memories and/or understandings of what a court said; hence 
the frequent wrangling over the language of court orders. In the Jensen case, the guardian ad 
litem's notes as to what the judge said and Eisenman's proposed order were materially different. 
(Pl.St.Facts, % 288.) No minutes were available for that hearing until August 11, after warrants 
had been issued. Eisenman knew that a "proposed" order could not form the basis of a contempt 
action, because it might or might not comport with the judge's own notes or memory. It is also 
notable that, of the documents that Eisenman provided to the D.A.'s office on August 15, she 
omitted copies of the underlying order, on which the ink was barely dry. (Id., % 343.) 
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3. Failed to disclose that the court orders and warrants upon which Eisenman based 
her complaint had been procured by misrepresentations and material omissions. (PLSt.Facts, f^lf 
197, 201, 214-215, 224-229, 234-236, 249, 283-285, 290-291, 314, 326.) 
ill. Cunningham 
With respect to Defendant Cunningham, Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of Facts 
establishes that she violated Plaintiffs' procedural and substantive rights guaranteed under 
Article I, Section 7. 
1. Failure to Complete Mandatory Investigation 
Cunningham violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Section 1 and Section 7 by failing 
to comply with the mandatory, non-discretionary statutes and administrative rules governing her 
obligations as a DCFS caseworker to conduct a "thorough preremoval investigation" of the 
Jensens and their son prior to taking any action against the Jensens' parental rights. U.C.A. § 
62A-4a-409(l)(a)(2003). This conduct violated both Plaintiffs' substantive right to associate 
with their family and to direct their son's medical care, but also their procedural right to a fair 
involvement with DCFS and the juvenile court. 
Analysis of this issue must begin with the recognition that DCFS's enabling statutes 
require DCFS and its caseworkers such as Kari Cunningham to give the highest regard to the 
family association and parental rights of the citizens of the State of Utah: 
(1) (a) Courts have recognized a general presumption that it is in the best interest 
and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and supervision of his natural 
parents. A child's need for a normal family life in a permanent home, and for 
positive, nurturing family relationships will usually best be met by his natural 
parents. Additionally, the integrity of the family unit, and the right of parents to 
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conceive and raise their children have found protection in the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The right of a 
fit, competent parent to raise his child has long been protected by the laws and 
Constitution of this state and of the United States. 
(b) // is the public policy of this state that parents retain the fundamental right 
and duty to exercise primary control over the care, supervision, upbringing, and 
education of their children who are in their custody. 
(3) When the division intervenes on behalf of an abused, neglected, or dependent 
child, it shall take into account the child's need for protection from immediate 
harm. Throughout its involvement, the division shall utilize the least intrusive 
means available to protect a child, in an effort to ensure that children are brought 
up in stable, permanent families, rather than in temporary foster placements under 
the supervision of the state. 
U.C.A. § 62A-4a-201(l)(2003)(emphasis added). 
DCFS caseworkers consequently operate under an unambiguous duty to respect and act 
in accordance with the parental rights of every Utah citizen. Of course, DCFS' primary purpose 
is to protect children from abuse and neglect, § 62A-4a-201(2), but it can only do so by using 
"the least intrusive means available," and in undertaking those least intrusive means, it must 
protect Utah parents' "fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, 
supervision, upbringing, and education of their children." Id. 
The statutes at issue establish a protected liberty interest under Article 1, Sections 1 and 7 
of the Utah Constitution. It is well recognized in the federal arena that state statutes using 
"explicitly mandatory language in connection with the establishment of 'specified substantive 
predicates to limit discretion" create protected liberty interests. Kentucky Dep 7 of Corrections v. 
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 466, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989)(internal quotations 
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omitted). Utah's preremoval investigation statutes and administrative rules contain explicitly 
mandatory language that required Cunningham to take certain steps as part of a thorough and 
accurate investigation prior to taking any action that infringed upon a citizen's parental rights. 
Those statutes and rules also contain specific substantive predicates that limit the social worker's 
discretion in fulfilling the required investigation. Accordingly, those statutes create a 
constitutionally protected interest in parents reported to have neglected their child. 
The DCFS preremoval investigation statutes and rules create a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest because they impose mandatory, non-discretionary requirements that DCFS 
caseworkers thoroughly and accurately investigate allegations of neglect and abuse before taking 
action that impacts parental rights. The preremoval statute and rules explicitly enumerate the 
required acts that must compose an investigation. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(2) (2003); § 62A-4a-
202.3(2)(a)-(g) (2003). Acting with the parents' fundamental rights in mind, DCFS is required 
under statute to conduct a "thorough pre-removal investigation" whenever it receives a report of 
child abuse or neglect. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(l)(a). DCFS administrative rules echo the 
requirement that a "child protective services caseworker" must complete an "accurate and timely 
investigation" following the receipt of a report of abuse or neglect. UTAH ADMIN. R. 512-201-1 
& 201-4 (2003). 
The statutes and rules leave the DCFS caseworkers with no discretion in what steps to 
take in completing an investigation, because the statues and rules specifically delineate the acts 
that compose the investigation. The statute mandates that DCFS' "investigation shall include" 
"a search for and review of any records of past reports of abuse or neglect involving the same 
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child, any sibling or other child residing in that household, and the alleged perpetrator;" a 
personal interview with the child, where he or she is older than five years; an interview with the 
child's parents; an interview of the person who reported the abuse; "interviews with other third 
parties who have had direct contact with the child[;]" an "unscheduled visit to the child's 
home[;]" and an independent medical examination, where allegations of medical neglect are at 
issue. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(2) (2003); § 62A-4a-202.3(2)(a)-(g) (2003). 
The statute goes on to specify exactly how caseworkers should conduct the required 
interviews, by specifically delineating when the interview can be conducted without notifying a 
parent, the length of an interview when it is completed without notification, those specific 
individuals who must be notified prior to conducting an interview, and when a child may have a 
support person during the interview. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(9) (2003). 
Additionally, by Rule, the caseworker is required to conduct an "assess[ment] [of] the 
immediate protection safety needs of a child and the family's capacity to protect the child[,]" 
including a "domestic violence assessment^]" an "[assessment of immediate risk, safety, and 
protection needs of a child to include an assessment of risk, that an absent parent or cohabitant 
may pose to the child[;]" an "assessment of risk, protection, and safety needs for any siblings or 
other children residing in the home as sibling or child at risk[;]" an "[assessment of the family's 
strengths, needs, challenges, limitations, struggles, ability, and willingness to protect the child[;]" 
a "[d]etermination of eligibility for enrollment or membership in a Native American tribe[;]" and 
finally, to ensure that "[m]edical or mental health evaluations [are] completed as required by 
statute within required time frames[.]" UTAH ADMIN. R. 512-201-4 (2003). 
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Viewing all statutes governing DCFS together, DCFS' compliance with the provisions of 
the preremoval statute not only serves to protect the state's parens patriae interest in the safety 
of children, but also serves to ensure that the government undertakes the least restrictive means 
to protect a child, and that the government does not unconstitutionally and unnecessarily intrude 
upon parents' constitutionally protected rights. DCFS can only make the determination that the 
state's interests outweigh a parents' interest by first conducting the mandatory, non-discretionary 
investigation required by U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409 (2003). 
DCFS' mandatory, nondiscretionary requirements create a protected liberty interest in 
Utah parents to an accurate, timely, and thorough investigation before the state encroaches upon 
their due process rights guaranteed under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The 
undisputed facts show that Cunningham failed to honor her obligations under the aforementioned 
statutes and rules. This conduct amounts to flagrant violations of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, by depriving Plaintiffs of their procedural protections guaranteed under those 
sections. By failing to afford Plaintiffs the pre-removal investigation to which they were 
entitled, Cunningham deprived the Jensens of their entitlement to "fairness" in DCFS' and the 
juvenile court's involvement in their son's medical care. Defendants make much over the fact 
that the Jensens purportedly had their day in court before a neutral, objective, and independent 
decision maker. What Defendants fail to recognize is that, where that neutral decision maker 
does not have the full breadth of evidence before him, which evidence should have been 
marshaled by the involved government actors but was not, in plain dereliction of duty, the 
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proceeding can never be "fair." As a result, such conduct presumptively violates Article I, 
Section 7. 
2. Cunningham violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections J 
and 7 by making material misrepresentations to the juvenile court. 
Plaintiffs have presented the following evidence of Cunningham's misrepresentations to 
the juvenile court: 
Cunningham's verified petition omitted several material facts, including that she had not 
done the statutorily required investigation; that tests necessary to confirm the diagnosis had 
never been run; that, if Parker did have Ewing's sarcoma, it was an atypical form and 
manifestation, which was one reason that the Jensens were questioning the use of a standard 
treatment on a non-standard condition; and that Dr. Corwin was a psychiatrist, and not qualified 
to provide an "independent assessment" of Parker's medical condition, or render a second 
opinion, or opine whether the Jensens were medically neglectful. {See Pl.St.Facts, ffl[ 165-167.) 
Cunningham admitted that her August 18, 2003 affidavit presents only the State's side of 
the story. Cunningham also admits that certain information in the affidavit is false or 
misleading. For example, she admits that she knew at this time that tests had not been conducted 
at Dana Farber, as implied by the affidavit, and that the CT and bone scans were normal, 
contrary to the affidavit's implication, and that the Jensens were no longer interested in IPT, 
contrary to the affidavit's assertion. Cunningham also knew at that time that the controlling 
genetic tests were in the works at L.A. Children's, did not know whether the test results were 
back, and did not ask anyone. She did not have any conversations with Dr. Coffin, as she 
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claimed in paragraph 7 of the affidavit. She referred to Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer as a "man," which 
she acknowledges is materially different from a doctor. (While Cunningham says that she 
"doesn't know" why she referred to Dr. Birkmayer as a man rather than a doctor, one obvious 
inference is that she wanted to create the false impression that the Jensens were consulting a 
layperson regarding their son's medical treatment, as opposed to a licensed physician.) 
Cunningham also falsely stated in her August 8 affidavit that Dr. Tishler had opined on July 28, 
2003, that "Parker should commence chemotherapy," when she knew that Tishler had repeatedly 
stated that he would not be making final treatment recommendations until all of his independent 
testing was in, including genetic testing. (See Pl.St.Facts, ff 317-319.) 
On August 18, 2003, DCFS worker Kari Cunningham submitted to the juvenile court 
another Affidavit in Support of Warrant to Take Child into Protective Custody. (Exh. 43, August 
18 affidavit.) The affidavit restated the same (mis)representations from Cunningham's August 8 
Affidavit. (See Pl.St.Facts, ^ 359.) 
Cunningham's repeated material omissions and misrepresentations to the juvenile court 
amounts to flagrant violations of Plaintiffs' substantive rights under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
3. Cunningham did not reasonably rely on DCFS medical neglect 
policy. 
Cunningham argues she reasonably relied on DCFS' emergency medical neglect policy, 
and that therefore, she cannot be held accountable for any violations of the Utah Constitution. 
What Cunningham neglects to mention is that she never followed the emergency medical neglect 
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policy. Even under the emergency medical neglect guidelines, Cunningham was still required to 
"meet with the parents, attempt to negotiate voluntary compliance with medical treatment 
pending or in lieu of court involvement, and assess and document the parents' reasons for refusal 
to treat." (p. 44 § A.3.) The undisputed evidence demonstrates that she never even attempted to 
fulfill such tasks before filing the medical neglect petition. Accordingly, she cannot now claim 
reliance on that policy to relieve her from liability for flagrant violations of the Utah 
Constitution. 
iv. Anderson 
1. Cunningham's liability has no bearing on Anderson 's liability. 
Defendant Anderson asserts that he cannot be held liable for any constitutional violation 
or tortious conduct because, he says, defendant Cunningham is not liable. But Anderson's 
liability is not contingent upon the acts of Cunningham, because Plaintiffs claim that Anderson 
independently violated their rights Article I §§ 1,7, and 14, of the state Constitution, and that he 
acted tortiously, by personally engaging in a number of unlawful acts: 
1. Anderson created, encouraged, or perpetuated a policy by which DCFS case 
workers did not investigate allegations of medical neglect if the reporting doctor was assigned to 
Primary Children's Medical Center (PCMC), but instead automatically assumed such reports to 
be true; 
2. Anderson imposed an unconstitutional standard on the Jensens that, if parents had 
a licensed medical doctor who disagreed with a doctor assigned to PCMC, the parents were not 
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permitted to make the call between the two physicians, they were required to follow the PCMC 
doctor's recommendations; 
3. failing to train DCFS caseworkers to follow the law and DCFS policy regarding 
medical neglect allegations, and exhibiting deliberate indifference with respect to the training 
and supervision of defendant Kari Cunningham; 
4. personally refusing to order DCFS to withdraw the medical neglect allegations 
and juvenile court petition despite acknowledging that the Jensens were not neglectful parents; 
5. failing to disclosure to the Jensens or the juvenile court his knowledge that a 
stipulation in which the Jensens had been promised an independent evaluation by Dr. Martin 
Johnston was not being honored. 
These are independent acts of Anderson himself, which have nothing to do with 
Cunningham's conduct or responsibility for constitutional violations. As a result, her liability 
has no bearing on Anderson's liability. 
2. Anderson violated Plaintiffs' substantive rights under Article I, 
Sections 1 and 7 by imposing the blatantly unconstitutional 
requirement that the state's preferred doctor would trump 
Plaintiffs' choice of doctor. 
Anderson had the authority to (and eventually did) terminate the medical neglect 
proceedings against the Jensens. For the first two months of his involvement, however, he 
refused to do so because it was his position that, if a licensed physician consulted by parents and 
a licensed physician consulted by the State disagreed, the parents did not get to make the call. 
Instead, Anderson took the position that the State could force the parents to go to court and let 
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the court decide which physician was "better." (Pl.St.Facts, ^[ 390-391.) Accordingly, 
Anderson refused to withdraw DCFS's petition regardless of whether the Jensens placed Parker 
under the care of a licensed physician. Id. That refusal was plainly unconstitutional. 
"Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the wcare, custody, and management' of 
their children." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, (1982); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923). That includes the right to direct the medical care of one's minor child. Dubbs 
v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003). It has long been settled in this country 
that the government cannot interfere with a parent's choice between licensed medical 
practitioners merely because the state prefers one over the other (or, as in this case, has instituted 
a policy to always enforce a particular provider's recommendations). Similarly, the state cannot 
interfere with a parent's choice simply because there is a conflict in medical opinion in a 
particular case. This principle was well articulated in In the Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 
1009(1979). 
In Hofbauer, 7-year-old Joseph Hofbauer was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease, and his 
attending physician, Dr. Cohn, recommended radiation treatment and possibly chemotherapy. 
"[A]fter making numerous inquiries," the boy's parents rejected Dr. Cohn's advice and elected to 
have their son treated with laetrile at a clinic in Jamaica. 
Neglect charges were filed against the Hofbauers for rejecting the first physician's 
recommendation. There was a "sharp difference in medical opinion as to the effectiveness of the 
treatment being administered to Joseph[:]" two physicians opined that radiation treatment was 
necessary; others opined that it was not, that nutritional therapy and other less-invasive measures 
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would be appropriate. Id. at 653. The family court found that "Joseph's mother and father are 
concerned and loving parents who have employed conscientious efforts to secure for their child a 
viable alternative of medical treatment administered by a duly licensed physician," and therefore 
concluded that the child was not neglected. Id. at 654. 
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. While recognizing that the fundamental right 
of parents to rear their child is not absolute, the court observed that "great deference must be 
accorded a parent's choice as to the mode of medical treatment to be undertaken and the 
physician selected to administer the same." Id. at 655. "In this regard, it is important to stress 
that a parent, in making the sensitive decision as to how the child should be treated, may rely 
upon the recommendations and competency of the attending physician if he or she is duly 
licensed to practice medicine in this State, for '[i]f a physician is licensed by the State, he is 
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment.'" Id., quoting Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 199 (1973). 
Analysis of a parent's rights to direct medical care cannot be posed in terms of 
whether the parent has made a 'right' or a 'wrong' decision, for the present state 
of the practice of medicine, despite its vast advances, very seldom permits such 
definitive conclusions. . . . Rather, in our view, the court's inquiry should be 
whether the parents, once having sought accredited medical assistance and 
having been made aware of the seriousness of their child's affliction and the 
possibility of cure if a certain mode of treatment is undertaken, have provided for 
their child a treatment which is recommended by their physician and which has 
not been totally rejected by all responsible medical authority. 
Id. at 656 (noting that "this is not a case where the parents, for religious reasons, refused 
necessary medical procedures for their child . . . [T]his is not a case where the child is receiving 
no medical treatment, for the record discloses that Joseph's mother and father were concerned 
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and loving parents who sought qualified medical assistance for their child"); see also State v. 
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (NJ. 1962) (parents rejecting for religious reasons unanimous medical 
opinion as to need for blood transfusions; u[h]ad there been a relevant and substantial difference 
of medical opinion about the efficacy of the proposed treatment or if there were substantial 
evidence that the treatment itself posed a significant danger to the infant's life, a strong argument 
could be made in favor of appellants' position"); In re CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. App. 
1973) (clinic's report of neglect for mother's withdrawal of child as patient was baseless; 
"Whether the mother's reasons for that dissatisfaction [with the clinic] were correct or incorrect 
is not the point. The mother had a right to choose between different doctors or institutions for 
the purpose of this type of care. So long as the mother was willing and intended to provide 
appropriate care in some manner, no finding can stand that she was guilty of neglecting the 
child"); In re Tony Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561, *3 (Pa. Q. 1912) (court could not substitute its 
medical judgment for that of parents absent showing of unfitness; even if defective judgment 
were a basis for superseding parents' decision, neglect was not shown where "the science of 
medicine and surgery, notwithstanding its enormous advances, has not yet been able to insure an 
absolutely correct diagnosis in all cases, and still less an absolutely correct prognosis"). Cf. 
Custody of a Minor, 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1064 (Mass. 1978) ("no dispute" as to diagnosis and 
need for chemotherapy; emphasizing that parent's refusal "was not based on the parents' view 
that another medically effective form of treatment could be found," but merely upon 'hope' of 
child's recovery). 
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Anderson cites no authority for the proposition that he could force parents to choose the 
"best" doctor, or the State's preferred doctor, and all authority is to the contrary. Regardless of 
his alleged pure motives, Anderson imposed a blatantly unconstitutional standard on the Jensen 
family. As a result, the medical neglect proceedings were extended another two months. The 
Jensens could not go home for another two months. They could not take Parker to Dr. Peterson 
for the long-overdue margin for another two months. They could not go back to work for 
another two months. 
3. Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections J and 
7 by admitting that the Jensens were not neglectful parents, yet 
refusing to order withdrawal of the medical neglect petition. 
Anderson is also incorrect in asserting that he did not possess authority to unilaterally 
terminate the juvenile court neglect proceedings. The record demonstrates that he could and did 
do that very thing. Pis' St. Add'l Facts, SOF ^ 389. 
4. Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections 1 and 
7 by making material misrepresentations and omissions to the 
juvenile court. 
Plaintiffs have further adduced evidence that Anderson omitted and misrepresented 
crucial information from the juvenile court. Foremost, Anderson knew of availability of genetic 
testing and failed to advise the juvenile court of that fact, or the fact that it had not bee 
performed. Furthermore, Anderson know that Dr. Johnson breached a prior stipulation by not 
performing independent testing, but he failed to inform the juvenile court of such fact. The 
record reflects: 
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1) As of September 4, 2003, Anderson knew that definitive diagnostic 
testing had never been run on Parker Jensen's tissue, and that the juvenile court was unaware of 
that fact. Yet he did not disclose that information to the court at hearings on September 3 or 
September 5, 2003. (Pl.St.Facts, ^ 397.) 
2) As of September 23, 2003, Anderson was informed by Dr. Martin 
Johnston that (a) Johnston intended to recommend chemotherapy even though the results of his 
independent testing was not in yet, and (b) he (Johnston) was going to wait a couple of days to 
tell the Jensens his conclusions. (Pl.St.Facts, ^416.) Anderson knew that, under a stipulation 
between DCFS and Jensen, Johnston was not to decide on the diagnosis or treatment unless and 
until he had completed independent testing. (Id., f^ 417.) In spite of his knowledge that the State 
had materially breached the stipulation, Anderson did not inform the juvenile court. 
Anderson asserts that there is no evidence he had any way of knowing that Johnston's 
diagnosis of Parker before the completion of genetic testing was a violation of the stipulation. 
But Anderson admits that he understood that the entire purpose of Johnston's evaluation was to 
obtain an independent, neutral evaluation of Parker's condition, and that Johnston was not going 
to arrive at any treating recommendations until the results of independent testing were recieved. 
(Pl.St.Facts, % 401). Contrary to the stipulation, however, Johnston told Anderson he had a 
strong inclination to follow the treatment recommendations made by the other doctors. This was 
a clear violation of the September 5 stipulation. Anderson's failure to inform the Court of that 
fact, standing alone, violated the Jensens' rights to family association and to direct their son's 
medical care guaranteed under Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
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5. Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections I and 
7 by failing to train DCFS caseworkers like Kari Cunningham. 
With respect to training, Anderson had a statutorily imposed duty to ensure that DCFS 
employees were fully trained to comply with the law. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-105.5(1) (2003) ("The 
director shall ensure that all employees are fully trained to comply with state and federal law, 
administrative rules, and division policy in order to effectively carry out their assigned duties and 
functions;'); see also U.C.A. § 62A-4a-107(1) (2003) (Child Welfare Training director is 
appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the director of DCFS). An issue of fact exists as to 
Anderson's authority with regard to training his subordinates, and whether he fulfilled his 
statutory duties to do so. 
6. Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections 1 and 
7 by instituting, affirming, or allowing a DCFS policy of not 
investigating medical neglect allegations from doctors at PCMC 
Anderson is liable for DCFS' policy of not investigating allegations of medical neglect 
from PCMC doctors. Anderson asserts that he had no authority to change, modify, or adopt 
DCFS policy. Therefore, he says, he cannot be held responsible for implementing an 
unconstitutional policy. Anderson gives himself too little credit. He admitted in his deposition 
that he had the ability to "influence" how DCFS practices were carried out. (Anderson depo., p. 
30.) In the Jensen case, where there was no written policy addressing the circumstance of 
medical neglect allegations made by specific institutions such as PCMC, the carrying out of the 
policy is the policy. 
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Furthermore, Anderson interpreted Division policy as permitting DCFS case workers to 
forego an investigation of medical neglect allegations if the reporting doctor was assigned to 
PCMC. (Cunningham depo., pp. 212-213 (Anderson told Cunningham that she had acted 
appropriately in her handling of the case; Cunningham's understanding was that her actions were 
consistent with DCFS policy).) Such a policy violates both Sections 1 and 7 by impermissibly 
interfering with the parent-child relationship and the right of family association. 
B. Article I Section 14 
The defendants' actions described above involving material misrepresentations and 
omissions caused the imposition of both custodial and noncustodial seizures of Plaintiffs. 
Custodial seizure is, as the term suggests, a physical arrest. A continuing seizure is one that 
results from state-imposed conditions that seriously, but not physically, restrict liberty. 
The continuing seizure concept was originally articulated by Justice Ginsburg in her 
concurring opinion in the case of Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994). Justice 
Ginsburg recognized that a citizen who is released from physical custody may be subject to state 
imposed conditions that restrict liberty, including conditions of bail, mandatory court 
appearances, restrictions on freedom to travel, diminishment of employment prospects, 
reputational harm, and "the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense." Id. at 278. In 
such a case, the person remains "seized" for trial, "so long as he is bound to appear in court and 
answer the state's charges." Id. at 279. Justices Souter's and Stevens' concurring opinions in 
Albright expressed agreement with Justice Ginsburg's view that "the initial seizure of petitioner 
continued until his discharge." Id. at 307. 
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Holding in accordance with Justice Ginsberg's opinion in Albright, the Second Circuit 
has concluded that non-custodial seizures that impose serious restraints on liberty are seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment. In Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 945 (2nd Cir. 1997), for 
example, the Second Circuit concluded that a post-arraignment order prohibiting an arrestee 
from leaving the State of New York and requiring that he attend court appointments amounted to 
a "seizure" within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. 
Other circuit courts have concluded that, where the conditions of release are more severe 
than the typical case, a Fourth Amendment seizure takes place. See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 
860-61 (5th Cinl999)(overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th 
Cir.2003))(holding that a plaintiff had alleged Fourth Amendment seizure where, in addition to 
being summoned to appear and answer to charges, plaintiff was forced to sign personal 
recognizance bond, and was required to report regularly to pretrial services and obtain 
permission before leaving the state); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3rd 
Cir. 1998) (finding seizure where plaintiff was required to post $10,000 bond, attend all court 
hearings, maintain weekly contact with pretrial services, and refrain from traveling outside New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania); DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601-603 (3rd Cir. 
2005)("...some onerous types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth 
Amendment seizure.") 
Several federal district courts have relied upon Murphy, as well as Justice Ginsburg's 
concurrence in Albright, to conclude that a plaintiff who suffers significant restrictions, even in 
the absence of travel restrictions, may nevertheless assert fourth amendment violations. See, 
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e.g., Kirk v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 2001 WL 258605 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Sassower v. 
City of White Plains, 992 F.Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Willner v. Town of North 
Hempstead, 977 F.Supp. 182, 189 (E.D.N.Y.1997); Martinez v. Gayson, 1998 WL 564385 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
The Utah Supreme Court would similarly construe the protections of Section 14, 
particularly given the Framers' experience with the polygamy prosecutions. Many members of 
the Church had been forced into hiding or to abandon their families during the 1880s, which was 
no less an infringement of their physical liberty than an arrest. (In 1887, less than a decade 
before the Utah Constitution was drafted, LDS President John Taylor had died while in hiding.) 
The Framers would have been very aware that a deprivation of freedom by the government can 
take forms beyond physical restraint. 
In this case, the Jensens suffered such "significant, ongoing deprivations] of liberty" as a 
result of the juvenile court proceedings that it is clear they were seized for Section 14 purposes. 
Justice Ginsberg recognized in Albright that numerous kinds of conditions imposed by 
government can effectuate a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, including 1) bail 
payments, 2) mandatory court appearances, 3) restrictions on freedom to travel, 4) diminishment 
of employment prospects, 5) reputational harm, and 6) the "financial and emotional strain of 
preparing a defense." Albright, supra, at 279. The government imposed all of these conditions 
on the Jensens during the course of the juvenile proceedings: 
The Jensens were unable to return to the state of Utah (their home) without the threat of 
arrest and removal of their child. They were unable to take their child for an evaluation in 
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Houston, and to other physicians of their choosing, because the State forbade it. They were 
subjected to mandatory court appearances. They were ordered to give up their passports. Daren 
Jensen lost his job, and was exposed to serious diminishment of other employment prospects, 
both because he was terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his time, 
finances, energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family's rights. 
The Jensens were held up to public ridicule and contempt, and subjected to close media 
scrutiny. They Jensens endured an enormous financial and emotional strain of defending their 
family from neglect proceedings that were based upon deceit. These facts rise to the level of a 
seizure under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
C. Existing Remedies 
Defendants assert that plaintiffs' state constitutional claims are precluded because the 
relief available to plaintiffs under federal law sufficiently redresses their injuries incurred as a 
result of defendants' violations of the Utah Constitution. Of course, according to defendants, 
there is no relief under federal law, which would seem to preclude that argument. 
Moreover, defendants' argument disregards the suggestion in Spackman that a plaintiff 
need only demonstrate that existing state law remedies, not federal remedies, are insufficient to 
redress his or her injuries. Spackman at f^ 24, n. 10 ("We do not reach the question of whether 
existing federal law remedies should preclude a state court from awarding damages for a state 
constitutional tort," and citing Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 707-08 (1998)(Callahan, C.J., 
concurring) for proposition that "the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff lacks a state 
remedy"); see also, Brokaw v. Salt Lake County, 2007 WL 2221065 (D.Utah 2007)(declining to 
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dismiss state constitutional claims based upon second Spackman element and rejecting 
defendants' argument that federal section 1983 claims sufficiently redressed plaintiffs injuries, 
and recognizing that ic[t]he issue of whether existing federal law remedies provide sufficient 
redress for a state constitutional claim is still an open question.") 
In answering this question, the Court should uphold the long-recognized principles of 
federalism by giving the Utah Constitution its full import and enforcement. See State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \ 33, 162 P.3d 1106 ("it is part of the inherent logic of federalism that 
state law be interpreted independently [from] ... federal questions....By looking first to state 
constitutional principles, we also act in accordance with the original purpose of the federal 
system.")(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
It is important to note that, in deciding to require a plaintiff to demonstrate an insufficient 
existing state remedy, the Spackman Court relied on United States Supreme Court cases 
declining to allow a federal constitutional claim against federal agents, where Congress, the 
federal legislative body, has enacted federal statutory schemes providing redress for the alleged 
federal injuries. Spackman, supra, at % 24, citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425, 108 
S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 
L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). 
If this Court concluded that the existence of a federal remedy precludes a claim for 
damages for a violation of an independent right guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, thereby 
determining that remedies available under the United States Constitution supplant remedies 
under the Utah Constitution, this Court will greatly weaken the efficacy of the Utah Constitution. 
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Such a ruling would place a chilling effect on future plaintiffs who have suffered injuries as a 
result of governmental violations of rights guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, and as such, will 
curtail the development of any meaningful jurisprudence for Utah's constitution. 
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have sufficient redress for their state constitutional 
violations through their common law claims. Anderson MSJ Memo at 13; Eisenman MSJ Memo 
at 13-14. No supporting analysis is provided, nor does any come to mind. Moreover, any 
remedy available under a common law tort is insufficient to remedy the flagrant violations of the 
supreme law of the State of Utah that occurred in this case. Foremost, allowing ordinary 
common law claims to trump state constitutional claims evinces a disregard for the import of our 
state Utah Constitution. As the Honorable Chief Justice Marshall observed in the Supreme 
Court's seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, a right without a remedy is not a right. 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
For longer than this country has been organized as a collective union, legal scholars have 
recognized the importance of providing a remedy for the violation of a constitutional right. In 
Federalist Paper No. 80, Alexander Hamilton wrote: 
... there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to 
constitutional provisions. ... No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions 
would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the government 
to restrain or correct the infractions of them. 
Without the availability of a remedy, a constitutional right is but a hollow shell protecting 
the citizenry in name only. In the absence of a means to punish the government for violating a 
provision of a state constitution and to provide Utah citizens with redress for Utah constitutional 
71 
injury, Utah's constitution will never deter egregious conduct or protect the rights of citizens. 
This Court should conclude that any available common law remedies are insufficient to redress 
the myriad of violations of the Utah Constitution effectuated by Defendants. 
D. Equitable Relief 
Defendants also suggest that unspecified "equitable relief might have fixed everything 
for the Jensens. The Defendants do not indicate what equitable procedure would have compelled 
them to stop making misrepresentations, or gotten Daren Jensen his job back, or unlocked the 
handcuffs on his wrists, or paid the Jensens' legal bills, or reimbursed their bond, or salvaged 
their reputation, or erased their emotional distress. No form of equitable relief could or can 
compensate the Jensens for their losses. It has been recognized that violation of constitutional 
rights cannot always be effectively remedied by injunctive relief. See Spackman, 2000 UT 87, f 
25. id., citing Bott ("if prisoners' rights under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief 
may not be adequate to remedy prisoners' injuries") and citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979) (damages were appropriate remedy for unconstitutional termination in light of fact that 
her former employer was no longer a Congressman). In Spackman, the Supreme Court cited the 
court's observation in Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 
503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.H. 1986) that "damages are an inappropriate remedy for a constitutional 
violation where the alleged injury 'can be undone' by the judiciary." The harm suffered by the 
Jensens cannot be "undone"; they can only be made whole after the fact, as the Framers would 
have intended. See Deseret Irrigation Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398 , 52 P. 628, 629 (1898) 
72 
("All wrongs are regarded as merely a privation of right, and the natural remedy is to put the 
injured party in the same position as he was before the wrong was committed"). 
VI EISENMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FOR HER 
ACTIONS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS A DISPUTE OF FACT IN 
THAT REGARD. 
Eisenman contends that she is entitled to absolute immunity for all of her actions in this 
case, because they stemmed from her job as Assistant Attorney General. In support of her 
arguments regarding absolute immunity, Eisenman cites to the decision of the federal court on 
Plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims. However, as explained above, this Court must engage in 
its own independent analysis and evaluation of the record and facts before it, and may not rely on 
the federal court's decision. 
When analyzing Eisenman's conduct under Utah law, it becomes apparent that she is not 
entitled to absolute judicial immunity for any of her conduct in this case. Utah recognizes 
judicial immunity for judicial officers and those individuals who perform "functions closely 
related to the judicial process." Sanders v. Leavitt, 37 P.3d 1052, 2001 UT 78, \ 19. "Whether a 
person or entity should be afforded judicial immunity depends upon the specific work or function 
performed." Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993). Although judicial 
immunity extends to acts closely related to the judicial process, judicial immunity does not 
extend to administrative or investigatory functions. Cline v. State, Div. of Child and Family 
Sendees, 142 P.3d 127, 2005 UT App 498, % 40. 
Although neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals has addressed 
the specific issue, this Court should conclude that a prosecutor is not entitled to judicial 
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immunity for actions involving wrongful misrepresentations and material omissions. In Buckley 
v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a prosecutor who engages in misrepresentations and omissions is not 
entitled to absolute immunity under federal law. The result would be the same under the Utah 
Constitution, particularly in light of the unique hardships visited upon early Utahns by 
misrepresentations and false testimony by government actors. See pp. 2-23, supra. 
As discussed at pp. 43-51, above, Eisenman's conduct was replete with material 
misrepresentations and omissions. Accordingly, she is not entitled to absolute immunity for 
flagrant violations of the Utah Constitution. Furthermore, a fact issue exists as to whether 
Eisenman's conduct was investigatory in nature, which would also preclude any entitlement to 
absolute immunity. There is evidence in the record that Eisenman conducted her own 
investigation in the Jensen case, which she deliberately skewed. For example, when Eisenman 
faxed certain records to Dr. Albritton prior to the July 10 hearing, she omitted all documents 
supportive of the Jensens' questions about the diagnosis, such as: the original PCMC pathology 
report, which suggested that cytogenetic testing might be informative; the original LabCorp 
report, which had a different diagnosis than PCMC; and Dr. Birkmayer's letters, which explained 
why he questioned whether Parker had Ewing's at all. (Pl.St.Facts, ffl[ 228-229.) Eisenman also 
represented in an e-mail to Dr. Birkmayer that the American Academy of Pediatrics had enacted 
a standard of care for the United States, which she knew was untrue. {Id,, ^ j 214-215.) 
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VII THE UNDISPUTED FACTS REGARDING DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT 
SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS A 
GENUINE DISPUTE OF FACT THAT THAT REGARD. 
A plaintiff proves intentional infliction of emotional distress by demonstrating that the 
defendant acted (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable 
person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality. Gulbraa v. Corporation of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ, 159 P.3d 392, 2007 UT App 126 (Utah App. 2007). Moreover, pursuant to the Utah 
Model Uniform Jury Instructions Reckless conduct is sufficient to satisfy the state of mind 
requirement of intentional infliction of emotional distress. It is sufficient that: 
the defendant either intended to cause emotional distress, or acted with reckless 
disregard of the probability of causing that distress. This means that the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant's conduct (1) was for the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress, or (2) that a reasonable person would have known that 
emotional distress would result. 
Utah Model Uniform Jury Instruction 22.4. 
If a jury believes plaintiffs' evidence, it will conclude that the defendants relied on 
misrepresentations and half-truths to force a 12-year-old boy to have unnecessary chemotherapy. 
Defendants' alleged actions would offend any generally accepted standard of decency and 
morality, and a fact issue exists in that regard. 
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VIII DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PLAINTIFFS' MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM, OR AT THE 
LEAST, THERE IS A DISPUTE OF FACT IN THAT REGARD. 
A. Utah does not recognize absolute immunity as a defense to malicious prosecution 
claims for social workers like Cunningham who make wrongful misrepresentations and 
omissions. 
Utah has established judicial immunity for judicial officers and those individuals who 
perform functions closely related to the judicial process. Sanders, supra, at \ 19. Although 
neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the specific issue, a 
child social worker is not entitled to judicial immunity for actions involving wrongful 
misrepresentations and material omissions. Additionally, judicial immunity does not extend to 
administrative or investigatory functions. Cline v. State, Div. of Child and Family Services, 142 
P.3d 127, 2005 UT App 498, ^ 40. As set forth in pages #-#, above, Cunningham's conduct was 
replete with material misrepresentations and omissions that flagrantly violated Article I, Sections 
1, 7, and 14, and was investigatory in nature. Cunningham is not entitled to absolute immunity 
for flagrant constitutional violations for investigative activities. 
B. Criminal Proceedings 
i. The criminal proceedings were not supported by probable cause. 
Eisenman and the other defendants argue that the criminal charges against Barbara and 
Daren Jensen were supported by probable cause, and therefore cannot form the basis of a 
malicious prosecution claim. That is a contested issue. For example, one component of the 
criminal charges was the false statement (by Eisenman, apparently) that the Jensens had "fled the 
state" after entry of an order. See Pis' St. Facts ffif 344-346. 
Defendants' argument is that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the criminal charges 
against were not supported by probable cause, because Barbara and Daren entered into pleas in 
abeyance and, defendants argue, in so doing admitted the existence of probable cause. See 
Eisenman Memo at 21, Anderson Memo at 17. 
Initially, plaintiffs note that both Barbara and Daren Jensen were arrested on the criminal 
charges. {See Pl.St.Facts, % 401.) In any event, however, Judge Cassell ruled that the plea 
bargains do not bar the Jensens' claims, so long as evidence is offered that: (1) the criminal 
charges were a result of misrepresentations or omissions; and/or (2) Barbara and Daren were 
coerced into signing it. PJ. ex rel Jensen v. Utah, 2006 WL 1702585 at * 11 (D.Utah 2006). 
Such evidence has been adduced. (Pl.St.Facts, 1ffl 328, 344-345, 347, 427.) 
Furthermore, the Jensens never admitted that the juvenile court's orders were based upon 
truthful allegations, they never admitted that any of the Defendants' conduct did not violate their 
constitutional rights, they never admitted that they were not justified in declining compliance 
with the juvenile court's custody order, and they never admitted that they did not have any 
otherwise cognizable defenses to the criminal charges. (See Pl.St.Facts, % 428) (plea bargain 
does not concede absence of defenses to elements of offense).) Accordingly, defendants may not 
now claim that Plaintiffs' pleas in abeyance preclude them from establishing that the criminal 
charges were not supported by probable cause. 
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ii. Eisenman and Cunningham were complaining witnesses in the criminal 
court proceedings. 
Cunningham contends that she was not a complaining witness in the criminal case against 
the Jensens, and that as a result she cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution. Cunningham 
testified that she did not say anything to the Deputy District Attorney before or during the 
meeting with Ms. Micklos. However, defendant Eisenman contends that Officer Peterson, who 
provided the probable cause statement for the criminal proceedings, obtained some of his 
information from Cunningham (Eisenman depo., pp. 230-231), and Cunningham's name does 
indeed appear on the statement. Therefore, unless defendant Eisenman concedes that 
Cunningham did not provide any of the information that led to the criminal charges, a factual 
basis exists on which a jury could find Cunningham at least contributed to the charges. There is 
also no dispute that Eisenman was a complaining witness, as identified on Officer Peterson's 
statement. Pis' St. Facts, ^ 349.i4 
iii. Barbara was arrested and otherwise seized in the criminal proceedings. 
Defendants also argue that Barbara Jensen was never arrested and therefore never seized, 
but that is factually incorrect. Barbara was booked into jail for the felony kidnapping charges on 
September 10, 2003. Pis' SOF ffij 400. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court would recognize 
that the substantial restrictions on her liberty rose to the level of a seizure. See pp. 66-69, supra. 
14
 Cunningham would also be liable for the criminal charges under a theory of inseparable 
liability, given that her actions combined with the other defendants' to produce a single result, 
and as a foreseeable consequence of her conduct in the juvenile court case. 
78 
iv. Plaintiffs are not judicially estopped from disputing certain facts related 
to the criminal proceedings. 
Defendants, by incorporation, assert that plaintiffs should be judicially estopped from 
making certain factual allegations in the course of their constitutional claims, because plaintiffs 
allegedly admitted the elements of the crime of custodial interference in the criminal court 
proceedings. Defendants' argument fails because, in Utah, judicial estoppel is only available 
against a party who has acted in "bad faith." See Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 2008 UT 2, f 
11, n. 1. ("...the purpose of judicial estoppel is not served 'where there is no evidence that the 
party against whom judicial estoppel is sought knowingly misrepresented any facts in the prior 
proceeding and where the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel had equal or better access to 
the relevant facts""){citing Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 
1995)). 
There is no evidence in the record that Daren or Barbara Jensen acted in bad faith or 
misrepresented any facts in the criminal proceedings. Rather, as demonstrated by plaintiffs' 
statement of facts, there is little doubt that the Jensen family was railroaded by defendants, and 
that defendants' affirmative misrepresentations and material omissions made to the juvenile 
court, the District Attorney's Office, and the criminal court, all caused independent violations of 
the Jensens rights guaranteed under the Utah Constitution. As a result, Defendants are precluded 
from asserting that any factual admissions made in the course of the criminal proceedings affect 
Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim. 
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v. Plaintiffs are relieved from showing that the criminal proceedings 
terminated in their favor because their pleas in abeyance were coerced. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim fails because the criminal proceedings did not 
terminate in their favor. Defendants argue that, under the common law, the general rule is that 
dismissal of charges pursuant to agreement by the defendant does not establish termination of 
those charges in the individual's favor. However, Defendants fail to recognize that, if a jury 
finds that Plaintiffs' pleas in abeyance to the criminal charges were procured by coercion, they 
are relieved from showing a favorable termination relative to those proceedings. Defendants' 
theory works this way: Eisenman and Cunningham, through material misrepresentations and 
omissions, were able to induce Salt County to file groundless felony kidnapping charges as well 
as misdemeanor custodial interference charges. Child kidnapping was a first-degree felony for 
which Utah law imposed mandatory imprisonment upon conviction "of not less than 6, 10, or 15 
years and which may be for life." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (2003). (The presumptive 
minimum sentence was the middle of the three, 10 years. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(7)(a).) 
"Custodial interference" was a Class A misdemeanor for which the court had discretion to order 
no imprisonment, or for no more than one year. Unlike felony kidnapping charges, the 
misdemeanor charge was eligible for a plea in abeyance, pursuant to which no conviction would 
be entered, and the plea would be withdrawn and the charge dismissed after 12 months. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-201(2), 77-2a-l, et seq. Because the Jensens ultimately agreed to 
plead in abeyance to the misdemeanor, Defendants say, they are precluded from claiming 
malicious prosecution as to either of the criminal charges. 
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All general rules have exceptions, and the Defendants' argument overlooks a big one: 
The rule upon which they rely does not apply if the individual's agreement was procured 
unfairly, such as through fraud, duress, or coercion. See PJ. ex rel Jensen v. Utah, 2006 WL 
1702585, *11 (D.Utah 2006); see also Robertson v. Bell, 57 Wash.2d 505, 358 P.2d 149 (Wash. 
1961)(Rule that favorable termination of a criminal proceeding may not be made a basis of 
action for malicious prosecution if termination is predicated upon a dismissal without regard to 
merits as result of compromise or settlement of parties is not applicable if settlement was not 
voluntarily and understandingly made but was made under coercion or duress, nor where 
dismissal is not shown to have been the result of a valid compromise or settlement.); Kostrzewa 
v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001); Blase v. Appicelli, 489 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Mich. 
1992) ("Although no published opinion in Michigan has addressed this issue, other jurisdictions 
have held that a settlement or compromise brought about by duress or coercion will not bar an 
action for malicious prosecution"); Garrick v. Kelly, 649 F.Supp. 607, 611 (E.D. Va. 1986) 
("weight of authority" is that invalid compromise does not bar malicious prosecution claim; "the 
defense of compromise is for the jury unless it is uncontested as a factual matter"); Gowin v. 
Heider, 386 P.2d 1, 13-14 (Or. 1963) (recognizing general rule, but noting that "[I]f... a 
settlement is not the free and voluntary act of the plaintiff in malicious prosecution, but is 
brought about by duress practiced upon him by the defendant, the rule just stated is without 
application"); Robertson v. Bell, 358 P.2d 149, 153 (Wash. 1961) ("The [general] rule is not 
applied in cases where the settlement was not voluntarily and understandingly made, but was 
made under coercion or duress, nor where the dismissal is not shown to have been the result of a 
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valid compromise or settlement"); George v. Leonard, 71 F.Supp. 665, 666 (E.D.S.C. 1947) 
(compromise not voluntarily or freely made, or made under duress or coercion, does not bar 
malicious prosecution claim); Piechowiak v. Bissell, 9 N.W.2d 685, 689 (Mich. 1943) (plea 
bargain is not conclusive evidence of probable cause on charge to which party pled guilty if 
"such plea was accomplished by fraudulent means"); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 240 N.W. 177, 181 
(Wis. 1932) (agreement entered into by woman to avoid being taken to jail on arrest warrant did 
not bar later malicious prosecution action; recognizing exception to general rule "where the 
procurement or compromise was induced by duress"); Lyons v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 84 
S.E. 744 (W. Va. 1915) allowing malicious prosecution claim by plaintiff who was wrongfully 
arrested at instigation of his landlord and who procured release by signing agreement not to sue; 
"Such wrongs ought not to occur in a free country, governed by law. . . . [Plaintiff] had a right, 
under the circumstances of this case, to prove that he signed it in order to obtain his liberty"); 
White v. InVl Text-Book Co., 136 N.W. 121, 123, 124 (Iowa 1912) ("exceptions [to general rule] 
are created to the effect that the settlement must have been voluntarily and understandingly 
made. . . . if the settlement is procured by fraud or duress, the dismissal of the proceedings by the 
prosecutor is such a termination of the case as will authorize an action for malicious 
prosecution"); Morton v. Young, 55 Me. 24, 27-28 (1867) (regarding allegation that resolution of 
underlying proceedings by agreement barred malicious prosecution claim, "[t]he same legal 
consequences do not follow acts done under duress of arrest and protest, as when done freely and 
voluntarily,—under the abuse, as under the legitimate use of legal process . . . The law does not 
make successful wrong a shield to protect its perpetrator from liability to afford redress to the 
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injured party"); Watkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. 506 (1810); 52 AM JUR 2D MALICIOUS PROSECUTION § 
38. 
To illustrate, New York's high court once offered this hypothetical: 
Take a case like this: A poor and helpless woman is arrested and the police 
justice informs her before he makes his final decision that he is inclined to hold 
her to bail, and she being friendless and unable to furnish bail, promises good 
behavior in the future if he will discharge her, and then he enters a discharge. 
What reason can there be for holding in such a case, if she can show that the 
criminal proceeding was instituted maliciously and without probable cause, that 
she may not maintain her action for malicious prosecution? . . . [P]roof that the 
discharge was made under such circumstances cannot upon principle furnish an 
absolute bar to the action. 
Bobbins v. Bobbins, 30 N.E. 977, 978 (N.Y. 1892). 
This exception is a corollary of the well-established common law rule that even a 
conviction does not preclude a malicious prosecution claim if the plaintiff can show it was 
obtained through fraud or duress. See Bestatement (Second) of Torts, § 667; see also Kennedy v. 
Burbidge, 54 Utah 497, 183 P. 325, 327 (1919) (conviction "procured by fraud, perjury, or other 
undue or unfair means employed by the defendant" in malicious prosecution case is "worthless 
as evidence of probable cause"); Olson v. Independent Order of Foresters, 7 Utah 2d 322, 324 
P.2d 1012 (1958) (order binding individual over does not establish probable cause for offense if 
it was "obtained by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means . . . or was procured through by false 
testimony offered by the prosecutor or given in his behalf). 
The common law exception also relates to the principle that, when two charges or civil 
claims are brought for which probable cause exists only as to one, a malicious prosecution claim 
is not barred on the unfounded charge. The courts' concern in that instance is that parties who 
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initiate wrongful proceedings should not be able to insulate themselves from liability by 
trumping up the charges, knowing that the other party will likely be coerced into pleading to the 
far less serious offense. Thus, the Second Circuit has rejected an argument that a conviction on a 
lesser charge bars a plaintiff from alleging malicious prosecution on a more serious charge: 
As disorderly conduct is a lesser charge than resisting arrest and assaulting an officer, . . . 
we should not allow a finding of probable cause on this charge to foreclose a malicious 
prosecution cause of action on charges requiring different, and more culpable, behavior. 
If the rule were the one followed by the district court, an officer with probable cause as to 
a lesser offense could tack on more serious, unfounded charges which would support a 
high bail or a lengthy detention, knowing that the probable cause on the lesser offense 
would insulate him from liability for malicious prosecution on the other offenses. 
Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
Quoting from earlier state and extra-jurisdictional decisions, the California Court of 
Appeal summarized the reasoning of these decisions: 
The authorities show . . . that, in order to maintain an action like this [malicious 
prosecution'], "it is not necessary that the whole proceeding be utterly 
groundless, for, if groundless charges are maliciously and without probable 
cause, coupled with others which are well founded, they are not on that account 
the less injurious, and, therefore, constitute a valid cause of action. 
Indeed, it would seem almost a mockery to hold that, by uniting groundless 
accusations with those for which probable cause might exist, the defendants could 
thereby escape liability, because of the injured party's inability to divide his 
damages between the two with delicate nicety. Such, we think, is not the law. 
[L]itigation that is groundless and motivated by malice . . . has no place in our 
judicial system, and we are therefore unwilling to bear its costs. After careful 
consideration, we see no reason to reach a different result when the litigation in 
question is the assertion of baseless and malicious grounds of liability in a single 
84 
lawsuit: in both instances the balance tips in favor of the policy of making whole 
the individuals harmed by such abuse of our courts. 
Mabie v. Hyatt, 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 590, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 675 (1998), review denied (emphasis 
added; citations omitted); see also Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 529 P.2d 608, 619 
(Calif. 1974) (We see no reason for permitting plaintiffs . . . to pursue shotgun tactics by 
proceeding on counts and theories which they know or should know to be groundless"). 
In accordance with the above principles, the Sixth Circuit recently followed the common 
law rule and noted that a plea bargain "procured by unfair means" would not bar a malicious 
prosecution suit: 
Thus, if the state threatened to prosecute Kostrzewa on a charge not supported by 
probable cause and promised to drop that charge if he pleaded guilty to another 
offense, the resulting plea bargain should not serve as a shield for an officer later 
charged with malicious prosecution. If Sergeant McWilliams charged plaintiff 
with obstructing a police officer simply because he demanded medical attention 
when at the police station, we cannot conclude that it is beyond doubt that there 
was probable cause to support this obstruction charge. Furthermore, if this 
charge, potentially devoid of probable cause, was used to procure Kostrzewa"s 
guilty plea for driving without a valid license, then plaintiffs malicious 
prosecution claim would survive the motion to dismiss despite the existence of a 
plea agreement. 
Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 643 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
The concerns expressed by the above federal and state courts are manifest here. By 
falsely telling Salt Lake County that the Jensens had kidnapped a child, defendants Eisenman 
and Cunningham ensured the filing of felony charges that carried mandatory imprisonment and 
high bail. They did so with the knowledge and/or for the reason that virtually anyone in the 
Jensens' position would be forced to plead to the relatively minor offense joined with it. 
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An issue of fact exists with regard to whether plaintiffs can show that their agreement to 
the plea in abeyance on the misdemeanor charge was involuntarily, and/or procured by fraud, 
coercion, duress, or other "unfair means." The extent of Defendants' misrepresentations 
(analogous to fraud) has been addressed above. With respect to duress, the court must look to 
the standards articulated in Sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 175-
176. See Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
Section 175 states that an agreement may be found to have resulted from duress "if a 
party's manifestation of assent is inducted by an improper threat by the other party that leaves 
the victim no reasonable alternative." Andreini, 860 P.2d at 921. "[W]hether duress existed and 
was sufficient to void consent is a mixed question of law and fact[.]" In re B.T.D., 2003 UT App 
99, 68 P.3d 1021 (applying Andreini in case challenging voluntariness of consent to adoption). 
Under Section 175, duress can be shown "[i]f a party's manifestation of assent is induced 
by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative . . . ." In 
analyzing the "threat" component, the Restatement notes that "[t]he threat may be expressed in 
words or it may be inferred from words or other conduct. Past events often import a threat. 
Thus, if one person strikes or imprisons another, the conduct may amount to duress because of 
the threat of further blows or continued imprisonment that is implied." Id., cmt. a. 
A threat is improper if "what is threatened is a crime or a tort . . . [or] a criminal 
prosecution." Id., § 176(1). A threat may also be improper "if the resulting exchange is not on 
fair terms, and (a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit 
the party making the threat, (b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of 
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assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or (c) 
what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends." Id., § 176(2). The threats 
with which the Jensens were confronted fall under all of these provisions. 
When considering whether a reasonable alternative exists, "[t]he standard is a practical 
one under which account must be taken of the exigencies in which the victim finds himself[.]" 
Id., cmt. b. Whether the victim has a reasonable alternative is a mixed question of law and fact, 
to be answered by the court only in "clear" cases. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court's application of these criteria in Andreini is instructive. In that 
case, the plaintiff argued that he had signed a physician's waiver of liability under duress, 
because the doctor knew he needed surgery on his hands but was unwilling to perform it without 
the release. The Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant, holding that 
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the defendant had made an improper threat 
or inducement, in the form of an alleged promise to correct the plaintiffs medical condition, and 
whether the "resulting exchange" - a failed surgical procedure for the plaintiff versus a release of 
all claims for the defendant - was "not on fair terms". Id. at 922. The court likewise found a 
question of fact regarding the allegation that the doctor knew the condition of the plaintiffs 
hands was worsening and that he needed surgery immediately, which a jury could find to have 
constituted "unfair dealing that significantly increased the effectiveness of [the defendant's] 
threat not to undertake the corrective surgery." Id. 
Having found a fact issue as to whether the defendant made an improper threat, the court 
next concluded that a fact issue also existed as to whether the plaintiff had reasonable 
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alternatives. "[T]he victim does not need to be in a life-threatening situation for a jury to find 
that there were no reasonable alternatives," the court noted. Id. at 923, citing an observation in 
the Restatement that "courts originally restricted duress to threats involving loss of life, mayhem 
or imprisonment." Under the modern approach, the reasonable-alternative standard "has been 
greatly relaxed and, in order to constitute duress, the threat need only be improper." Id. In 
Andreini, the plaintiffs alternative was not to have this doctor perform the surgery. The jury 
could find that to mean he had no reasonable alternatives, the court held. 
In this case, by October 2003, Daren Jensen had lost his job because of the Defendants' 
actions, and would be unable to look for one while charges were pending. The Jensens owed 
thousands of dollars in attorney fees that they already could not pay. They had been booked into 
jail on arrest warrants and forced to pay more than $5,000 in bonds to be released. They had no 
money and no health insurance for their family. Evidence had consistently been fabricated or 
manipulated against them by the government official Defendants. They had been excoriated in 
the media. They had been asked to turn in their LDS Temple recommendation cards because of 
the pending felony charges. They were facing the potential loss of their children if the State 
went after them as a result of the criminal charges that the State had procured in the first place. 
As most people would be compelled to do under such circumstances, the Jensens took the 
plea in abeyance on the misdemeanor charge.15 Under the particular circumstances of this case, 
15
 See Docket, Case No. 031905430, Third District Court, Oct. 2, 2003. (As the University 
Defendants have stated, court proceedings referenced in the Complaint may be considered within 
the bounds of a motion to dismiss.) Plaintiffs also note that, although the County filed the 
charges, as the complaining witnesses and parties, Defendants exercised control over the 
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a question of fact exists as to whether the Jensens' plea in abeyance was completely voluntary, 
and/or whether it was procured by unfair means, fraud, duress, coercion, or other wrongful act. 
Plaintiffs have adduced evidence to demonstrate coercion through unfair means: 
1. The felony charges were filed due to defendants' intentional and/or 
reckless misrepresentations to the District Attorney's office. (Pl.St.Facts, fflj 197, 201, 214-215, 
224-229, 234-236, 249, 283-285, 290-291, 314, 326.) That the felony charges were "trumped 
up" due to defendants' misrepresentations is further evidenced by the fact that, in attorney 
Nakamura's experience, it is rare for a plea bargain to drop a first-degree felony charges in 
exchange for a misdemeanor plea, essentially a three-step reduction. (Id., % 427.) 
2. The felony charges carried mandatory jail time that exceeded the 
minimum sentence for first-degree murder. (Pl.St.Facts, f 348.) 
3. Going to trial on a first-degree felony case would have cost the Jensens 
thousands of dollars, even if they won, and the Jensens were out of money. (Pl.St.Facts, ffl[ 395, 
426.) 
Consequently, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' wrongful 
initiation of criminal process claim as it relates to the criminal proceedings. 
C. Juvenile court proceedings 
1. The juvenile court proceedings terminated in the Plaintiffs 'favor, or 
alternatively, "unusual circumstances "justify dispensing with such 
requirement. 
disposition of those charges. See, e.g., Tape of Hearing, Sept. 3, 2003 (DCFS/State arranging for 
county warrants to be suspended during appearance of Jensens in court). 
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In Utah, the wrongful use of civil proceedings "consists in instituting or maintaining civil 
proceedings for an improper purpose and without a justifiable basis." Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 
65,1) 19, 981 P.2d 841. "One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or 
procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful 
civil proceedings if (a) he [or she] acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other 
than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based, and 
(b)... the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought." Id. 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674). 
In seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim for wrongful initiation of the juvenile court 
proceedings, Anderson asserts out that he was not involved in initiating the juvenile proceedings 
originally, and therefore, that he cannot be held liable for wrongful initial of civil process. 
Although it is true that Anderson was not involved until after the juvenile court proceedings 
commenced, as noted above, a complaining witness is not only a witness who encourages or 
initiates the filing of a proceeding, but also includes a person who takes part in the continuation 
or perpetuation of a proceeding. Anderson continued and perpetuated the juvenile court 
proceedings by failing to order withdrawal of the medical neglect petition. 
Apparently recognizing that principle, Anderson argues that, even though he was 
Director of DCFS, he did not have the authority to unilaterally drop DCFS's neglect petition. 
That is directly contradicted by the evidence. Anderson did unilaterally drop the petition. He 
testified that he had the authority to sign off on the dismissal, and that he did so. (Pl.St.Facts, \ 
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389.) He cannot now deny the same authority that he (1) exercised in 2003, and (2) admitted in 
his deposition. At the very least, a question of fact exists as to his authority. 
Finally, Anderson's allegations to the contrary, the juvenile court proceedings terminated 
in favor of the Jensens. The medical neglect petition was dismissed and the state's and DCFS's 
involvement in the Jensen family ceased. Anderson argues that the dismissal of the juvenile 
court petition was not "on the merits," as is required for a wrongful initiation of civil process 
claim under Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774, Utah App.,2004, 2004 UT App 378, f 29. In Hatch, 
the Utah Court of Appeals considered whether a proceeding must always be terminated in favor 
of the plaintiff and "on the merits," or whether the Utah Supreme Court intended to allow a 
plaintiff to proceed with a claim in "the most unusual circumstances," as the Utah Supreme 
Court had previously indicated would be allowed in Baird v. Intermountain School Federal 
Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976). The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that 
the Supreme Court's statement that a wrongful initiation of civil process claim could survive a 
termination not on the merits in "unusual circumstances" was merely "dicta." Hatch at % 29. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has cited Baird for the "unusual circumstances" exception 
when analyzing the elements of a wrongful initiation of civil process claim, in order to note how 
Utah law varies from the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Gilbert, 1999 UT 65 at 
f 19. The Gilbert Court did not note any concerns about the viability of the unusual 
circumstance exception, and presumably the Supreme Court would have noted disagreement 
with the exception if it had any. 
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Even if the juvenile court proceedings had not terminated in plaintiffs' favor, Plaintiffs 
should still be allowed to proceed with their wrongful initiation of civil process claim under the 
"unusual circumstances" exception to the favorable termination element. The nuances of 
procedure and practice in the informal juvenile court must be considered in evaluating the 
importance of a favorable termination on the merits. Although the juvenile court's order of 
dismissal followed the state's decision to withdraw, the guardian ad litem had not so stipulated, 
and the dismissal did not occur until after an evidentiary hearing at which the GAL elicited 
evidence as to the Jensens' alleged neglect. The dismissal was, given the unique procedural 
structure of juvenile court, "on the merits" for purposes of the Jensens' claim. 
Additionally, the misrepresentations Defendants made in the course of the juvenile court 
proceeding also give rise to unusual circumstances that relieve the Jensens from proving a 
favorable termination. In other words, but for the misrepresentations and material omissions of 
Defendants, Plaintiffs would have been able to obtain a favorable termination on the merits. As 
a result, even if there was not a technical and formal termination on the merits in favor of the 
Jensens in the juvenile court proceedings, they should nonetheless be allowed to proceed with 
their wrongful initiation of civil process claim due to the unusual and unique circumstances 
presented by the juvenile court procedure. 
ii. The juvenile court proceedings were not supported by probable cause. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' wrongful initiation of civil process claim related to the 
juvenile court proceedings must be dismissed because the juvenile court proceedings was 
supported by probable cause and brought for a proper purpose. In this case, the purpose for 
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which the proceedings were brought is a hotly contested issue of fact. Moreover, any alleged 
probable cause is vitiated by the defendants' material omissions - a half truth can be equally or 
more misleading than an overt misrepresentation.16 
IX. CUNNINGHAM IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE GROUND THAT SHE ALLEGEDLY RELIED UPON ADVICE OF 
COUNSEL. 
In her motion, defendant Cunningham acknowledges that no Utah case has ever held that 
a social worker may claim reliance on advice of counsel to overcome claims that he or she 
violated rights guaranteed under the Utah Constitution. The only support cited for her argument 
is federal law, which is not binding upon this Court. 
Moreover, even if advice of counsel were available in constitutional claims, Cunningham 
would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Advice of counsel is an affirmative 
defense upon which the defendant bears the burden of proof. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 
811 P.2d 151, 159-160 (Utah 1991). The defense is only available if the defendant proves that 
she acted in good faith and made a full disclosure of all material facts to the attorney. Id. at 160. 
See Perkins v. Stephens, 28 Utah 2d 436, 437, 503 P.2d 1212, 1212 (1972); Potter v. Utah Driv-
Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960); Cottrell v. Grand Union 
Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 189, 299 P.2d 622, 623 (1956); Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah at 218, 241 
P. at 312. 
16
 As an example of this, see Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 
(10th. Cir. 1999). 
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Here, Cunningham did not provide all material information to her attorney. For example, 
attorney Eisenman assumed that Cunningham had performed the statutorily required 
investigation, Pis' SOF f^ 196, which Cunningham admits was not true. Cunningham did not 
disclose that tests necessary to confirm the diagnosis had never been run; that, if Parker did have 
Ewing's sarcoma, it was an atypical form and manifestation, which was one reason that the 
Jensens were questioning the use of a standard treatment on a non-standard condition; and that 
Dr. Corwin was a psychiatrist, and not qualified to provide an "independent assessment" of 
Parker's medical condition, or render a second opinion, or opine whether the Jensens were 
medically neglectful. (See Pl.St.Facts, ffl[ 165-167.) These failures - which explain some of the 
glaring misstatements in the affidavits prepared for her by counsel - preclude Cunningham's 
advice-of-counsel defense, or an issue of fact exists in that regard. 
XL WAGNER AND ALBRITTON ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
DEMONSTRATE THEY ACTED WITH FRAUD OR MALICE, OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL 
FACT. 
In 2003, a governmental actor was not entitled to governmental immunity where he or 
she acted with fraud or malice, or where he or she gave false testimony under oath. U.C. A. § 63-
30-4(b)(2003). As set forth above, there is ample evidence upon which this Court may conclude 
that Defendants Wagner and Albritton acted with fraud and malice, and that they gave false 
testimony to the juvenile court under oath. Because Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence 
of fraud or malice in addition to false testimony, or at the least have raised a dispute of fact in 
that regard, summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity must be denied. 
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XL PLAINTIFFS HAVE SET FORTH SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The evidence set forth in Plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Facts, and as elaborated 
upon above, is more than sufficient to demonstrate reckless or wanton misconduct. See pp. 40-
69, suprp. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2009. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
/s/ Karra J. Porter 
Roger P. Christensen 
Karra J. Porter 
Sarah E. Spencer 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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